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The Sale of control and 
the Ontario follow-up offer* 
Gilles LECLERC** 
Cet essai se veut une analyse exhaustive de l'une des dispositions les plus 
controversées de la loi sur les valeurs mobilières d'Ontario, soit l'offre 
équivalente (follow-up offer). L'article 91(1) du Securities Act, 1978 stipule que 
lorsque les valeurs d'une compagnie conférant à l'acheteur le contrôle effectif 
sur celle-ci sont acquises de moins de 15 détenteurs à un prix supérieur de 15% 
du prix du marché, l'acquéreur doit offrir aux actionnaires minoritaires 
d'acheter leurs valeurs pour une considération au moins équivalente à celle 
payée antérieurement. Cette disposition vise à réglementer la vente des valeurs 
conférant le contrôle où une prime excessive était payée à leur détenteur sans 
que les autres actionnaires puissent la partager. 
Après avoir rappelé l'évolution de la législation relative aux prises de 
contrôle, l'auteur situe les axes fondamentaux sous-tendant l'offre équivalente, 
soit l'égalité de traitement et la crédibilité du marché des valeurs. 
L'étude détaillée du fonctionnement de l'offre équivalente est ensuite 
abordée; l'auteur s'efforce de mettre en parallèle l'évolution de la situation du 
marché en Amérique du Nord ainsi que l'interprétation de l'offre équivalente, la 
première expliquant la seconde. Les principes d'égalité de traitement et 
d'équilibre entre les différentes parties lors de prises de contrôle sont mis en 
évidence pour justifier certaines décisions. 
L'auteur conclut en s'interrogeant sur la justesse des principes actuels qui 
guident l'actuelle législation. La judiciarisation excessive de tout ce domaine 
porte à croire qu'une révision des modes actuels d'intervention de la Commission 
ontarienne devrait être entreprise. 
* This is a completely revised and updated version of a paper originally completed in August 
of 1981 and submitted to the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto for a Master in 
Laws. The research is up-to-date to January 19, 1982 in respect of journals and to April 1, 
1982 in respect of statutes, caselaw and other relevant material. On June 21, 1982, the 
Quebec Government tabled Bill 85 titled Securities Act. This Bill, which was received by the 
author after this article had been sent to the printer, does not contain a section similar to 
s. 91(1), but limits the private agreement exemption, which will be an exempted takeover bid, 
if the securities are acquired at a cost not higher than 15% above the average market price. 
See s. 116(3). 
** L.L.B. (Laval), L.L.M. (Toronto); of Desjardins, Ducharme, Desjardins & Bourque, 
Montréal. 
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1. Introduction 
"Of course its unethical, 
its business." 
Ben WICKS, The Globe and Mail, 
April 8, 1982, B-l 
1. On June 23, 1978, Bill 7 was given assent by the Ontario Legislative 
Assembly and was proclaimed in force a year later, in September 1979 '. In 
this Act one finds the actual mechanism of the private agreement followed by 
what is known as the follow-up offer. Generally speaking, where a purchaser 
acquires a holding of more than 20% of voting securities through one or 
several private agreements at a consideration of 15% above the market price, 
the purchaser has to make an equivalent offer to the remaining security 
holders within 180 days of the agreement. The combined effect of s. 88(2)(c) 
and 91(1) is to prohibit a controlling shareholder from selling his control 
block at an excessive premium without the same opportunity being given to 
minority shareholders. 
Because a certain amount of premium is allowed, the actual mechanism 
may be seen as a compromise between the two opinions expressed in 1973 by 
the Select Committee on Company Law2, a compromise which has not 
always been included in the various drafts of the new securities act. In Bills 
154 and 75, tabled in 1972 and 1974 respectively, the private agreement 
exemption was retained. It was later dropped in Bills 98, 20 and 30, the latter 
two having been proposed in 1977 and finally reintroduced in Bill 7 in 1978, 
where the follow-up was then included. 
2. The policy considerations underlying the introduction of the follow-
up offer in Ontario may be classified into two categories. The first is framed 
on an attempt to promote confidence in the marketplace3. The Commission 
expressed concerns following an increase in the frequency of sales of control 
whereby controlling shareholders were allowed a premium with no general 
offer being made to all shareholders4. Together with a statement made by 
1. S.O. 1978 c. 47, now R.S.O. 1980 c. 466 [hereinafter referred to as 1978 Act or the Act]. 
2. See infra, #21 and ff. 
3. See e.g. In the Matter of Stuart Bruce McLaughlin, and S.B. McLaughlin Associates Ltd, 
(1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 98C,p. l l lC(June 5); (1981) 14 B.L.R. 46, p. 54; appeal to Divisional 
Court dismissed, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 385C (Nov. 6), and appeal to the Court of Appeal 
dismissed (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 408C [hereinafter referred to as McLaughlin]. 
4. In informal announcements, the OSC expressed the view that "as a matter of fairness or 
ethics, such a purchaser should make an offer of equivalent value to the minority 
shareholders". See V.P. ALBOINI, Ontario Securities Law. Toronto, Richard DeBoo, 1980, 
p. 684 [hereinafter referred to as Alboini]. 
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the Minister5 responsible for the Act, they are indicative of the importance 
attached to the credibility of the marketplace as well as to the protection of 
the public, being in this case the minority shareholders. The same type of 
argument was put forward in 1965 to explain the legislation dealing with 
takeover bids and insider trading6. At that time, it was concluded that the 
argument was inapplicable to this particular situation. Several years later, 
the beliefs that the public, the minority shareholders, was not in jeopardy 
where a sale of control by private agreement was concluded and that the 
common law was a sufficient remedy were abandonned and legislative 
protection enacted7. Indeed, the hope that the judicial process would 
develop remedies to deal with these situations has proven ineffective8. The 
frequency of such transactions was likely a major factor in the adoption of 
the follow-up offer. In fact, few sales of control by private agreement took 
place when the Kimber Committee released its Report. 
3. The follow-up offer indicates that the effectiveness and the credibility 
of the marketplace, where control of a corporation is sold by private 
agreement, can be achieved through an equality of treatment among 
shareholders9. Using the introductory language of the City Code 10, both the 
5. Two statements were made. The first one occurred late in February 1978, and justified the 
reinstatement of the private exemption and its restriction by the follow-up requirement by 
using some administrative reasons. See (1978) Legislature of Ontario Debates Official 
Report (Hansard) 165, p. 166; it was also reproduced in (1978) OSC Weekly Summary, 
March 3, Notice I, 2a, p. 3a. 
A second statement was made four months later, such statement being the most relevant. 
It reads as follows : 
"After careful consideration, we have concluded that it is prejudicial to the credibility of 
the public marketplace to permit the owner of a corporation who has taken in minority 
shareholders to dispose of his shares subsequently at a premium that is unavailable to the 
minority. The provisions in Bill 7 are designed to prevent this abuse but to retain 
maximum flexibility in order not to impose any unnecessary restraint on dealings in 
control blocks. Accordingly, no change is proposed at this time in these provisions of the 
Bill." 
See (1978) OSC Weekly Summary, August 11, p. 4. 
6. See infra, «11 to 19. 
7. See e.g. Chairman Report, (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 79A, p. 82A (Feb. 26). 
8. See In the Matter ofTorstar Corporation, and Harlequin Enterprises Ltd, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 
62C, p. 67C [hereinafter referred to as Torstar] ; McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 1 IOC ; p. 58. 
9. See Torstar, supra, note 8, p. 68C; McLoughlin, supra, note 3, pp. 109C and 114C; p. 57 
and 61-62; see infra, H65 and ff. 
10. The City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers [hereinafter referred to as City Code] was first 
issued in March 1968 by the City Working Party, and is considered a development of the 
Notes on Amalgamations of British Businesses issued in 1959. The Code provides a 
voluntary self-discipline system supervised by a Panel. For an excellent description of its 
functioning, see M.A. WEINBERG, M.V. BLANK, A.L. GRLYSTOKE, Weinberg and Blank on 
Take-Overs and Mergers. (4th ed.) London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1979, ch. 12 [hereinafter 
referred to as Weinberg and Blank]. 
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Select Committee and the OSC acknowledged that a follow-up offer was a 
"good, standard commercial behaviour based upon a concept of equity 
between one shareholder and another" ". Although there was no compulsory 
offer to the remaining shareholders before 1978, several cases were observed 
in Ontario where such an offer was made by the controlling shareholder 
following a sale of control n. Indeed, the Commission said in February 1979 
that it 
[...] has been accepted as good commercial practice to require the offeror to 
make a similar although not always identical offer to all shareholders where 
control was secured through private agreement." 
4. A similar concern for minority shareholders upon the conclusion of 
private agreements was expressed in the United States. A thesis submitted by 
one commentator also advocated an equality of treatment between majority 
and minority shareholders. In 1965, Professor Andrews put forward the 
following idea called the equal opportunity rule : 
[t]he rule to be considered can be stated thus : whenever a controlling 
stockholder sells his shares, every other holder of shares (of the same class) is 
entitled to have an equal opportunity to sell his shares, or a prorata part of 
them, on substantially the same terms. Or in terms of the correlative duty: 
before a controlling stockholder may sell his shares to an outsider he must 
assure his fellow stockholders an equal opportunity to sell their shares, or as 
high a proportion of theirs as he ultimately sells of his own.14 
5. The follow-up offer is also based upon another American theory 
proposed in the early thirties, whereby control is viewed as being a valuable 
asset in itself. This theory has been clearly stated by the Commission in its 
decision in BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l), where it said that 
[...] it is important that one goes to the underlying principles. Ontario 
mandates that premiums paid for "control" are to be shared among all security 
holders of the class of securities being acquired. Such principles include the 
concept of a vendor knowingly and willingly disposing of an asset that includes 
the means to control, that is the vendor has the intention of disposing not only 
of the securities owned but of the means of control associated with those 
securities at a premium above the "market price".15 
11. See Policy 3-41, infra, note 345, p. 173. 
12. See infra. #19 and note 70. 
13. See Draft Policy, infra, note 344, p. 8. 
14. W.A. ANDREWS, "The Stockholders' Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares", 
78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, p. 515 (1964-65), see infra, #27 and ff. 
15. In the Matter of British Columbia Forest Products Ltd. Noranda Mines Ltd, and Alberta 
Energy Company Ltd, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 116C, p. 118C (June 19) [on 99b; hereinafter 
referred to as BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l)]; see infra, #40 and ff. 
40 Les Cahiers de Droit (1982) 23 C. de D. 35 
6. This point of view, based upon the underlying premises and the 
historical evolution of the takeover bid legislation in Ontario, has recently 
been questionned by a group of securities practitioners in an Interim Report 
released late in November 1981 '6. For them, 
the receipt of a premium by the vendor is no longer the basis of a perceived 
abuse (as under the corporate asset and breach of fiduciary duty theories) but is 
instead the trigger for this new right conferred on minority shareholders." 
They have consequently suggested that in the future the follow-up offer 
requirement be triggered by an acquisition of effective control rather than by 
an infringment of the so-called minority shareholders' rights in the takeover 
contexts. They went on to say that the actual mechanism set up in s. 91(1) 
was inappropriate to achieve its objective (i.e. the distribution of the 
premium obtained from the sale of a controlling interest) and stressed the 
deterrent and excessive effect of such an obligation upon the Canadian 
capital marketl8. 
The authors of the Interim Report correctly pointed out that more rights 
were conferred to minority shareholders where takeover bids are imple-
mented. It must however be stressed that such a principle clearly underlies 
the actual legislation on takeover bids, and that s. 88(2)(c) and 91(1) are an 
integral part thereof. Taking into consideration the reasons behind the 
introduction of the takeover bid regulation in 1965 19, it is submitted that the 
follow-up offer may be viewed as a "logical" step forward ; whether this step 
was appropriate or whether it was necessary and useful are rather different 
questions20. 
It should however be noted that Ontario is the only Canadian juris-
diction where such pattern of legislation is operative. The federal government 
criticized it on two occasions, once through the report of the Royal 
Commission on Corporate Concentration21 and more recently in its Propo-
sals for a Canadian securities act22, in which the same pattern was not 
16. Interim Report of the Committee to Review the Provisions of the Act Regulating Take-Over 
Bids. (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 212A (Nov. 27) [hereinafter referred to as the Interim Report]. 
17. Id, p. 229A. 
18. Id, pp. 230-31A. 
19. See infra. H 9 and ff. 
20. See infra, note 90. 
21. Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration. Ottawa, Minister of Supply 
and Services, March 1978, pp. 138-39. 
22. Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada. Ottawa, Minister of Supply and 
Services, 1979, vol. 2, #7.19, pp. 123-24 [hereinafter referred to as Proposals, followed by 
the appropriate volume number (there are three of them)]. 
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included. The Province of Québec, when releasing its own proposals for a 
new legislation23, also decided against following the policy choice made by 
Ontario, similarily as Alberta did in its new Securities Act, 1981u. Only 
Manitoba, through a new Securities Act, has followed Ontario ; this legis-
lation has however not yet been proclaimed25. 
7. It is interesting to note that similar developments took place in 
Europe in the seventies. Generally speaking sales of control effected through 
private purchases with no general offer have raised public criticism some-
what similar to those made here. For instance, the Commission Bancaire 
belge released in its 1978-79 annual report a consolidation of its decisions 
and recommendations issued during the preceding ten years. They are based 
upon the following premises : the necessity to assure participants that the 
marketplace is efficient and fair to them ; the equality of every shareholder 
and the sharing by everyone of the premium paid in a sale of control. The 
Commission has suggested that the principle of equality of treatment would 
be best respected if a public offer at a similar consideration was made to all 
shareholders where control is sold privately. 
The European Commission issued in 1977 a Code of Conduct26 related 
to transactions in transferable securities. This Code, issued as a Commission 
recommendation, stresses that equality of treatment should be guaranteed to 
all holders of the same class of securities. This equality, together with an 
equal opportunity given to remaining shareholders, should be found where 
control is sold, either privately or by way of a public offer. These examples 
demonstrate that the sale of control problems are not limited to Ontario, but 
are rather common to countries where capital markets are an essential part 
of the economy. 
8. The aim of this essay is to review and analyse the follow-up offer as 
known and applied in Ontario. Chapter 2 will be devoted to a brief review 
of the evolution of the takeover bid rules, while Chapter 3 will analyse the 
manner in which s. 88(2)(c) and 91(1) are brough into play. A study of the 
discretionary powers conferred to the OSC with respect to the follow-up 
offer will be found in Chapter 4. 
23. Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec. Réforme de la loi sur les valeurs mobilières. 
Document de consultation, (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Quebec Working Paper] ; but see 
Bill 85, s. 116. 
24. S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1. 
25. The Securities Act, 1980, S.M. 1980, c. 50. 
26. Commission Recommendation, July 25, 1977, concerning a European Code of Conduct 
Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities, (1977) O.J.E.C. L 212-37. 77/534/EE5. 
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2. The origin of the follow-up offer 
2.1. The basic principles of takeover bid rules their evolution: from 1965 
to 1973 
2.1.1. Principles underlying the takeover bid 
9. The private agreement was originally an exemption from the 
application of the takeover bid rules to the offeror. In other words, the 
offeror did not make a takeover bid while concluding an agreement with less 
than fifteen security holders for the acquisition of their voting securities. 
10. Introduced in 1966, the section of The Securities Act, 196627 
dealing with takeover bids was one of the innovations recommended28 by 
the Kimber Report19. At the time it was tabled, there was no existing legal 
framework in the U.S. governing takeover bids30, though there were 
provisions in the U.K. While the Committee considered the English system, 
it emphasized that its recommendations would be guided by domestic factors 
first rather than by a foreign experience31. The Report then stressed that the 
primary objective of the takeover bid legislation should be to provide the 
offeree shareholder with sufficient protection of his bona fide interests. This 
could be achieved through an accurate disclosure of information, both 
27. S.O. 1966 c. 142, s. 80(g), Part IX, which became The Securities Act, RSO 1970 c. 426, 
s. 81(g) and s. 81(b) for the private agreement [hereinafter referred to as 1966 Act, but with 
the RSO 1970 numbers], 
28. See infra. # 14 and ff. 
29. Province of Ontario : Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation 
in Ontario, (1965) [hereinafter referred to as the Kimber Report]. 
30. Legislation in the U.S. with respect to takeover bid was introduced in 1968 through The 
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)-(e) and § 78 m(d)-(f); it constituted an amendment to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78jj. See E.R. ARANOW, H.A. EINHORN, 
Tender Offers for Corporate Control. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973, 
pp. 69-77 and the Supplement thereof published in 1977, pp. 1-10. There is no follow-up 
offer in the U.S. at the present time, and none is intended to be implemented. See ALI Fed. 
Sec. Code, (1980), § 202 (166)(A). 
It seems however that the scope of application of sales of control at a premium will be 
seriously narrowed. The tender offer requirements will apply where an acquisition of 
equity securities by a purchaser provides him with an ownership of more than 5% in the 
class of equity sought. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 606(A). With the disclosure required, 
[§605,06,07] and the individuality of each tender offer [§ 202(166)(B)], it is likely that 
transactions in which a large premium, unavailable to minority shareholders, was paid will 
be more difficult to conclude and indeed, should be less frequent. 
31. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.03. 
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procedurally and in substance32, designed to permit offeree shareholders to 
reach "[...] a reasoned decision as to the desirability of accepting a bid for 
their shares"33. The Report also attempted to ensure a certain from of 
equality of treatment among shareholders 3 \ especially in respect of the price 
offered and on the pro rata acceptance of shares tendered in a partial 
takeover bid. However, the Committee made it clear that its recommen-
dations 
[...] would not unduly impede potential bidders or put them in a commercially 
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis en entrenched and possible hostile board of 
directors of an offeree company.35 
11. Other concerns of the Kimber Committee were the lack of public 
confidence in the securities industry, and various public criticisms of many 
aspects of the securities regulation in Ontario. These points were discussed in 
relation to the efficiency of the secondary market36 and were also referred to 
where insider regulation was approached37, the Committee believing it was 
"[...] improper for an insider to use confidential information acquired by 
him by virtue of his position as an insider to make profits by trading in the 
securities of his company"38. The behavior of insiders in takeover situations 
was also considered by the Kimber Committee. Referring to the press 
criticisms39, it called such behavior "[pjerhaps the most controversial 
32. Id., #3.10; see also P. ANISMAN, Takeover Bid Legislation in Canada: A Comparative 
Analysis. Toronto, C.C.H. 1974, pp. 16-18 [hereinafter referred to as Anisman]; D.L. 
JOHNSTON, Canadian Securities Regulation. Toronto, Butterworth, 1977, p. 319 [here-
inafter referred to as Johnston}. Anisman has exposed specific criticisms over the sole 
disclosure requirements as being an insufficient means per se to adequately protect the 
offeree shareolder. He has also noted that the method of acquisition would require to be 
regulated. This item was indeed considered by the Kimber Committee when it discussed 
the behavior of insiders during takeover bids. See infra, # 16. 
33. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, # 3.10 ; see also In the Matter of the take-over bid by Federal 
Commerce & Navigation Ltd and in the Matter of the take-over bid by Olympia & York 
Investments Ltd, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 20C, p. 25C (April 24). 
34. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.17; see Johnston, supra, note 32, p. 319; Anisman, supra, 
note 32, p. 18. However, both made different comments on the same issue. Anisman has 
written a footnote speaking about the accepting shareholders while Johnston has 
discussed partial bids. 
35. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.10. See also Johnston, supra, note 32, pp. 319-20. 
36. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, «1.11 and #1.12. 
37. Id., # 2.02 and 2.32 ; see J.C. BAILLIE, "The Protection of the Investor in Ontario", ( 1965) 8 
Can. Pub. Admin. 172, pp. 254-58 for a review of the considerations underlying the Kimber 
recommendations in respect of insider tradings. 
38. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #2.02; see also H.P. CRAWFORD, "Insider Trading", (1965) 
8 Can. B.J. 400. 
39. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.08; see also J.P. WILLIAMSON, Supplement to Securities 
Regulation in Canada. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1966, pp. 383 and ff. 
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feature of take-over bid transactions". The same situation was observed in 
the chapter of the Kimber Report dealing with takeover bids. The Report 
made clear reference to the pressure exercised by the general public in the 
preceding years40 by stating that there had been 
[...] criticism by the general public, the financial community and the press 
concerning both the form and effect of numerous commercial transactions 
whereby a company or a bidding group has sought to acquire legal or effective 
control of another company by a procedure which has come to be known as a 
'take-over bid'.41 
12. In fact, the Report and its recommendations are based on the 
premise that the improvement of securities legislation in favour of investors 
will benefit the industry ; in return, the general public will take advantage of 
a more effective and more efficient securities industry42, each contributing to 
the other43. The concept of disclosure of information required from public 
companies, insiders and offerors in takeover bid situations, as well as the 
civil liability of insiders when dealing with their corporation's stock, were 
therefore introduced in the 1966 Act following recommendations of the 
Kimber Report. They were considered as being "major steps forward"44 in 
the area of investor information, viewed by the Committee as a factor of 
public confidence45 and protection, as well as the thrust toward even handed 
dealings46. 
40. See Johnston, supra, note 32, pp. 15 and 318, noted that one of the reasons for the creation 
of the Kimber Committee was the widespread allegations about the use of inside 
information in a takeover bid by Shell Oil Ltd for Canadian Oil Ltd. See also J.C. BAILLIE, 
supra, note 37, pp. 207-10 and pp. 258-63 for a review of the events which took place 
between 1963 and 1965. 
41. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.01. It has to be noted that similar reasons were at the 
origin of much of the actual legislation regulating takeover bids in the United States and in 
Europe. See e.g. for the U.S. E.R. ARANOW, H.A. EINHORN, supra, note 30. For Europe 
see e.g. R. WTTERWULGHE, L'offre publique d'acquisition au service dun marché des 
sociétés, Bruxelles, La Renaissance du livre, 1973; see also M.F. COHEN, "A Note on 
Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock", 22 Bus. La»- 149 (1966-67). 
This situation is far from being closed. In August 1980, the Campeau Corporation 
attempted to takeover Royal Trustco Corporation. The bid was finally unsuccessful, but 
raised one of the most serious and bitter battles ever seen in Canada. The price offered by 
Campeau was substantially above the market price of the shares. The press throughout the 
country made critical comments about the underlying motivations for the management's 
opposition to the bid versus the interests of the shareholders. See e.g. The Globe and Mail, 
editorial note "As giants do battle ( 1 ) and (2)", October 21 and 22, 1980 : "But how well 
were the ordinary shareholders of Trustco served, ... how protected are ordinary 
shareholders among such giants?". See also A. BOOTH, "OSC hearing a venture into 
unknown territory". The Financial Post, Jan. 24, 1981, p. 4. 
42. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #1.17. 
43. P. ANISMAN, P.W. HOGG, infra, note 166, p. 138. 
44. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 110C ; p. 58. 
45. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #1.17; see also #2.02, #2.04 and #3.10. 
46. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 110C ; p. 58. 
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13. The Merger Study*1, released in February 1970, did not add much 
to the background on which the takeover provisions rely, but underlined 
some of the drawbacks of such transactions48 for the minority shareholders. 
2.1.2. Principles underlying the private agreement 
14. Immediately following the paragraph where the Kimber Committee 
laid its views on how a takeover bid should be defined, it explained why 
transactions of blocks of shares, representing legal or effective control and 
acquired by way of private agreement49, were eliminated from the definition. 
Even though the Committee recognized that the general body of share-
holders would be refused the same opportunity to tender its shares and 
deprived of the premium offer received by the controlling shareholders when 
control was sold by private agreement, it stated 
[...] that the evolution of a legal doctrine which may impose upon directors or 
other insiders of a company who constitute a control group a fiduciary duty 
toward other shareholders of such company in cases of change of control is, 
apart from insider trading aspects, a matter to be left to development by the 
judicial process.50 
15. Several inferences may be drawn from this conclusion. Firstly, the 
Committee implicitly admitted that nothing in the actual state of law in 
Ontario was designed to deal with the sale of control by private agreement. 
The common law, using the concept of fiduciary duties, was at that time 
underdeveloped and inadequate in covering these transactions51. It is 
however unclear what the Committee's intentions were with regard to this 
recommendation. It was suggested52 that it had anticipated the evolution of 
the legal doctrine in Canada following that of the U.S., where directors and 
controlling shareholders have sometimes been held to be subject to fiduciary 
duties when selling a control block53. In respect of this argument, it was 
unclear whether the Canadian courts would adopt the U.S. position54, the 
47. Department of Financial and Commercial Affairs : Report of the Committee of the Ontario 
Securities Commission on the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by Business 
Combinations and Private Placements (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Merger Study]. 
48. Id, pp. 88-89. See infra, #19. 
49. See Anisman, supra, note 32, pp. 37 and ff. 
50. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.12. 
51. Seeinfra, #28, #29, #67 and #146; see also Felling et at. v. Peeling et al., (1982) 130D.L.R. 
(3d) 761, p. 762. 
52. Torstar, supra, note 8, p. 67C. 
53. Infra, #30 and 31. 
54. F. HCOBUCCI, "Canadian Corporation Law: Some Recent Developments", lecture 
delivered at Cambridge University, July 28, 1981, for the benefit of the Canadian Institute 
for Advanced Legal Studies, p. 21. 
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Committee itself expressing its doubts by the expression "legal doctrine 
which may impose upon [those] who constitute a control group a fiduciary 
duty toward other shareholders" 55. 
It was also suggested that the Kimber Committee was reluctant "[...] to 
move further than necessary in the absence of further facts"56. Indeed, 
transactions whereby control was sold at a premium were unusual in 
Canada, although somewhat frequent in the U.S.57 It is also undetermined 
whether the Committee preferred to rely on the inherent flexibility of the 
common law, whether this decision to exclude private agreements from the 
takeover definition was wise58, optimistic59, or simply whether the Commit-
tee avoided facing the problem. 
16. A second observation comes from the last part of the statement 
and is rooted in the exemption allowed for insider trading. The Committee 
agreed to regulate such aspects of the sale of control even though not 
regulating the whole system. What is interesting in this case is that Canadian 
common law was again clearly inadequate and weak in its efforts to protect 
shareholders, that is to regulate misuse of confidential information and 
profits arising thereby60. These weaknesses led the Kimber Committee to 
recommend a "two-fold remedy" which substantially altered the state of law 
as it stood in 1965: full and public disclosure of all transactions effected by 
insiders and, the disclosure being insufficient in itself, an "[...] effective 
procedure to recover any benefits derived by those who engage in improper 
insider trading"61. The proposed legislation in respect of insider tradings 
was linked to the public confidence aspect of the Report, as well as to the 
objective of protecting the public. In the case of insider trading, public 
confidence in the market was in jeopardy. The same issue was behind the 
takeover legislation, but in this context, "public" meant only the offeree 
shareholders. In both cases, the public had to be protected. In both cases, 
such protection was given by disclosure requirements, specific timing 
provisions, equality of treatment and new weapons to be used in the courts. 
These recommendations were designed to secure, improve and restore public 
confidence in the securities industry. For the reasons discussed above, this 
moral concern was nonexistent with respect to private agreements. Com-
bined with the Committee's unwillingness to set up a comprehensive 
55. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.12. 
56. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 110C; p. 58. 
57. See infra, #30 and ff. 
58. J.C. BAILLIE, supra, note 37, p. 259. 
59. D.D. PRi.Nnci;, "Takeover Bids: Part IX of the Ontario Securities Act 1966", 19 Am. J. 
Comp. Law, 325, p. 341 (1971). 
60. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #2.03. 
61. Id., #2.04. 
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regulation of the securities industry, or to produce a national securities code, 
it was not felt necessary to regulate such sales of control : therefore "private 
agreements" were excluded from the takeover definition. 
17. Another reason behind the existence of the private agreement 
exemption is that buyers and sellers did not need the kind of protection 
afforded by the Act62. In fact, the legislation focused on the principals in the 
transaction instead of the remaining shareholders. Given the large amounts 
of money as well as the number of shares involved, the Act assumed that the 
participants were sophisticated enough to know what they were doing and 
did not need the protection of the statute63. In addition, the equality of 
bargaining power64 between buyers and sellers and the access to relevant 
information also made the legislation unnecessary65. 
18. But in a different way, it was not the aim of the Act to attempt to 
regulate transactions where the public was not involved66, such as those 
involving private companies as well as many other exemptions. The private 
agreement exemption, seen in the context of an offer not made to the 
shareholders generally67, might well be included in this category of private 
transactions. It was then enacted in a logical manner, even though it was 
unable to adequately protect those shareholders not directly involved in such 
transactions. 
19. The Merger Study released in 1970 did not propose any major 
modification of the statements made by the Kimber Committee. The opinion 
of the Study as to the oppression of the minority68 is unclear and has been 
criticized by Anisman as drawing an artificial distinction between corporate 
and securities law69. 
The private agreement exemption was seen in the Merger Study as 
raising questions about the premium over the market price paid on a sale of 
62. This proposition implies that no premium is paid. See infra, #25. 
63. See Johnston, supra, note 32, p. 330; N.N. ANTAKI, G. LECLERC, "Le droit des valeurs 
mobilières et les placements privés", (1979) 20 C. de D, 725. 
64. N.N. A N T A K I , G. LECLERC, supra, note 63, #43 and 44. 
65. Anisman, supra, note 32, p. 41. 
66. This is the case in the U.S., where authors have said that the concept of tender offer 
excluded private purchases of shares, the term "private" having a similar connotation to 
the one used in s. 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa. 
See E.R. ARANOW, H.A. EINHORN, supra, note 30, pp. 70-73 and pp. 2-4 of their 
Supplement. 
67. See for discussion Anisman, supra, note 32, pp. 41-44; D.D. PREMTICE, supra, note 59, 
pp. 332-34, who has suggested similarities with public offerings ; Johnston, supra, note 32, 
pp. 324-25 and p. 330. 
68. Merger Study, supra, note 47, #7.03; see supra, #13. 
69. Anisman, supra, note 32, p. 16 and footnote 25. 
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control. Even though the Merger Study looked at the City Code and even 
though it observed a certain concern for the minority shareholders in a 
number of cases 70, it found that the controlling stockholders had not "[...] so 
abused their positions as to require special treatment as a matter of securities 
legislation"71. In accordance with the evidence, it concluded that there was 
no reason to deviate from the Kimber Report "[...] as to questions of fairness 
of treatment as between shareholders72", such a matter being properly left to 
the corporate law and the courts. It did suggest, however, that the number of 
shareholders involved in a private agreement be limited to fifteen 73. 
2.2. The evolution of the basic principles and the birth of 
the follow-up offer: from 1973 to 1978 
2.2.1. The Select Committee on Company Law 
20. In 1973, the Select Committee on Company Law tabled its report 
on mergers, amalgamations and certain related matters 74. In chapters 10 to 
17, the Committee dealt with almost all the various aspects of takeover bids. 
In the eleventh chapter, the private agreement was considered, a subject 
which deeply divided the Committee into two factions 75. 
21. The problem was approached similarly as it had been in 1965 and 
1970. The Select Committee acknowledged that a premium was almost 
invariably paid to the controlling shareholders and in many cases, no general 
offer involving the same terms was made to the other shareholders 76. The 
Select Committee then stated three different options facing it : 
[s]hould this situation be allowed to continue, should the legislation remove 
the present private agreement exemption or should the legislation continue the 
70. Four cases of offers made to the remaining shareholders out of a total of 87 bids collected. 
Other cases were mentioned, but without specific numbers. 
71. Merger Study, supra, note 47, #7.09; see also #7.04. Before this statement, they explained 
the economic drawbacks of an offer to every shareholder as removing incentives for 
entrepreneurship. 
72. Ibid.; see also D.D. PRENTIŒ, supra, note 59, pp. 342-43, for comments on the 
recommendations of the Merger Study, see also Torstar, supra, note 8, pp. 67C-68C. 
73. Merger Study, supra, note 47, #7.10. This recommendation was put into legislation in 1971 
through s. 22 of An Act to amend The Securities Act. 1966, S.O. 1971 c. 31. 
74. Select Committee on Company Law, 1971 Report on Mergers, Amalgamations and Certain 
Related Matters by Select Committee on Company Law, (1973), Ontario Legislative 
Assembly, 3rd Session. 29ih Legislature, 22 Eliz. II [hereinafter referred to as Select 
Committee Report]. 
75. Id., eh. 11, #6. 
76. Id., ch. II, #1. 
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exemption but require, as a condition, that a general offer be made by the 
offeror to all other shareholders of the same class?'7 
After having consulted the Merger Study, the City Code and the new opinion 
released by the OSC, each faction put forth its views. 
22. The majority favoured the exemption as it existed in the 1966 Act 
without having to make any general offer to the remaining shareholders. 
This, together with the idea of abolishing the exemption, to which the 
majority disagreed, was seen as discouraging the entrepreneurship of 
businessmen78. It further pointed out that shares were the personal property 
of their owner who should be left free to dispose of them at whatever terms 
he considered advisable. It also expressed the view that the behavior of 
controlling shareholder in relation to the corporation's affairs was not the 
focal point "[...] but his freedom to dispose of his shares privately as he 
thinks fit and that his freedom should not be diminished unless there are 
cogent overriding reasons for doing so" 79. 
These arguments were then followed by a second type based upon a so-
called economic rationale. The majority said that a prospective purchaser, 
although having sufficient resources to buy the controlling interest, might 
not be able to extend his offer to the general body of shareholders. Having 
qualified a general offer as an economic hardship, it further stated that the 
result of such an offer would be that only those who could afford it would 
consider a purchase of control. 
Finally, the majority put forward a third type of argument which was 
rooted in a legal basis. They rejected the principles laid down in the City 
Code saying that 
[...] such principles do not represent a legal enactment but are of persuasive 
force only and that in any event such principles have been developed for 
application to a financial system whose resources, philosophy and operations 
are different from our own.80 
23. The minority views expressed in the Select Committee Report are 
generally seen as the origin of the follow-up offer presently known in 
Ontario. At the very beginning of its opinion, it formulated its views in this 
way: 
[t]he minority of the Committee [...] is of the view that, while the sale of control 
or effective control by private agreement should not be abolished, the present 
77. Ibid.; see also ch. 11, #3. 
78. Id., ch. 11, #7. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid. 
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exemption in The Securities Act should be made conditional on the person 
acquiring such control making within a reasonable period (which the minority 
feels should be not later than 60 days after acquisition of control) an offer to 
the remaining shareholders of the same class which offer should not be 
conditional on any level of acceptance. Such a requirement should also cover a 
change of control or effective control by private agreement in the case of a 
private company.81 
24. Firstly, the minority agreed with the majority that the reduction if 
not the elimination of the premium on a sale of control might be viewed 
"[...] as a move towards removing an incentive for entrepreneurship"82. 
However, it expressed doubts as to the forcefulness of the argument 
permitting such a premium. Secondly, and this being a major difference from 
the majority opinion, it stated that each share of the capital was, at least 
conceptually, the same as every other share and concurred with the idea that 
the sale effected by a controlling shareholder was rather a sale of corporate 
assets belonging to all shareholders than a mere sale of shares. The minority 
did not object to a premium resulting from a sale of control, but affirmed it 
should be shared by everyone. It further dismissed the economic hardship 
argument, being unconvinced that this would be an inevitable result. 
Adopting the principles underlying the City Code, the minority set aside the 
legal ground put forward by the majority "[...] since the provisions of the 
City Code are invariably followed in almost every instance"83. 
The minority also proposed that the consideration offered in the 
extended offer be identical or alternative in the manner of its payment84. A 
notice to holders of both outstanding shares and debt instruments was also 
suggested85. It then dealt with the "troublesome" meaning of acquisition of 
control. It adopted the same figure of 20% used in the 1966 Act and 
dismissed the idea of suggesting a specific number of people involved in a 
private agreement before a general offer could be requested86. Finally, the 
minority acknowledged that 
[t]he minority is not unmindful that, in the case of a private agreement, there 
may, in certain circumstances, be a compelling reason why a general offer need 
81 Id, ch. II, #8. 
82 Id., ch. 11, #9. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Id., ch. 11, «10. 
85 Id., ch. 11, #11. 
86 Id., ch. 11, «12. 
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not be made. Some flexibility should be provided, as is the case with the City 
Code, and the Ontario Securities Commission should have the right to order, 
under proper circumstances, that a general offer need not be made.87 
25. Several observations arise from each opinion. The first one is 
related to the proposal that the private agreement exemption be deleted from 
the Act itself. On this point curiously enough, both sides reached the same 
conclusion not to delete, but for different reasons. The majority saw its 
removal as a reduction of the incentives which promote the entrepreneurship 
of businessmen. On the other hand, the minority simply said the exemption 
was not improper per se, but its effects might be regulated to ensure a certain 
amount of fairness for all shareholders. This latter argument seems a more 
appropriate way to explain the situation which was facing the Select 
Committee. In essence, the problem is not the existence of the private 
agreement exemption, but rather that which results from its use: the 
premium paid only to controlling shareholders. This payment is the root of 
the inequality of treatment between controlling and remaining shareholders, 
not the sale itself88. 
26. The second observation may be seen as a corollary of the first one. 
Having realized that control was sold through private agreements, the 
minority said that it would be better to regulate its effects, while the majority 
focused on the freedom of the controlling shareholder to initiate the 
transaction by selling his shares. By advancing such opposite opinions, the 
Select Committee reflected what was taking place in the U.S. where the 
courts advocated one position and commentators the other89. The traditional 
common law view was shared by both the majority of the Select Committee 
and most of the American courts. They were in opposition to the minority of 
the Select Committee and the American theorists who believed that assets as 
well as shares were sold by the controlling shareholders. It cannot be said 
that one approach is intrinsically better than the other since each one is 
based on opposite premises. A choice between them was more of choice of 
policy and philosophy of regulation than anything else90. 
87. Id., ch. 11, # 13. The minority also talked about an exemption from the proposed follow-
up offer in cases of foreign ownership, leaving this point to a further legislative action by 
the government. 
88. See on the actual links between s. 88(2)(c) and 91(1) and the effect of their abrogation 
Chairman Report, supra, note 7, 83A. 
89. See infra, #30 to #32 and #37 to #40. 
90. J.D.A. JACKSON, "Control Block Transactions", in Recent Developments. Securities and 
Corporate Law. Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), May 9, 1980, Part IV, pp. IV-86 to 
IV-116, pp. IV-90-91 [hereinafter referred to as Control Block Transactions]; Johnston, 
supra, note 32, p. 340. 
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2.3. The common law and the sale of control 
27. In the U.K. as well as in Canada91, directors' fiduciary duties are 
arguably identical to the duties owed by any other fiduciary92. One of the 
historical reasons for which fiduciary rules were applied to directors is that, 
being responsible for the management of the corporation's property, they 
were in a situation obviously lending itself to the taking advantage93 of their 
control position. A strong body of rigid rules was therefore developed in 
order to protect beneficial owners from such potential abuses by directors 
acting as trustees94. 
28. One of the major problems springs from the fact that directors' 
duties are owed to the corporation and not to shareholders95. Even though it 
has been noted that this rule does not imply that directors can never be 
viewed as fiduciaries for the shareholders96, particularly when they breach 
their duties97, this rule laid down in Percival v. Wright98 is firmly established 
in the U.K. and in Canada. Another difficulty arises since it is unclear 
whether directors' duties, which are applicable also to officers acting on 
behalf of directors99, might be applied to controlling shareholders. This 
difficulty is obviously resolved where majority shareholders are directors as 
well, but the situation is doubtful where this is not the case 10°. 
29. It is however arguable under the present case law that both 
controlling shareholders and directors or officers are under no fiduciary duty 
while selling a control block at a premium l0'. They are not subject to any 
91. See e.g. for an abstract of the duties imposed upon Canadian directors F. IACOBUCCI, 
M.L. PILKINGTON, J.R.S. PRINCH \RD, Canadian Business Corporations. Toronto, Canada 
Law Book, 1977, pp. 296 and ff. [hereinafter referred to as Canadian Business Corpo-
rations]; S.M. BI:CK, "The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconsi-
dered", (1971) 49 Can. Bar Rev. 80, pp. 90-92. 
92. L.B.C. GOWLR, Cover's Principles of Modern Company Law. 4th ed. London, Stevens & 
Sons, 1979, p. 572. 
93. See e.g. S.M. BUCK, supra, note 91, pp. 91, 92. 
94. See Weinberg and Blank, supra, note 10, #210; Canadian Business Corporations, supra, 
note 91, p. 293; L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, ch. 24. 
95. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, pp. 572-73. 
96. Ibid. 
97. See e.g. Allen v. Hyatt, (1914) 17 D.L.R. 7, pp. 11-12 (P.C.). 
98. Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421 ; however, it has been held that this case had been 
wrongly decided by the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See Coleman v. Myers, [1977] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 225 (NZCA); L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, P. 573. 
99. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, p. 574. 
100. A.J. BOYLE, "The Sale of Controlling Shares: American Law and the Jenkins Committee", 
(1964) 13 Int. Comp. L.Q. 185, p. 188, notes 8-10. 
101. Ibid. ; see also W.P. ROSENFELD, "Corporate Acquisitions", [1912] LS.U.C. 367, pp. 371, 
12;Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 719; Farnham v. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688; (1972) 6 D.L.R. 
(3d) 97; rev. in appeal on other grounds [1973J 2 O.R. 132; (1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 156 
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duty to disclose such deals and are allowed to keep the premium gained 
therefrom as well, providing that (in respect of directors or officers only) no 
unusual circumstances such as fraud on the minority or breach of fiduciary 
duties occur 102. In fact, it appears that both the U.K. and the Canadian 
common law are unlikely to follow American decisions on the sale of 
controll03, even though it has been suggested that such a view could perhaps 
eventually be adopted in England 104. 
30. The American case law is rather more complex than the Anglo-
Canadian one. The general thread of the decisions is called the majority rule. 
It stresses that, although directors and majority shareholders owe fiduciary 
duties to their corporation 105 in respect of their management, neither owe 
such a duty towards minority shareholders when selling their stock 106. As 
with any other shareholder, they are free to sell their shares at whatever price 
they can obtain 107. The mere ownership of shares is in itself insufficient to 
create a fiduciary relationship with the minority108, either as a group or 
individually109. There is also no obligation to disclose110 either the trans-
action or its purposes, or to make sure that remaining shareholders will be 
offered a similar opportunity111. 
31. American courts have however developed theories which allow the 
recovery of the premium paid to controlling shareholders "2 upon a sale of 
(C. A.) ; In the Mailer of Consolidated Manitoba Mines Ltd and Great Basin Metal Mines Ltd, 
(1966) O.S.C. Bulletin 5, p. 8 [December 1966]; Western Ontario Natural Gas Co. Ltd v. 
Aikens, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 647, p. 660 (Ont. H.C.). 
102. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, p. 624 and ch. 25 in general ; Canadian Business 
Corporations, supra, note 91, pp. 317-18. 
103. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, p. 707. It is also interesting to note the difference between 
the third edition, where the title of ch. 24 includes the expression controlling shareholders, 
and the fourth edition, where such wording has been dropped. 
104. Id., p. 640 and p. 707; see supra, #15. 
105. See e.g. Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.) and #838 and #848 ; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 NYS 2d 
622 (S.C., N.Y. Count., 1941), p. 650, where cases are cited illustrating when majority share-
holders have been said to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the minority. 
106. See e.g. Yerke v. Batman, 376 N.E. 2d 1211, p. 1214 (CA. Ind., 1978) ; Keely v. Black, 111 
Atl. 22, p. 23 (C.A.N.J., 1920); Roly v. Dunnett, 88 F. 2d 68, p. 69 (10th Circ. 1937). 
107. See e.g. Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F. 2d 1259, p. 1262 (4ih Circ, 1978); Essex Universal 
Corporation v. Yates, 305 F. 2d 572, p. 576 (2nd Circ, 1962); Stanton v. Schenck, 252 NYS 
172, p. 173 (S.C., N.Y. County, 1931). 
108. See e.g. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F. 2d 545, p. 547 (10th th Circ, 1969) ; Levy v. American 
Beverage Corp., 38 NYS 2d 517, p. 525 (S.C. Ap. Div., 1942). 
109. See e.g. American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 
p. 740-41 (D.C. Virg., 1980). 
110. See e.g. Yerke v. Batman, supra, note 106; McDaniel v. Painter, supra, note 108. 
111. See e.g. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, p. 405 (D.C. N.Y., 1968). 
112. See e.g. Benson v. Braun, 155 NYS 2d 622, p. 625 (S.C. Sp. Tr., 1956). 
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control. A minority rule, framed on the fiduciary duties owed by controlling 
shareholders "3 both to the corporation and to minority shareholders "4 , has 
been developed. This rule stresses that majority shareholders have to respect 
their fiduciary obligations in transactions affecting the minority. 
32. A so-called special facts doctrine was also developed, whereby 
limited fiduciary obligations are imposed upon controlling shareholders, 
compelling them to disclose to the minority the purpose of the transactions 
concluded "5. 
33. The general thread discussed above has been narrowed by Ameri-
can courts. In a series of decisions generally known as the looting cases "6 , 
selling shareholders were held liable where it was established that they knew 
the buyer would loot the corporation's assets upon their resignation. These 
cases have stressed that where the controlling shareholder has reason to 
believe that the purchaser is irresponsible or is willing to mismanage and loot 
the corporation "7, he has to conduct an enquiry to determine the buyer's 
intention "8 and to refuse to sell if the buyer can be seen to have the effective 
desire of looting the corporation's assets. The cases have been viewed by 
commentators as based upon the duty of good faith and due care owed by 
directors and controllers on the transfer of their shares "9. They have been 
explained by the use of tort principles of fraud and negligence '20 rather than 
113. See e.g. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, p. 306 ; 60 S. Ct. 238 (1939) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Bogen, 250 U.S. 483, pp. 491-92; 30 S. Ct. 533, p. 537 (1919); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 
212 F. 2d 389, p. 396 (6ih Circ, 1954). 
114. See e.g. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company, 460 P. 2d 464 (1969) ; DeBaun v. First Western 
Bank and Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, p. 361 (CA., 1975). 
115. See e.g. Brown v. Halben, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (CA. 1969); L. Loss, Securities Regulation. 
Supp. 1969. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., pp. 1446-50 ; Strong v. Reptile, 213 U.S. 419:29 
S.Ct. 521 (1909). 
116. Insuranshares Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (D.C Pa., 1940); 
Gerdes v. Reynolds, supra, note 105. 
117. See e.g. McDaniel v. Painter, supra, note 108, p. 547; DeBaun v. First Western Bank and 
Trust Co., supra, note 114, p. 360; Insuranshares Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 
supra, note 116, p. 25; Gerdes v. Reynolds, supra, note 105, p. 654; Ritchie v. McGrath, 571 
P. 2d 17, pp. 22, 24 (CA. Kan., 1977) ; Swinney v. Keebler Company, 480 F. 2d 573, p. 578 
(4.h Circ, 1973); Harman v. Willbern, 520 F. 2d 1333 (10ih Circ, 1975). Cases where the 
seller did not have reasons to believe that the purchaser will loot corporation. See e.g. 
Benson v. Braun, supra, note 112, p. 626. 
118. See e.g. where an enquiry has to be held see supra, note 117. Where an enquiry was held 
unnecessary, see Levy v. American Beverage Corp., supra, note 108, p. 524. 
119. N. LEECH, "Transactions in Corporate Control", 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, p. 782(1955-56); 
"Note : Duties of Controlling Shareholders in Transferring Their Shares", 54 Harv. L. Rev. 
648, P. 649 and 653 (1940-41). 
120. Benson v. Braun, supra, note 112, p. 629; R.W. JENNINGS, "Trading in Corporate Control", 
44 Calif. L. Rev. 1, pp. 8-9 (1956). 
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in terms of fiduciary relationship ; the measure of damages represents the 
harm suffered by the corporation m and perhaps also, the amount paid as 
premium which had to be returned l22. 
34. The sale of corporate office has been another ground upon which 
the courts have relied in cases of transactions where control has been sold at 
a premium, accompanied by the resignation of directors and officers. It has 
been held illegal to sell corporate office m , to receive money to provide the 
buyer with immediate control over the corporation purchased124, or to 
receive compensation for the loss of office 125. Such contracts have been 
declared void, as being contrary to the public interest126. Moreover, 
directors have been held liable in such cases for having breached their 
fiduciary duties by receiving sums which rightfully belonged to their 
corporation127. It must be noted that in English law, the payment received 
for the loss of corporate office on a sale of control by private agreement does 
not fall within s. 193(1) of the Company Actu%. However, in both the U.K. 
and in Canada, such a payment would constitute a breach of the directors' 
fiduciary duties l29. 
35. Misrepresentations to the minority, as well as diversion of corpo-
rate opportunity l3°, have also served as grounds for actions against directors 
and majority shareholders in the U.S.131 Under specific circumstances and 
121. R.W. JENNINGS, supra, note 120, p. 9; N. LEECH, supra, note 119, pp. 779-80. 
122. A. HILL, "The Sale of Controlling Shares", 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986, pp. 988-89 (1956-57); 
N. LEECH, supra, note 119, p. 779-80; see also Benson v. Braun, supra, note 112. 
123. See e.g. Sugden v. Crossland, (1856) 65 Eng. Rptr. 620; McClure v. Law, 55 N.E. 388 (C.A., 
N.Y., 1899); In re Caplan's Petition, 246 NYS 2d 913, p. 915 (S.C. Ap. Div., 1964); Gabriel 
Industries, Inc. v. Defiance Industries, Inc., 239 N.E. 2d 706 (CA., N.Y., 1968); however, 
sale of office together with sale of shares has been said to be legal in Essex Universal Corp. 
v. Yates, supra, note 107; Barnes v. Brown, 86 N.Y. 527 (1880); Benson v. Braun, supra, 
note 112, p. 626; see also R.W. JENNINGS, supra, note 120, pp. 19-20 for other cases. 
124. See e.g. Porter v. Healy, 91 A 428 (S.C. Pa., 1914); Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.), supra, 
note 105, #902. 
125. See e.g. R.W. JENNINGS, supra, note 120, pp. 19-22. 
126. Id., footnote 181, where the author gives an important amount of cases. See also Brecher v. 
Gregg, 392 NYS, 2d 776, p. 778 (S.C, N.Y. County, 1975). 
127. See e.g. Benson v. Braun, supra, note 112, p. 626; McClure v. Law, supra, note 123, p. 389; 
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra, note 107, p. 575. 
128. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, p. 706; Weinberg and Blank, supra, note 10, #2531; 
Company Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38. 
129. L.B.C. GOWER, supra, note 92, p. 706; Weinberg and Blank, supra, note 10, #2531; 
Canadian Business Corporations, supra, note 91, p. 318. 
130. Perlman v. Feldmann, infra, note 143; Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra, note 107, 
p. 576. 
131. See e.g. F.G. O'NEIL, "Squeeze-outs" of Minority Shareholders : Expulsion or Oppression of 
Business Associates. Chicago, Callaghan, 1975, #4.4. 
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conditions, which differ from the breach of fiduciary duties as used in 
corporate state law actions, reliance on the federal securities act has been 
accepted as a basis for liability. S. 10b and Rule 10b-5, s. 14(f) and s. 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act[il have been used by minority shareholders 
following sales of control at a premium m . 
36. Beside the courts' development, American commentators have 
devoted a substantial amount of energy to this topic134. They have cons-
tructed several theories which attempt to explain why premiums are paid 
when control is sold and by whom this premium should be claimed. Also, 
they have tried to find a rationale reconciling the cases dealing with sales of 
control. It is interesting to note, although unfortunate, that the theories put 
forth have not generally been adopted by the courts, thereby resulting in two 
separate schools of thought135. 
37. One of the most important works published on the topic is that of 
Berle and Means136 ; the authors suggest that control is a valuable asset 
belonging only to the corporation. Its value is related to the ability of its 
holder to dominate a property which belongs to others 137. Professor Berle 
has subsequently noted that control is neither merely an attribute of stock 
132. Supra, note 30. 
133. See e.g. T. SCHUF, "Sale of Control: The Equal Opportunity and Forseeable Harm 
Theories Under Rule 10b-5", 32 Bus. Law 507 (1976-77); N. LEECH, supra, note 119, 
pp. 758 and 831 ; R.L. BROOKS, "Rule 10b-5 in the Balance : An Analysis of the Supreme 
Court's Policy Perspective", 32 Hast. L. J. 403 (1980), see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores. 421 U.S. 723; 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185; 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); Santa Fe Industries. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462; 97 S. Ct. 1292 
(1977); Chiarella v. United States; 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Ciment 
Corp., 507 F. 2d 374 (2nd Circ, 1974) ; Birbaun v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F. 2d 461, cer. 
den. 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (2nd Circ). 
134. See e.g. E.R. HAYES, "Sale of Control of a Corporation: Who Gets the Premium?", 
4 J. Corp. L. 243 (1979) ; T.L. H\ZEN, "The Sale of Corporate Control : Towards a Three-
Tiered Approach", 4 J. Corp. L. 263 (1979); R.J. S\NTONI, "The Developing Duties of 
Controlling Shareholders and Appropriate Restraints on the Sale of Corporate Control", 
4 J. Corp. L. 285 (1979); T.L. HAZEN, "Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of 
Controlling Shareholders — Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies — 
And a Proposal for Reform", 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1023 (1976-77), T.L. HAZEN, "Premiums 
in the Sale of Corporate Control", 11 Inst. Sec. Reg. 317 (1980); R.W. JENNINGS, supra, 
note 120; N. LEECH, supra, note 119; A. HILL, supra, note 122; A.A. BERLE, "'Control' in 
Corporated Law", 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958), A.A. BERLE, "The Price of Power : Sale 
of Corporate Control", 50 Cornell L.Q. 628 (1964-65), D.C. B\YNL, infra, note 140; 
W.D.ANDREWS, supra, note 14. 
135. See e.g. McDaniel v. Painter, supra, note 108, p. 548. 
136. A.A. BERLE, G. MEANS, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, 
MacMillan Co., 1933 and 2nd ed. 1968. 
137. Id, p. 244. 
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ownership nor a thing, but rather a function ; the holder of a control position 
therefore occupies a power position l38. Such a position is a corporate asset, 
not an individual one 139 ; the money paid for it should be returned to the 
corporation. 
38. Professor Bayne, in the course of a substantial number of articles140, 
has taken a "moralist approach"141. He has developed the concept of 
"contrôleur", a person being subject to strict fiduciary duties. The "contro-
leur'"s major task is to select a suitable successor. The premium paid on a 
sale of control is described as a "premium-bribe" ; its acceptance is viewed as 
a breach of fiduciary duty. The premium therefore has to be paid back. 
39. A third general approach which has also been proposed is 
attributed to Professor Andrew. He has suggested that 
[...] whenever a controlling stockholder sells his shares, every other holder of 
shares (of the same class) is entitled to have an equal opportunity to sell his 
shares, or a prorata part of them, on substantially the same terms. Or in terms 
of the correlative duty: before a controlling stockholder may sell his shares to 
an outsider he must assure his fellow stockholders an equal opportunity to sell 
their shares.142 
138. A.A. BERLE, supra, note 134, p. 1215 [58 Colum. L. Rev.}. 
139. Ibid. 
140. D.C. BAYNE, "A Philosophy of Corporate Control", 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963-64); 
"Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee", 53 Geo. L.J. 543 (1964-65), "The Sale of 
Corporate Control", 33 Fordham L. Rev. 513 (1964-65); "The Definition of Corporate 
Control", 9 Si-Louis U.L.J. 445 (1964-65); "The Sale-of-Control Quandary", 51 Cornell 
L. Q. 49 (1965-66) ; "The Sale-of-Control Premium : The Intrinsic Illegitimacy", 47 Tex. L. 
Rev. 215 (1968-69) ; "The Sale-of-Control Premium : The Definition" 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485 
(1968-69); "The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition", 57 Calif. L. Rev. 615 
(1969) ; "A Flaw in the Law : The Demand Rule : A Brief, 22 5/. Louis U.L.J. 69(1978-79) ; 
"A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyemberg Shoe-Floresheim Case Study", 
18 Stan. L. Rev. 438 (1965-66). See G.A. LEWIS, "The Legitimate Transfer of Corporate 
Control: A Paradigmatic Study of the Custodial Concept", 13 Creighton L. Rev. 463 
(1979-80) for an application of Bayne's theories. 
141. See T.L. HAZEN, supra, note 134, p. 271 [4 J. Corp. L.}. 
142. W.D. ANDREWS, supra, note 14, p. 515. Professor Jennings suggested the same thing; see 
supra, note 120, p. 31 ; N. LEECH, supra, note 119, p. 839; A. HILL, supra, note 122, p. 1017 
also agrees but underlies economic difficulties of doing a general offer in certain 
circumstances. He also qualified the rule as a blanket rule, p. 988. For Professor BERLE, 
supra, note 134 [50 Cornell L.Q. 628] a general offer is a remedy, not a right, p. 639. In 
Canada, a general offer was also viewed as positive. See Canadian Business Corporations, 
supra, note 91, pp. 450-61. For another criticism of equal opportunity rule, see G.B. 
JAVRAS, "Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares : A Reply to Professor 
Andrews", 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1964-65). American practitioners howerver suggest to 
their clients to make an equivalent offer to remaining shareholders when such is possible. 
See P.L.I. Acquisitions 1978, 169. 
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40. One of the most analysed decisions related to the sale of control is 
the Second Circuit court case of Perlman v. Feldmann m , where Feldmann 
was held liable to the minority shareholders for the premium he received on 
the sale of his control block. This case has generally been viewed as 
sustaining the sale of asset theory put forth by Berle and Meansl44 ; however, 
the decision has also been said to fall within the looting case category l45, or 
to be a loss of corporate opportunity. Many commentators have agreed on 
the fact that the decision heavily relied upon the specific facts of the case, i.e. 
the Korean War and the associated steel shortage. The decision is also 
considered as the major factor which prompted most of the sale of control 
literature in the U.S. 
41. The impact of the American situation has undeniably influenced 
legal development in Canada. Even though it has been suggested that a full 
application of Perlmann was unlikely in Canada 146, the sale of asset theory 
has been specifically used in two cases. In Great Basin 147, a 1966 OSC 
decision dealing with a transfer of control shares in escrow, the Commission 
made an implicit reference to Perlman when it noted that the real asset of 
Great Basin was its cash position. This reference to the Perlman case 
becomes even more evident in light of the Commission's statement by which 
it said that "in a period of tight money this (the cash asset) places the 
company in a strong bargaining position" 148. Later, the OSC also discussed 
issues similar to those raised in the U.S. ; the sale of a control block being not 
merely a sale of shares, but also the sale of the control over the board of 
directors, the sale of the corporate asset, the breach of fiduciary duties 
following the looting of the corporation by the purchaser and finally the loss 
of a corporate opportunity. Furthermore, the Commission suggested that 
giving an equal opportunity to non-controlling shareholders would be an 
equitable practice. The application was refused, but the OSC noted that it 
was without prejudice to a further application, following either an offer to 
remaining shareholders, or the approval of those shareholders together with 
a full disclosure of all material facts related to the future plans of the 
applicant. 
143. 219 F. 2d 173 (2nd Circ, 1955) cer. den. 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
144. A.A. BERLE, supra, note 134, p. 1221 [58 Colum. L. Rev.]; but see R.W. JENNINGS, supra, 
note 120, p. 9, note 33 and N. LEECH, supra, note 119, pp. 810, 11 for opposite opinions. 
145. See e.g. W.D. ANDREWS, supra, note 14, pp. 509 and ff ; A. HILL, supra, note 122, pp. 989, 
90. 
146. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 716. 
147. Supra, note 101. 
148. Id, p. 9. 
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42. It is interesting to note that the Great Basin decision contains 
many of the actual elements found both in s. 91(1) and in Policy 3-41149. The 
OSC said that an equal opportunity was a good corporate practice, even 
though Ontario law was not settled in respect of the obligations owed by the 
controlling shareholders. It also declared that the protection of the share-
holders where the law appeared to be unclear, and that the Commission was 
not bound by the strict rules of corporate law, were tasks performed "in 
pursuance of its obligation to protect the investing public"150. It further 
stressed that rigid rules were undesirable, and that it "might be economically 
wrong to adopt rules which would prevent the removal of ineffective 
management" '" . 
43. In the case of Farnham152, the Ontario High Court faced a 
situation somewhat similar to that in Perlman and in Brown v. Halbert153 ; 
this case was however settled before being tried. An offer was made to 
acquire the control of Slater Steel, at a premium. The control group of 
insiders and directors accepted the offer and, without disclosing any 
information to the shareholders, bought as many shares as possible on the 
public market with the view to enhance their profit on the sale of their 
control block. To avoid the takeover bid regulations, they artificially 
lowered the number of their group to less than fifteen, in order to take 
advantage of the private agreement exemption. A class action was launched 
on behalf of the shareholders alleging conspiracy and breach of fiduciary 
duty. A declaration that the premium obtained was owed to the corporation 
was also sought. A motion to dismiss the action succeeded on appeal on the 
basis that a derivative action rather than a class action should have been 
initiated. The Court of Appeal noted that 
[t]he claims made in the statement of claims are completely novel. Their 
success may depend on the trial Court applying or extending the principle 
followed in Perlman v. Feldmann (1955), 219 F. 2d 173, and Brown v. Halben 
(1969), 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, or on the trial Court holding that a breach of the 
provisions of Part IX of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, constitutes an 
actionable civil wrong. As I appreciate the appelants' argument, they do not 
now challenge Morand, J.'s decision that the difficult questions of law raised 
by the novelty of the plaintiffs claims should not be determined in interlocutory 
proceedings, and their attack on the form of the action and the statement of 
claim is confined to matters not specifically dealt with in the judgment 
below.154 
149. The major difference is that s. 91(1) prescribes to the purchaser and not the seller of the 
control block to make an equivalent offer ; see infra, ch. 4. 
150. Id, p. 11. 
151. Id., p. 10. 
152. Supra, note 101. 
153. Supra, note 115. 
154. Supra, note 101, pp. 133-34 (CA.). 
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44. It is important to note that Ontario did not attempt to remake the 
American common law, nor did it solve the entire range of problems pointed 
out by U.S. commentators in the literature on sale of control. The Ontario 
legislation on the follow-up offer does not regulate transactions and the 
information which has to be disclosed when an insider buys stock to increase 
his profit before the sale of his control block. Neither does the legislation 
attempt to impose upon controlling shareholders fiduciary duties when 
selling their shares 155. Indeed, Ontario has done only one thing by intro-
ducing s. 91(1): it has provided the remaining shareholders with a means to 
ensure equality of treatment where control of a corporation is sold at a 
premium. 
3. The mechanism of the follow-up offer 
3.1. The private agreement 
45. Where a private agreement is concluded with less than fifteen 
security holders, and where the price paid for the securities is 15% above the 
market price as defined in the Act, the offeror must make an equivalent offer 
within 180 days of the date of the agreement to the remaining holders of the 
same class of securities 156. 
155. See however the OSC interpretation in McLaughlin, supra, note 3. 
156. The actual wording of s. 88(2)(c) has been extensively broadened. The word shares has 
been replaced by securities, thereby considerably expanding the scope of application of the 
private agreement. The expression shareholder was similarly replaced by security holders. 
Finally, the single word agreements was substituted for the expression private agreement. 
A similar exemption is found in the Canada Business Corporation Act. S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, 
s. 187(a) [hereinafter referred to as the CBCA]. The Federal text is simpler than the 
Ontario one, although directed to the same purpose. Share is defined as a share which 
carries a general or specific voting right, as well as a security currently convertible into 
such a share, and an option and right to acquire either such share or convertible security. 
The word shareholder is also narrower than the expression security holders as used in the 
Ontario statute. The expression separate agreements is used in the Federal text, Ontario 
having preferred the word agreements alone; but the effect seems to be the same. Finally, 
the CBCA omits reference to an offer not made to shareholders generally, a statement 
having been criticized as troublesome, and omits reference to any counting rule. 
The Québec Working Paper decided to propose a definition of private agreement which is 
framed on the Ontario section and on the second "counting rule". The text reads as 
follows : 
An offeror who makes a take-over bid is exempt from the requirements of this Part where 
[..,] the bid is not made to security holders generally and envisages the purchase of 
securities by way of separate agreements with not more than five security holders, with 
the reservation that where the securities have been acquired within the two preceding 
years for resale under this exemptions, [sic] each seller from whom they were purchased 
under the bid must be counted as a holder; 
See Québec Working Paper, supra, note 23, s. 106(2). 
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One of the features of the 1978 Act is that the private agreement has 
become an exempted takeover bid rather than being an exempt offer as in the 
1966 Act. While the actual wording of the takeover definition does not 
include any exemption of any kind, a second section of the Act provides that 
a takeover bid will be exempted from the requirements of Part XIX where 
such takeover is an offer to purchase securities by way of private agreement157. 
46. This slight difference in wording has many implications. The first 
is linked to the qualification of a transaction as being a takeover bid, 
regardless of the number of voting securities involved and the ownership 
resulting thereof. Obviously, if no takeover bid occurs, no private agreement 
as understood under the 1978 Act will exist. 
In the Atco158 case for instance, the Commission took into account 
both the substance of the transaction and the broad wording of s. 88(l)(k)(i),60. 
One commissioner, relying on a strict interpretation of the expression the 
other issuer, dissented from the Commission '6I. 
In the Turbo case, the OSC ruled that a private agreement followed by a 
stock exchange takeover bid had to be regarded as one takeover for the 
157. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 88(2)(c). This is not the case in the CBCA. 
158. In the Matter of Atco Ltd. IU International Corporation Canadian Utilities Ltd, (1980) 
O.S.C. Bulletin 412 (Sept.) [hereinafter referred to as Atco]. 
On May 12, 1980, Atco entered into an agreement with IU International Corporation, 
incorporated under Maryland Law, to exchange IU common shares owned by Atco for 
12,093,670 Canadian Utilities Limited shares beneficially owned by IU. This amount 
represented 58.1% of the outstanding CU common shares. On the date of the agreement, 
Atco was not in possession of any IU common shares ; an offer was then made both in the 
U.S. and in Canada to acquire the necessary amount of shares. The U.S. tender offer 
requirements were followed but Atco filed an application with the OSC under s. 99(e) to 
seek a ruling declaring the Atco acquisition exempted from the requirements of the 
takeover bid section of the 1978 Act, as well as a ruling declaring the agreement concluded 
on May 12 to be exempted therefrom. The first request was granted, but a second hearing 
was held on the other ruling sought by Atco. 
Counsel for Atco first argued that no takeover bid as defined in Ontario had taken place 
because IU, the only shareholder of CU involved in the transaction, had no address in 
Ontario as a shareholder of CU. Counsel further submitted that even though the tender 
offer made for IU shares was a condition for the completion of the May 12 agreement, 
such an offer could not lead to the conclusion 
[...] that ATCO's subsequent acquisition of CU stock involves a takeover bid because the 
minority shareholders who would be the recipients of a follow-up offer under section 91 
would be the minority shareholders of CU not IU and, in any event, all IU shareholders 
are receiving ATCO's tender offer, [p. 415] 
159. Id., p. 416. See also Pacific Coast Coin Exchange v. The Ontario Securities Commission, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 122, p. 127. 
160. Atco, supra, note 158, p. 417. 
161. Id., pp. 425-27; see infra, #49. 
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purchase of the Merland shares 162. So far, the Commission has relied upon 
the intent of the purchaser while making his offer as well as the outcome of 
the overall transaction in deciding whether a takeover bid has been made. 
47. A second implication of the difference in wording arises in 
connection with the residence of the security holders to whom a takeover bid 
is proposed. The Ontario legislation applies as soon as an offer is made to a 
security holder whose address in the books of the offeree corporation is in 
Ontario. If this is not the case, all other criteria become irrelevant : such an 
offer will not fall within the definition of takeover bid 163. 
A more difficult situation arises from the second part of the takeover 
bid definition, which deals with the acceptance of an offer to sell. Simply 
stated, the issue is whether or not the shareholder accepting an offer and 
selling his shares must have an address in Ontario 164. Such acceptance is 
deemed to be an offer ; the shareholder accepting is deemed to be an offeror, 
thereby referring to the first part of the definition, the offer to purchase. On 
the other hand, the person who has initiated the acceptance is deemed to be 
an offeree. Therefore, if this offeree does not have an address in Ontario, 
there would be no takeover bid as defined by s. 88(l)(k)165. Indeed, 
s. 88(l)(k)(ii) would be of some effect only between Ontario residents l66. The 
argument by which no Ontario address is required to bring s. 88(l)(k)(ii) into 
play seems doubtful in such a contextl67. 
48. A third implication of such difference in wording is related to the 
amount of voting securities which may be sold through private agreement. 
As long as the threshold of 20% of ownership is not reached, the transaction 
will not qualify as a private agreement falling under s. 88(2)(c). In other 
words, a sale whose result for the purchaser is an ownership of less than 20% 
will not be a takeover bid, nor will it fall within the definition of a private 
agreement. On the other hand, a resulting holding of 20% or more will bring 
the takeover bid definition into play. Such transaction, if properly qualified 
as a private agreement, will be exempted from Part XIX of the 1978 Actl68, 
but subject to s. 91(1). 
162. See Turbo case [reasons], infra, note 212, p. 82C. The case is discussed infra, U 109 and ff. 
163. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 88(l)(k) and 88(2); see Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 729. 
164. That part of the definition will be deleted in the new definition of takeover bid. See (1981) 
2 O.S.C.B. 80A(13 nov.). 
165. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 729. He also notes that the same appears to be true in respect of 
s. 88(l)(k)(iii). 
166. See notes 163 and 165; see also P. ANISMXN, P.W. HOÜG, "Constitutional Aspects of 
Federal Securities Legislation", Proposals Tome 3, supra, note 22, 135, p. 150, note 74. See 
infra, 4.2.3. 
167. Such an argument was refused by the dissenting commissioner in Alco and not discussed 
by the majority. See Alco case, supra, note 158, p. 428. 
168. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 88(l)(k) and 88(2); see also Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 723. 
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49. From those implications, it is already obvious that close relations 
exist between takeover bids and private agreements. Indeed, a private 
agreement is no longer viewed solely as a sale of control, but rather as an 
acquisition of shares through a public offer, the private agreement being a 
manner to avoid the rules laid down in the 1978 Act*69. The direct 
consequence thereof is that holders of the same class of securities may not be 
treated the same way where one attempts to takeover their company. Put in a 
different way, ss. 88(2)(c) and 91(1) have become more a question of equality 
of treatment among shareholders than anything else. It has been correctly 
pointed out in the Interim Report that the follow-up offer was a device 
through which new rights were conferred to minority shareholders '70. That 
the "evil" of paying a premium on a sale of control is not the sole feature 
sustaining s. 91(1) appears therefore somewhat obvious; that this is what 
people were expecting from the 1978 Act is much less clear. In any event, to 
confer more rights to the minority in takeover situations is not an isolated 
event in the evolution of securities legislation m . It appears the real question 
is whether that evolution is still desired by participants in the Ontario 
marketplace. 
3.1.1. Conditions of application 
3.1.1.1. An offer to purchase 
50. Before s. 88(2)(c) is applicable, an offer to purchase must exist. 
Because the private agreement exemption is an exempted takeover bid, the 
above discussion of an acceptance as it is deemed to be an offer to purchase 
will apply in respect of s. 88(2)(c). It would otherwise be too easy to attempt 
to avoid the application of the section by seeking only acceptance without 
making any offer to potential purchasers 172. The wording of the section 
being broad, an offer to purchase may be practically anything, from a phone 
call to a formal written contract sent to shareholders. It seems that the 
section does not consider the form used to transmit the "information" or 
"offer", but rather its substance. 
3.1.1.2. Securities 
51. The offer is made for the purchase of securities, an expression 
being a little troublesome. Security is a defined term whose meaning is broad 
169. See e.g. the remarks made by the OSC Chairman in the Chairman Report, supra, note 7, 
p. 82A. 
170. See Interim Report, supra, note 16, p. 229A. 
171. See supra, #14 and ff. 
172. Such explanation was put forth by the dissenting commissioner in Atco, supra, note 158, 
pp. 428-29. 
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and almost unrestricted m . When taken in connection with the definition of 
published market " \ the resulting effect seems to be that s. 88(2)(c) will apply 
as soon as any type of the offeree's securities are sold by fewer than fifteen 
holders. However, there are two arguments opposing such an interpretation. 
52. Firstly, one has to bear in mind that the private agreement 
exemption has to be viewed in the context of an exempted takeover bid, 
which transaction is restricted to voting securities. Such a term is defined in 
s. 1(1)(44) of the 1978 Act. A private agreement, to fall within the definition 
set out in s. 88(2)(c), should then be made in relation to voting securities 175. 
Secondly, it is hard to imagine a case in which a sale of control is 
effected through a private agreement without the transfer of voting stock. 
The use of the word security may be explained by the fact that the private 
agreement exemption was not primarily designed to allow a sale of control, 
although such is the purpose for which it was used L76. To sell control, 
nothing but voting securities must be transferred. Practically speaking 
therefore, only such securities will be exchanged and not just any type of 
security as the word may imply. 
53. If s. 88(2)(c) is not restricted to voting securities, the requirement 
of the follow-up offer might be avoided by relying upon s. 99(a), such a 
private agreement being not a sale of control177. 
3.1.1.3. By way of agreements 
54. The offer to purchase securities is concluded by way of agreements. 
The 1978 Act has clarified a confusing situation. The 1966 Act used the term 
173. See e.g. N.N. ANT^KI, "Le contrat de placement de fonds; une valeur mobilière 
envahissante", (1978) 19 C. de D. 903; F. IACOBUCCI, "The Definition of Security for 
Purposes of a Securities Act", Proposals Tome 3. supra, note 22, p. 221. 
174. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 88(1)0); see infra, #77. 
175. Alboini has suggested than an option is not included in the definition of voting securities. 
However, this expression refers to "any security, other than a debt security" ; 1978 Act, 
s. I(l)(44) [emphasis added]. The use of the word security refers to s. 1(1)(40), where 
security is defined. Such a word includes an "option [...] or other interest in or to a 
security", 1978 Act, s. l(l)(40)(iv). Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 723. See also s. 103(1) which 
set up compulsory disclosure of information when an acquisition by an agreement results 
in an ownership superior to 20% for a purchaser. In respect of non-voting or multiple 
voting securities, see Non-voting Securities: The Toronto Stock Exchange Request for 
Comments, (1980) OSC Weekly Summary, Supp. X-2, Oct. 10, and O.S.C. Interim Policy 
3-58 and 3-59 (1981), 1 O.S.C.B. 36E (June 26) ; Addendum No. 1, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. IE 
(July 10). Addendum No. 2, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 26A and I4E (Aug. 7) ; O.S.C. Interim Policy 
3-58 Restricted Shares (Uncommon Equities) Distributions and Disclosure, (1981) 2 
O.S.C.B. 77E (Nov. 20); O.S.C. Policy 3-58, (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. IE (Jan. 22). 
176. Supra, #17. 
177. Sec infra, it 149 and ff. 
G. LECLERC The Sale of Control 65 
private agreement without defining it l78, thereby creating some difficulties. It 
was not clear whether all the vendors had to enter into the same agreement, 
or whether separate agreements were allowed "9. The difficulty became even 
greater when the CBCA used the expression separate agreements m, even 
though this expression was itself subsequently criticized as being ambi-
guous m . Moreover, private agreement was used in contrast to shareholders 
generally in an attempt to denote a takeover by way of private agreementl82. 
55. The 1978 Act, acknowledging many of the criticisms made, does 
not contain the word private anymore, but simply uses the expression 
agreements. Although this word is also undefined, it might be broad enough 
to include any type of agreement whereby securities are exchanged. An 
example of such a broad interpretation was indeed given by the Commission 
during the takeover bids by both Noranda and BCRIC for the acquisition of 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd, of Vancouver 183. Within the course of the offers, the 
two bidders attempted to increase their holdings in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd 
by special tactics effected through the private market and stock exchanges' 
floor. In a decision released early in April 1981, the Commission said it 
considered "[...] crosses, put-throughs and any other prearranged trades [as] 
a form of private agreement" 184. A formal order was then issued pursuant to 
s. 124(1) of the 1978 Act denying the application of s. 88(2)(c) to any 
takeover*of MacMillan Bloedel Ltd shares made by BCRIC, Noranda or 
their affiliates 185. 
3.1.1.4. With fewer than fifteen security holders 
56. The offer to purchase securities by way of agreements is restricted 
to fewer than fifteen security holders. If fifteen or more people are parties to 
178. See R.L. F^LBY, "Take-Over Bids and the Ontario Securities Act of 1966", (1967) 5 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 227, p. 229, where a definition of private agreement has been suggested. 
179. See Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 684-85; Anisman, supra, note 32, p. 37; Johnston, supra, 
note 32, pp. 215-16. 
180. CBCA, supra, note 156, s. 187. 
181. See Proposals tome 2, supra, note 22, p. 122. 
182. See Anisman, supra, note 32, pp. 41-43; D.D. PRENTICE, supra, note 59, pp. 332-33 and 
341; see infra, #63, #64. 
183. The initial bid was launched by BCRIC on March 11, 1981, see The GlobeandMail, March 
11, 1981, B-l, and until June 1981. 
184. In the Matter of MacMillan Bloedel Ltd, Noranda Mines Ltd and British Columbia Resources 
Investment Corp., (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 106B (April 10); D. WILLOUGHBY, "BCRIC, Noranda 
limited to public trading in MB", The Globe and Mail, April 7, 1981, B-2; see infra, #66 
and #72. 
185. Id., p. 107B. 
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the transaction, the exemption will not apply. This "fourteen-men rule" 186, 
although apparently simple, raises some difficulties. 
57. Firstly, nothing is said about the residence of the sellers. Both 
Anisman187 and Johnston submitted that s. 81(b)(i) of the 1966 Act would 
apply only to Ontario shareholders selling their shares and not to those 
living outside Ontario l88, even though the result would be that more than 
fifteen shareholders in total could be parties to the private agreement. 
Another author has simply stated 
[t]he limitation likely applies regardless of the residence of the holders as it 
does not appear to have been the intent to permit an offeror to rely on the 
private agreement exemption in the Act and in the legislation of other 
jurisdictions to conclude agreements with up to 14 security holders in each 
jurisdiction.I8' 
The explanation put forward both by Professors Anisman and Johnston 
would appear very sound where the private agreement was an exempt offer. 
Now that it is an exempted takeover bid, the idea that the "fourteen-men 
rule" applies regardless of the sellers' residence sounds logical, as long as at 
least one security holder to whom the offer is tendered has his address in the 
offeree's books in Ontario. The offeror must therefore be very careful where 
his offer is made in other provinces or in other countries at the same time it is 
tendered to Ontario security holders. 
58. Secondly, new counting rules were introduced in the 1978 Act to 
restrict the various possible ways of avoiding the application of the 
"fourteen-men rule". They are designed to provide solutions to practical 
problems encountered in calculating the number of purchasers to whom the 
private agreement can be offered. For these two rules, the burden to 
establish their availability lies with the offeror, who has to make a 
reasonable enquiry. If, by this enquiry, he ought to know the facts raising the 
application of the counting rules, such knowledge will be presumed. It is 
unclear what has to be understood by a reasonable enquiry and in which 
circumstances the "ought to know test" will apply. The key word is 
obviously reasonable; this implies an objective test, which will be applied on 
the facts of each individual case where one of the counting rules applies. 
186. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-94. 
187. Anisman, supra, note 32, p. 42. 
188. Johnston, supra, note 32, p. 325. He raised serious doubts about the Ontario's power to 
regulate transactions which take place outside of its borders. Therefore, the number of 
fifteen should be regarded as relevant only for the amount of purchases involved in 
Ontario. See on the constitutional aspects and the powers for the provinces to regulate 
"extraterritorial" transactions, P. ANISMAN, P.W. HOGU, supra, note 166, pp. 143-53. 
189. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 685. 
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59. The first rule is contained in s. 88(2)(c)(i) and clears up an 
ambiguity found in the 1966 Act. As stated by Alboini, 
[ujnder the Old Act, it was not clear whether fewer than 15 shareholders (now 
security holders) meant fewer than 15 registered shareholders or beneficial 
owners, particularly where a registered shareholder was acting on behalf of his 
beneficial owners.190 
Every direct beneficial owner of the securities has to be counted where an 
agreement ' " exists among them. The obligation to include them arises 
where the offeror deals with a registered securities holder acting as a trustee, 
an executor, administrator or other legal representative. 
This new rule will prevent the use of a trust or any other legal scheme in 
an attempt to be included as one of the fourteen. For example, more than 
fourteen security holders might have deposed their shares under a trust, such 
a trust appearing as one holder upon the sale of the shares192. The duty to 
discover such a device lies with the offeror. He must first know whether the 
seller is acting as a representative and, if so, the number of beneficial owners 
represented 193. 
60. Two exemptions are provided to the rule. An inter vivos trust 
established by a single settlor is excluded. This exemption presumably 
assumes 
[...] that the settlor has settled the shares on the trust personally. Since he could 
have sold them directly and counted as a single shareholder, it does seem 
inappropriate to include all of the beneficiaries under the trust in the number of 
shareholders subject to the agreement.194 
The second exemption applies where an estate "[...] has not been vested 
in all persons beneficially entitled thereto" l95. In such a case, the estate is 
viewed as being a single security holder as long as every person having a right 
in the will is unable to exercise or benefit from such a right. One of the results 
of this exemption was described as creating an onerous duty upon the trustee 
to dispose of the control block before the estate becomes fully vested, to 
avoid the counting rule 196. A potential conflict was thus seen between the 
190. Ibid. 
191. Such an agreement includes a trust, an estate or other type of arrangement. See Control 
Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-94. 
192. Ibid.; Älboini, supra, note 4, p. 685. 
193. Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 685-86. 
194. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. 1V-95. Two examples of such transactions 
are explained in Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 686. 
195. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 88(2)(c)(i). 
196. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-95; Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 686, 
gives an example which explains how the rule works. 
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best interest of the beneficiaries on the one hand and the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the trustee on the other. 
61. Generally speaking, the first counting rule is designed to solve very 
practical situations encountered in the past. The language used is relatively 
clear, although the expression other legal representatives was seen as creating 
some difficulties of interpretation. As underlined by Alboini, there is some 
question as to whether the ejusdem generis rule would restrict the meaning of 
other legal representatives to the preceding words of the section. 
The effect of such an interpretation would be to restrict the scope of 
application of s. 88(2)(c)(i)l97. It must be noted however that the OSC seems 
unwilling to be caught by a literal or technical interpretation of the private 
agreement exemption, as well as the follow-up offer requirement198. 
62. A second counting rule is found in s. 88(2)(c)(ii) and is alternative 
to the first. In short, the purchaser of a control block must discover whether 
the securities sold to him were acquired by the seller with the view to resell 
them through the private agreement exemption. The two years immediately 
preceding the agreement date must be investigated. If such is the case, each 
prior vendor must be counted. The rule is designed to prohibit schemes 
whereby sellers attempt to lower their number to fewer than fifteen security 
holders. This was indeed the case in Farnham ' " and in R v. Littler200, the 
latter being a criminal case dealing with charges of fraud. 
The second counting rule will apply whenever the first rule is inappli-
cable. The purchaser will have to hold a reasonable enquiry to know whether 
the securities were gathered by the seller "[...] with the intent that they 
should be sold under such agreement"201. As was noted, "[i]t is always a 
difficult matter where a party's reliance on an exemption depends upon 
another's intention"202. Where the securities sold were not acquired with 
such an intention, the prior vendor will not have to be counted as being one 
of the fourteen. Alboini also suggested that the rule would have to be 
respected only if the securities were bought to be sold to a specific offeror203. 
Without any clear indication of what a reasonable enquiry is, the second 
counting rule might be found to be much more vague than it may initially 
appear. 
197. Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 686-87. 
198. See e.g. Alco, supra, note 158. 
199. Supra, note 101. 
200. (1974) 41 D.L.R. (3d) 523; (1976) 65 D.L.R. (3d) 443 and 467 (Québec CA.). 
201. 1978 Act. supra, note 1, s. 88(2)(c)(ii)-
202. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 687. 
203. Ibid. 
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3.1.1.5. Not made to security holders generally 
63. The last component of s. 88(2)(c) stipulates that the offer is not 
made to security holders generally. The word generally has been the object of 
many discussions and interpretations. It was unknown in which cases an 
offer was not made to shareholders generally : whether it was an offer made 
to less than fifteen security holders204, or made to more than fifteen but 
concluded with fewer than fifteen205. An analogy with the public distribution 
of securities was also proposed206. The deletion of the word generally and its 
replacement by a specific number was suggested as well by Anisman to 
remedy this lack of clarity. 
64. The fact that the private agreement is an exempted takeover bid is 
not of much assistance. It is obvious that the offer required by s. 89(1)(1) of 
the 1978 Act is an offer made to shareholders generally. Such a pattern does 
not have to be followed where a sale by private agreement is concluded207 ; 
but it is still unclear how many people may be contacted before the offer 
qualifies as having been made to security holders generally. A comparison 
may be drawn with the seed capital offering208, which exemption limits the 
number of investors to be contacted to fifty, or seventy-five in the case of 
certain qualified tax shelters 209. However, it remains merely a comparison. 
The only thing which could be said with confidence is that the 1978 Act adopts 
the approach of regulating only the result of the offer (i.e. those concluded 
with fewer than fifteen people) and leaves aside the number of people to whom 
the offer may be proposed. It is likely that the Act was intentionally left 
uncertain in respect of this point in order to give flexibility to offerors. 
3.1.2. Private agreement, takeover bid and 
equality of treatment 
65. The introduction of a follow-up offer as a legal requirement 
following a sale of control made through an agreement was a response to a 
certain inequality of treatment existing between majority and minority 
security holders210. At the time this mechanism was introduced, the private 
204. D.D. PRENTICE, supra, note 59, p. 333. 
205. Anisman, supra, note 32, p. 43. 
206. D.D. PRENTICE, supra, note 59, pp. 333-34. 
207. See Notice Re: Take-Over Bids Private Agreements not Permitted While Bid Through 
Offering Circular Outstanding, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 19A (July 17) [hereinafter referred to as 
July 17 Notice]. 
208. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 71(l)(p); see N.N. ANTAKI, G. LECLERC, supra, note 63. 
209. Regulation Made Under The Securities Act, 1978. R.R.O. 1980 Reg 910, s. 14(e), (f), (g), 
[hereinafter referred to as Regulation]. See (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 80A (Nov. 13). 
210. See supra, introduction. 
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agreement exemption was used to acquire control from a specific group of 
individuals without tendering the same offer to the remaining security 
holders. Through such a device, one group was given an advantage while the 
other group was deprived of an equal opportunity2". On the other hand, a 
public takeover bid was another method of acquiring such control, this time 
an offer being made to all security holders. These two transactions, private 
agreement and takeover bid, were indeed used for the same general purpose, 
but very seldom were they utilized in conjunction with each other. 
66. The market situation then evolved. Since the late seventies, 
"takeover fever" has hit the North American marketplace, with the result 
that a tremendous amount of corporations have been either offerees or 
offerors. Private agreements began to be used along with takeover bids2'2, or 
together with the stock exchange or private company exemptions. These 
schemes resulted in an inequality of treatment between security holders. In 
short, different considerations were paid to specific groups who were willing 
to tender their shares213. For instance, market purchases through a stock 
exchange while a partial takeover bid had been launched was a way to 
provide an advantage to market sellers. A private agreement concluded prior 
to a takeover bid, with a consideration smaller than the one paid in the 
agreement, was another way to give specific groups a financial advantage for 
the sale of the same securities. 
Such manoeuvres were obviously designed to go against the concept of 
equality of treatment between security holders2'4. In Ontario, this concept 
underlies s. 89(3), 91(1) and s. 91(3) of the 1978 Act. The latter states that all 
holders of the same class of securities must be offered the same consideration 
211. See supra, # 14 and ff. 
212. See supra, note 184 and #55; July 17 Notice, supra, note 207. The takeover bid fight 
between First City Financial Corp. and Genstar for the control of Canada Permanent 
Mortgage Corp. was a transaction where private agreements were extensively used. See 
infra, till, and see J. WILLOUGMUY, "Genstar warned on private deals", The Globe and 
Mail, July 15, 1981, B-8; "Equivalency is issue in Belzberg follow-up". The Globe and 
Mail, July 21, 1981, B-l ; see also In the Matter of Genstar Corporation [notice of hearing], 
( 1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 62A (Oct. 16) ; In the Malter of First City Financial Corporation Ltd and 
240083 B.C. Ltd, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 185B (Oct. 16); In the Matter of Turbo Resources 
Limited, Merland Explorations Limited and Bankeno Mines Limited, (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 67C 
(March 26) [reasons] [hereinafter referred to as Turbo case, followed by the appropriate 
qualification ([order] [ruling] etc.)]. The OSC issued between July and March 1982 not 
less than twelve different statements in respect of this case. 
213. See July 17 Notice, supra, note 207; J. WII.LOUOHBY, "First City loses its private deals 
option in vying for Canada Permanent Control", The Globe and Mail, July 22, 1981, B-7. 
See infra, #72. 
214. See e.g. remarks made by the OSC Chairman, (1981) 2 O.S. C.B. 262A, p. 266A (Nov. 27); 
see infra, #71. 
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by an offeror making a takeover bid for their securities215. Any collateral 
agreement, which would provide a different consideration to certain holders 
of the same class of securities, is prohibited. 
67. The OSC has become very sensitive to transactions whereby voting 
stock is acquired through agreements followed by a takeover bid where 
remaining security holders are offered a different consideration216. In the 
opinion of the Commission, such a method of achieving transactions goes 
against the intent of Part XIX of the 1978 Act, especially s. 91(3)2". To deal 
with this situation, or put differently, to ensure a complete equality of treat-
ment between majority and minority218, the OSC issued late in April 1981 an 
Addendum219 to the Ontario Draft Policy 3-37 22°. 
68. The Addendum does not consider cases where a follow-up offer is 
required because equality of treatment is respected. However, the OSC is 
concerned with such equality where a private agreement is not a takeover 
bid, or is properly qualified under s. 88(2)(c), but where a follow-up bid does 
not have to be made221. The Commission's concern lies with the conside-
ration paid in a subsequent takeover bid, this often being inferior to the 
amount paid through the private agreement. The Addendum issued by the 
OSC has far-reaching consequences. The Commission will look at the whole 
scheme, including both the private agreement as well as the takeover bid, to 
determine whether the same consideration has been offered to every holder 
of the same class of securities for the purpose of s. 91(3). Such determination 
will apply when the purchaser has concluded a private agreement with the 
intention of making a subsequent takeover bid. Moreover, such an intention 
is deemed existing where a takeover bid is announced within 180 days of the 
215. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 91(3). 
216. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-110; see infra, #72. 
217. See July 17 Notice, supra, note 207, p. 20A. They have been considered as being takeover 
bids by the OSC; see J. WILLOUGHBY, "Private soliciting by Wood Gundy termed 
takeover", The Globe and Mail, July 3, 1981, B-2 [citing OSC's Chairman]. See also 
Addendum, infra, note 219, p. 24E. In Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, 
p. IV-110, the author also proposed that such a way to achieve transactions would be an 
infringement of s. 89(1)0), 91(3) and 94. 
218. See infra, U 146; see also McLaughlin, supra, note 3, pp. 112C-113C ; pp. 59-61 ; Torsiar, 
supra, note 8, pp. 67C-68C. 
219. Addendum to Draft Ontario Policy No. 3-37, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 24E (April 24) [hereinafter 
referred to as Addendum]. 
220. Draft Ontario Policy 3-37, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 7E (Feb. 13) [hereinafter referred to as Draft 
Policy 3-37]. It is a consolidation of Ontario Policy No. 3-37, Interim O.S.C. Policy 3-51 
and 3-52. In general, this new policy is designed to ensure that security holders are treated 
in a fair and even handed manner when certain types of combinations or business 
reorganizations occur. 
221. Addendum, supra, note 219, p. 24E. 
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date of the private agreement. The presumption applies prima facie and is 
rebuttable upon an application under s. 99222. 
Where the takeover bid is related or linked to an offer to purchase all 
securities of a class of any holder pursuant to a private agreement, such 
linked or related takeover has to be made for all securities of the class sought 
at a price at least as great as the one paid in the agreement223. 
69. One of the results of the Addendum is that two separate transactions 
are deemed to be only one transaction completed in two steps. The private 
agreement is viewed as an attempt to avoid treating each security holder of 
the same class equally where the purchaser seeks effective or absolute 
control224. A subsequent takeover bid made at a smaller consideration is 
then seen as a breach of s. 91(3). The question is therefore to know whether s. 
91(3) has to be considered and applied225, bearing in mind that a private 
agreement under s. 88(2)(c) is a takeover bid exempted from all the 
requirements of Part XIX of the 1978 Act, except s. 91(1). 
70. S. 91(1) is designed to force a purchaser to make a follow-up offer 
to the remaining security holders where s. 88(2)(c) has been properly relied 
upon. This offer, the only requirement which has to be observed by the 
purchaser, is deemed a takeover bid for purposes of Part XIX. The offer has 
to comply with this Part, except for the provision related to the consideration 
offered, because s. 91(1) contains specific requirements about this. A certain 
form of equality of treatment is therefore available to the remaining security 
holders226. The fact of making a takeover bid subsequent to or related to a 
private agreement, where such a bid is not legally required, cannot be a 
method of avoiding compliance with the principle of equality of treatment 
for all holders227. 
A private agreement is an exempted takeover bid subject to s. 91(1) and 
not to s. 91(3). The bid which has to respect s. 91(3) is not the private 
agreement, but rather the subsequent or related takeover bid made at a lower 
price. The consideration offered must be at least as great in respect of a 
related takeover bid and the same for a subsequent one228. The wording 
implies that the consideration paid in the first takeover, the private 
agreement, is higher. The second bid has therefore to be made either at the 
222. Id., p. 25E ; see supra, note 30 for U.S. law. 
223. Id., p. 24E; see infra, #71. 
224. See supra, introduction. 
225. See Control Block Transactions, supra, nolo 90, p. 1V-110, 111. 
226. About the consideration, s. 91(3) says that it must be the same, while s. 91(1) says that a 
consideration equal in value is sufficient. See infra, # 107 and ff. 
227. See infra, #97. 
228. See infra, # 107 and ff. 
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same or at a consideration at least as great as that offered in the first bid. The 
Addendum stresses that two takeover bids are launched for the same purpose 
and belong to the same transaction ; one bid is exempted and the other one is 
not exempted from Part XIX. Allowing the second bid not to have a 
consideration identical to or as great as the one paid in the first bid would 
constitute a breach of s. 91(3). However, it would be impossible to increase 
the price paid in the private agreement if the consideration of the second bid 
is higher, because the introductory language of s. 88(2) submits the private 
agreement of s. 88(2)(c) only to s. 91(1) and not to s. 91(3). Indeed, the 
Addendum submits only the second bid to s. 91(3) and not the first one, the 
Addendum being based upon the premise that the consideration paid in 
reliance on s. 88(2)(c) is higher than the one offered in the second bid, and 
that the private agreement has been entered into prior to the takeover bid. 
71. To cover this latter situation, the OSC has recently decided to rely 
upon s. 89(3) in order to challenge private agreements entered into at a 
consideration greater than the one offered in a takeover bid. This reliance 
upon s. 89(3) has emerged from the lengthly battle for the control of Canada 
Permanent ; the Commission is taking the view that both offers are linked or 
integrally related to one another, thereby infringing upon s. 89(3)2M. 
72. During the course of the same takeover bid230, the Commission 
faced a new situation where private agreements were used simultaneously to 
a public takeover circular. The Commission has responded to this practice 
with orders pursuant to s. 124231 denying the availability of s. 88(2)(c) to the 
offeror, and cease trading orders232. It has also ruled that these agreements 
ought to be viewed as takeover bids233, and that such a procedure was 
against the spirit of the 1978 Act. The OSC has also decided that these 
agreements could not be said as being market purchases234. 
73. The stock exchange purchases have not been prohibited so far. 
Early in April 1981, the Commission refused to express comments on the 
offerors' rights to purchase on the floors of stock exchanges while making 
229. See Notice of Hearing In the Matter of Genstar Corporation, (1981) 2 O.S. C.B. 62A (Oct. 
16). No decision has yet been reached. 
230. See also supra, #55. 
231. See supra, note 184; Genstar Corp. and Canada Permanent Mortgage Corp., (1981) 2 
O.S.C.B. 37B (July 17). This order was subsequently rescinded; see July 17 Notice, supra, 
note 207, p. 19A. 
232. See e.g. Penn West Petroleum Ltd. Strom Resources Ltd, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 21D (July 17), 
rescinded (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 80B (Aug. 7). 
233. Supra, note 217. 
234. July 17 Notice, supra, note 207, p. 20A. 
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takeover bids235. It refused however the right to purchase through the 
private market236. 
74. It is obvious that the actual market situation has a distortive effect 
upon the use of private agreements. The problem is no longer whether a 
corporation's asset is sold, entitling all security holders to share its value and 
being offered an equal opportunity. It is rather to determine whether every 
security holder, either majority or minority, is given an equal treatment in 
takeover bid situations 237. 
That "evolution" of the use of the private agreement exemption and the 
increasing involvment of the Commission raise more substantial questions 
on a long term basis. That s. 88(2)(c) had been used first by sophisticated 
investors, then as a device to sell control at a premium and now as collateral 
manoeuvres to succeed in takeover fights is per se somewhat irrelevant. On 
the other hand, the OSC's involvment may be justified by the necessity to 
protect both the Ontario market credibility and minority shareholders, two 
objectives of the 1978 Act2n. The true question is to determine the extent to 
which market participants are willing to be regulated239; in other words, is 
the concept of equality of treatment still fully applicable and desirable in the 
North American marketplace? 
3.2. The follow-up offer 
3.2.1. Prerequisite conditions of application 
3.2.1.1. Private agreement 
75. Where a takeover bid is exempted from Part XIX of the 1978 Act, 
because it falls within the private agreement exemption, the purchaser is 
subject to the provisions of s. 91(1) if the conditions of application are met. 
This will happen if there is a published market for the securities bought 
through a private agreement, and if the price paid exceeds 15% of the 
average price listed on this published market. The follow-up offer will have 
235. See July 17 Notice, supra, note 207, where it was stressed that these purchases have to be 
made through a stock exchange or at the OTC market. 
236. See supra, note 212; see Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV—112. 
237. See e.g. infra, #86. 
238. See for a powerful example, Turbo case [reasons], supra, note 212, 82C. 
239. So far, the Commission has clearly stated that its involvement in takeovers ought not to 
imply either a violation of the law and the policies or criticism of the conduct of any party. 
See e.g. Notice Re : Commission Enquiry — Take-over Bid Legislation and Policy. Proposed 
Take-Over Bid for Noranda Mines Ltd, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 22A (July 24). 
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to be made within 180 days of the date of the agreement, at a consideration 
equivalent to the greatest one paid in the agreement240. 
76. As was suggested above, it might be possible to conclude a sale by 
way of agreement which does not fall within s. 88(2)(c). In such a case, two 
options face the purchaser. In the first, no takeover bid is made, thereby 
preventing s. 88(2)(c) from coming into play. In such an instance, there are 
no consequences for the purchaser because the Ontario legislation does not 
apply to this private agreement transaction241. 
In the second instance however, there is a takeover bid as defined by 
s. 88(l)(k), but the conditions of s. 88(2)(c) have not been fulfilled. The result 
in this case is completely different vis-à-vis the purchaser. Because he has 
made a takeover bid which does not comply with the requirements of the 
1978 Act, he contravenes the Act and is guilty of an offence under s. 118(1). 
Moreover, those security holders acting as sellers have a right of rescission 
against the purchaser, and every other security holder to whom a takeover 
bid circular should have been communicated has a right to claim damages242. 
3.2.1.2. The published market 
77. Where s. 88(2)(c) has been properly relied upon, another condition 
must be satisfied before a follow-up offer is required ; there must be a 
published market for the class of securities acquired through the private 
agreement243. This expression is defined in s. 88(l)(j) and refers to a stock 
exchange recognized by the OSC on which the offeree company's securities 
are listed, or any other market on which such securities are traded, providing 
that the trading prices are published in a newspaper or a business publi-
cation. In its Policy i-42244, the Commission recognized the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) for the purposes of s. 88(1)0). In this Policy, the OSC also 
emphasized that the TSE would not be the only exchange qualified as being a 
published market. The second part of the definition implies that almost any 
established stock exchange in Canada or elsewhere would be considered an 
acceptable published market245. 
240. S. 91(1) may also become compulsory if an offeror, without being legally bound to do so, 
undertakes to make an equivalent offer to remaining security holders. See infra, U 107 and 
ff. 
241. See ALBOINI, supra, note 4, p. 723. 
242. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 130; see Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-97. 
243. See In the Matter of Sands Oil & Gas Exploration Limited, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 188B(Oct. 16) 
where no published market existed ; an exemption under s. 99(e) from s. 91(1) was granted. 
244. Ontario Policy No. 3-42, Recognition of Stock Exchanges, (1979) O.S.C. Weekly Summary, 
(Sept. 14), 183, revised in March 1981. 
245. Id., p. 185. 
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3.2.1.3. The market price 
78. The meaning of market price, as well as its calculation, are the core 
of s. 91(1). Generally speaking, a follow-up offer will be mandatory where 
the consideration paid for the securities sold through the private agreement 
is 15% or more above such market price. 
79. This expression is defined in s. 88(l)(e) and refers to two alternative 
methods: (1) the opportunity for the Commission to determine what the 
market price of the securities is, in accordance with s. 99(b); or (2) where 
such a determination has not been made, the market price is calculated 
according to the Regulation. In both cases, the market price refers to the 
published market of the class of securities acquired by private agreement. 
3.2.1.3.1. The method under the Regulation 
80. The method of calculating the market price under the Regulation is 
found in s. 163 ; it is defined as being 15% in excess of the simple average of 
the closing price of the securities exchanged during each of the ten business 
days preceding the date of the first agreement246. The day on which the 
agreement is to take place should not be included in calculating the ten 
days247. The computation is conducted for the class of securities acquired 
through the private agreement. The closing price is determined daily by 
reference to the type of published market of the class of securities bought. 
Where there is more than one published market, but only one within 
Canada, the closing price is the price per security of the last trade effected on 
the Canadian published market. Odd and block transactions are excluded 
from the calculation. In the event that only excluded transactions were 
conducted, the closing price would simply be an average of the bid and ask 
prices248. 
81. This last part of s. 163 has been given an extended meaning by the 
OSC in the Newsco2*9 case. In the calculation presented by the applicant, 
transactions occurred during only six of the ten days required. The average 
was then calculated by reference to this number, the effect being an increase 
of the market price and a decrease of the premium resulting from the sale. It 
does not seem that any excluded transactions were concluded during the four 
246. Regulation, s. 163(3). 
247. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-98. 
248. Regulation, s. 163(1) and (2). 
249. In the Matter of Ronalds-Federated Ltd and In the Matter ofNewsco Investments Ltd, ( 1980) 
O.S.C. Bulletin, 304 (July 1980) [hereinafter referred to as Newsco}. See infra, #130 for the 
facts on the case. 
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days left aside. The Commission did not accept this method of calculation. It 
said that s. 163(1) should have been applied, using the bid and ask prices 
published by the TSE to determine the closing price250. 
82. When there is more than one Canadian published market, the 
relevant one will be selected on the basis of the greatest volume of trading in 
the particular class of securities acquired through the private agreement for 
the ten business days preceding the date thereof. The same pattern will be 
used when selecting an appropriate market located in a foreign jurisdiction. 
There is nothing to suggest what happens if there is no Canadian but several 
foreign published markets. The use of the trading volume should however 
address this difficulty. Finally, a published market is deemed non-existing 
where no closing price may be calculated for at least one of the ten business 
days. 
3.2.1.3.2. The method under the Commission's discretion 
83. The other method which may be used to determine the market 
price is to seek a ruling from the Commission based upon s. 99(b). This 
section gives the OSC the power to set aside the calculation made in 
accordance with the Regulation and to substitute its own finding. Such a 
determination may only be made where the market price has been affected 
by an anticipated takeover bid or by improper manipulation. Indeed, 
specific rumours and activities, organized by either the purchaser or the 
seller, may result in an increase of the market price over a short length of 
time, thereby decreasing the premium received and eventually setting aside 
the follow-up obligation originally required251. The pressure created by an 
anticipated takeover may also push the value of the securities up or down, 
thereby producing a price which is not representative of the "[...] true 
trading prices of such securities"252. Section 99(b) is designed to provide a 
remedy to such situations. 
84. The section might be classified within the category of the anti-
avoidance rules of the follow-up offer. In fact, the purpose of s. 99(b) is 
emphasized by the eventuality that security holders might be intentionally 
deprived from the premium to which they are entitled following either 
questionable practices from the purchaser or unrealistic market situations 253. 
250. Id, p. 307. 
251. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-99 and IV-107. A good example of a 
similar situation during the course of a takeover fight is found in a Notice released by the 
OSC in September 1981 and again in February 1982. See Take-Over Bids: Security 
Exchange Offers Market "Support", "Maintenance" or "Stabilization". (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 
48A (Sept. 25); (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 64A (Feb. 5). 
252. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(I). supra, note 15, p. 119C. 
253. Id., p. 120C. 
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85. Section 99(b) allows the Commission to exercise its discretion only 
if certain criteria are established. It must be satisfied that a takeover bid was 
anticipated, and, if so, whether such an anticipation affected the market 
price of the securities sold by private agreement254. Where these two findings 
are positive, the OSC may determine, "[...] if it chooses to do so"255, a new 
market price. 
86. The OSC decision in the BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l) case gives the 
impression that the Commission will act very cautiously where requested to 
exercise its discretionary power under s. 99(b). In its first decision under 
s. 99(b), the Commission emphasized the fact that it should not "[...] abuse 
the rights of majority security holders"256. Applied specifically to the case 
decided, the OSC noted that such security holders should not be deprived 
from the opportunity to sell their control block without the purchaser being 
obliged to make a follow-up offer simply "[...] because the market players 
anticipated a second take-over bid [...] or a follow-up bid by the offeror, with 
no evidence upon which such anticipation could reasonably be based"257. 
The Commission went further and linked the exercise of its discretion 
on the existence and reliance by investors upon a bona fide trading price. It 
said that cautiousness will be exercised in calculating a market price different 
from the one arrived at under s. 163 of the Regulation where the "[...] 
published market prices reflect the auction market's perception of the actual 
exchange market value of the subject security"258. Using the same concept, 
the Commission further said it would be improper to compel a purchaser to 
make a follow-up offer where the bona fide market relied upon is subse-
quently viewed as having been "substantially affected" 259 by tradings whose 
object was to trigger the application of s. 91(1). In other words, the OSC is 
not only attempting to prevent majority security holders from using artificial 
schemes to avoid s. 91(1), but as well to prohibit minority security holders 
from devising similar schemes to obtain a mandatory follow-up offer260. 
254. The same pattern also applies with respect to improper manipulation. 
255. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l), supra, note 15, p. 118C. 
256. Id., p. 120C. 
257. Ibid.; see also BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2). infra, note 441, p. 16C. 
258. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l). supra, note 15, p. 120C. 
259. Id., p. 121C. The Commission stressed in the prior paragraph that "[t]here must be 
confidence in the marketplace for holders of large blocks of securities as well as for holders 
of small blocks of securities". Page 120C. 
260. See also BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), infra, note 441, pp. 14C-15C. The actual Chairman has 
compared those cases to "consumerism-type litigation" launched by "Nader-like people". 
See (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 262A, p. 266A (Nov. 27). 
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87. In the BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l) case, s. 99(b) was used to chal-
lenge261 the deal concluded by Noranda Mines Ltd with Alberta Energy Co. 
Ltd, whereby Noranda sold to AEC its 28% holding in British Columbia 
Forest Products. In late March 1981, Noranda made a takeover bid to 
acquire MacMillan Bloedel. In a response to a letter from the British 
Columbia Minister of Forests, Noranda announced early in April a willing-
ness to sell its interest in BCFP. On April 25, Noranda agreed to sell its 
holding to AEC by way of private agreement in consideration of $25 a share, 
but the information that a deal had been reached was not released until May 
15. Because the consideration paid was not in excess of the market price, the 
OSC first ruled that AEC would not have to comply with s. 91(1)262. 
An application was then filed by Cemp Investments Ltd and several 
other security holders under s. 99(b), asking the Commission to determine a 
new market price for the shares of BCFP for the reason that such shares had 
been affected by an anticipated takeover bid263. The applicants were 
obviously attempting to compel AEC to make them a follow-up offer. Such 
an offer was at that time impossible since no "excess premium" 264 had been 
paid. If they were able to lower the stock exchange price, then the market 
price would decrease and the premium paid would correspondingly increase. 
The 15% premium allowed would therefore no longer be respected, bringing 
into play s. 91(1). 
88. The result of the decision is that a new market price will not 
automatically be calculated by the Commission where it has been established 
that an anticipated takeover bid had affected the market price of the 
securities sold by private agreement. In the BCFP-Noranda-AEC(1) case, the 
evidence submitted was very technical ; evidence from financial analysts as 
well as a substantial amount of financial data were presented to the OSC. 
However, the determination of a new market price will be made with respect 
to the two tests laid down by the Commission : the need not to abuse the 
majority's rights and the existence and reliance by investors on a bona fide 
trading market. 
89. The first test may be viewed as a test of general application which 
might serve as a guideline where the OSC exercises its discretion under any 
subsection of s. 99. The fact that the statement was made in relation to the 
Commission's responsibility and duty seems a clear indication that the OSC 
does not intend to restrict its application only to s. 99(b). Phrased differently, 
261. It was also used before as reported in Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, 
p. IV-108; see also BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), infra, note 441, pp. 8C to 11C. 
262. See The Globe and Mail, May 22, 1981, B-7. 
263. Id., May 23, B-20. 
264. See infra, note 271. 
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the test might be viewed as a measure of safety for a bona fide purchaser 
concluding a transaction under s. 88(2)(c) where the public price is distorted 
by the effect of the actual "takeover fever". In fact the test could be viewed 
as independent from the second one, and might be applied even though the 
reliance on a bona fide trading market is not properly established or is 
doubtful. 
90. The second test is based on the investor's reliance upon a bona fide 
trading market : it brings into play the need to determine the parties' 
intention. Highly subjective, the test gives the Commission the difficult duty 
"[...] to look at the intention of the parties and [...] to ascertain what parties 
do knowingly"265. As noted by the OSC, this difficulty should not prevent 
the Commission from attempting to protect the interests of both majority 
and minority security holders266. These two tests do not narrow the 
availability of s. 99(b), but rather restrict the chance of a ruling modifying 
the market price established under s. 163 of the Regulation. 
3.2.1.3.3. Other elements of the market price 
91. In the calculation, reasonable brokerage fees or other commissions 
can be added to the market price. The OSC noted in Newsco that where none 
of these fees were paid as part of the private agreement, no such amount 
should be added to the market price. What had been done by Newsco was to 
add the maximum commission applicable on a retail trade to the market 
price, thereby increasing it. Counsel for the TSE pointed this out, and the 
Commission agreed that such a calculation was improper267. One commis-
sioner disagreed on the point, saying that such was not a determining factor 
as to the application of s. 91(1). Relying upon the company's computation of 
the market price, he said the point was not vital nor was the Commission 
required to express an opinion on the meaning of the statutory language268. 
92. Once the market price has been properly calculated, then the 
consideration paid by the purchaser has to be determined. Where the offer 
has been made in cash, in Canadian currency, the result is automatic. 
However, where the sum was paid both in cash and in securities, conversion 
265. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(l), supra, note 15, p. 121C. 
266. Ibid. 
267. Newsco, supra, note 249, pp. 307-08. 
268. Id., p. 316. He added that 
[,..] [h]ad the point been significant I would have held that because a price paid in a 
market transaction ordinarily would have been increased by a brokerage fee or 
commission it was the intent of the statute that the statutory market price was to be 
calculated on the same basis. 
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ratios as well as the exchange rate of a foreign currency will be used if 
required269. The result will be an amount in Canadian dollars. 
93. As soon as the consideration paid exceeds the market price, a 
follow-up offer is mandatory. In fact, the meaning of market price itself 
allows a 15% premium above the price listed on a published market. Such 
"allowable control block premium"270 must be distinguished from the 
"excess premium"271, which is any amount above the one allowed. The 
result is unequivocal272: "an excessive premium, however, small, require[s] 
[the applicant] to make a follow-up offer to the remaining shareholders [...] 
or to seek an exemption"273. 
This point is crucial. The amount of the excess premium is irrelevant 
when considering whether or not the purchaser has to make a follow-up 
offer. In Newsco, the excess premium was worth $0.78 and in Atco, $1.96. 
These amounts, regardless of how small they were, brought into play the 
follow-up requirement274. The fact that such a result may appear extreme on 
some occasions275 is also irrelevant ; what triggers the follow-up offer is not 
the consequences thereof, but rather whether the prerequisite conditions are 
fulfilled. 
94. The Interim Report put forth an interesting suggestion as to the 
concept of allowable control premium and the excess one by proposing that 
the consideration paid in the follow-up offer be limited to that excess 
premium. As they explained, 
[t]his would recognize, in effect, that a 15% premium was acceptable and non-
abusive of the interests of minority shareholders, and that a sharing of the 
premium was necessary only to the extent that the premium exceeded the 
amount which the legislation permitted.276 
269. See for an example Atco, supra, note 158, p. 418. 
270. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 307. 
271. Ibid. 
272. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 112C; pp. 59-60. 
273. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 308. See infra, #ch. 4. 
274. See Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 311 and Atco, supra, note 158, pp. 419-20. 
275. In the case of Newsco, an excess premium worth $0.78 forced the company to spend $18 
millions for the follow-up offer. The Commission was however very sensitive and cautious 
about the consequences of a follow-up offer. It said that such a result (for Newsco) 
is quite true, but it only illustrates that a general Policy Statement such as 3-41, and a 
definition of market price such as is attempted by s. 162(3) of the Regulations, cannot 
cover all possible situations. Experience may dictate that amendments to the Act, the 
regulations and the Policy Statement will be necessary to take account of the realities of 
the marketplace and to insure that equity is done as between shareholders. In accordance 
with the Commission's practice, before any such changes are made they will be exposed 
for public comment and discussion. 
Newsco, supra, note 249, pp. 314-15. 
276. Interim Report, supra, note 16, p. 236A. 
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The suggestion respects the spirit of the 1978 Act and gives more 
flexibility to the purchaser while recognizing that the control block has a 
specific value which may lawfully belong to the seller so long as it stays 
within a reasonable amount. It cannot be said that equality of treatment 
between shareholders is not respected since the 1978 Act already permits a 
reasonable premium. The suggestion put forward by the Interim Report 
simply attempts to case the administration of s. 91(1)277. 
3.2.2. Conditions of application 
95. Where the conditions found in both s. 88(2)(c) and s. 91(1) are met, 
a follow-up offer to the remaining security holders has to be made within 180 
days of the date of the first agreement278. As the Commission noted, 
[...] a follow-up offer is required only if there is a published market in the class 
of securities acquired and the value of the consideration paid for any such 
securities exceeds the defined market price at the date of the relevant agreement 
plus reasonable brokerage fees.2" 
96. This statement seems to imply that the follow-up offer is required 
only where all the conditions discussed above are satisfied ; Policy 3-4128° 
reinforces this view281. One difficulty comes from the fact that the Policy also 
states that a follow-up offer is expected even though "[...] some or all of the 
conditions triggering the obligation in section 91(1) are not present"282. 
Moreover the OSC, paraphrasing the same section of the Policy, said that the 
starting point for making a follow-up offer is an expectation, and if s. 91(1) is 
applicable, a legal requirement283. Both statements were made in the context 
of the accepted bias in good commercial practices which favors making such 
an offer. 
This possible interpretation is unlikely284, having regard to the actual 
state of the law in Ontario. It is further doubtful that a moral bias would be 
sufficient to impose upon the purchaser of control such a general offer. The 
forcefulness with which people are seeking an exemption from s. 91(1) is 
277. This suggestion will unlikely be retained having regard to the actual interpretation given to 
s. 91(1) by the OSC. 
278. It must be stressed that the offer must be made by the Offeror. Unless an exemption is 
granted under s. 99(e), a subsidiary or another company could not be substituted to the 
Offeror to comply with s. 91(1). See Turbo case [reasons] supra, note 212, p. 79C. 
279. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 306; see also Aico, supra, note 158, p. 417. Emphasis added. 
280. See infra, note 345. 
281. Id, p. 177. 
282. Ibid. 
283. Newsco, supra, note 249, pp. 311-12, repeated in Alco, supra, note 158, p. 420. 
284. See infra. #130 to 133. 
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indicative of the purchaser's reluctance to extend the private offer to every 
security holder. Furthermore, in all the decisions released dealing with 
s. 91(1), the Commission has carefully established that all the threshold tests 
found in s. 91(1) were satisfied before compelling the purchaser to make a 
follow-up bid. The statement found in Policy 3-41 may be indicative of the 
direction in which the OSC would like to see the purchaser's behavior move, 
but is merely an indication of such a desire, not a legal requirement. 
97. Notwithstanding this interpretation, a follow-up offer may also 
become compulsory even though the legal obligation to do so might have 
been non existant. This is indeed what happened in the Turbo case, where 
Turbo undertook to make a general offer to the minority shareholders of 
Merland. Even though the OSC decided that a takeover bid had been 
implemented, it said that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the 
offer made by Turbo whether its obligation arose from the Act or from its 
voluntary commitment285. In other words, a purchaser of control who agrees 
to make a follow-up offer on a voluntary basis must strictly comply with the 
legal requirements applicable. 
This position has far-reaching consequences. The flexibility which 
might have been gained from an undertaking to respect s. 91(1) seems to 
disappear. It is now probably easier for a purchaser to wait until being 
ordered to make a follow-up offer rather than attempting to respect a 
legislative spirit with which he likely disagrees. In any event, it seems that 
s. 91(1) is becoming the section to avoid286. This situation appears to result 
from an attempt to apply a certain philosophy to a reluctant marketplace 
through a legislation which everyone thought was not going to be strictly 
enforced. 
3.2.2.1. Within 180 days 
98. As stated above, the follow-up offer must be made within 180 days 
of the date of the first agreement. Such an offer being deemed a takeover bid, 
the requirements of the 1978 Act must therefore be followed287. 
99. However, a ruling sought under s. 99(e) might prevent the offeror 
from being caught by the timing rule. The facts of each individual case will 
likely exercise a strong influence as to whether the ruling is considered not 
prejudicial to the public interest. Among these facts, the diligence of the 
applicant will be heavily relied upon. In the Turbo case for instance, the 
Commission issued an offer extending from December 29, 1981 to February 
285. Turbo case [reasons], supra, note 212, p. 86C. 
286. See infra, H 141. 
287. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 91(1) in fine. 
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26, 1982 the follow-up offer Turbo Resources had undertaken to complete 
several months before288. Turbo represented to the OSC that it had 
experienced delays in completing evaluations of both Merland and Turbo 
shares and that other reasons beyond its control had hampered the Turbo 
follow-up offer. It is worth noting that the proposed federal budget tabled on 
November 12, 1981, high interest rates and equity market prices were some 
of the events relied upon by Turbo in seeking the ruling289. 
100. Another method of postponing the follow-up offer is to seek an 
exemption pursuant to either s. 99(a) or (e). Furthermore, if the exemption is 
denied, the follow-up offer shall still be made within the time allowed290. 
Quasi-criminal sanctions, civil actions, either by offerees or the OSC291 may 
otherwise be launched against the purchaser. 
The time at which the exemption must be presented is an important 
feature. In McLaughlin for instance292, the exemption was submitted on 
March 6, 1981, exactly nine days before the expiration of the 180 days 
period293, while the hearing took place on April 14. The initial agreement 
was concluded on September 16, 1980. Relying upon the wording of s. 99(a), 
counsel argued that the Commission could not issue an order pursuant to s. 
99(a) in favor of the applicant where the time allowed to make the follow-up 
offer had expired294. They also relied upon the OSC policy of not granting 
applications having a retroactive effect295, underlying that a positive ruling 
in favor of McLaughlin would have the effect of retroactively curing the 
applicant's default296. 
288. A Follow-up Offer by Turbo Resources Limited to Security Holders of Merland Explorations 
Limited, (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 14B (Jan. 15), varied and exented until March 5, 1982, by an 
order pursuant to s. 140 : In the Matter of a Take-Over Bid by Bankeno Mines Limited for 
Securities of Merland Explorations Limited, (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 164B (Feb. 26). 
289. See (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 14B, p. 15B (Jan. 15). 
290. Newsco. supra, note 249, p. 314. 
291. See infra, #101, #103 and #104. 
292. Memorandum to the Commission, April 6, 1981, released April 14, 1981 at the hearing 
[hereinafter referred to as Staff submissions]. 
293. The reasons for such a delay were explained at the hearing by counsel for McLaughlin, 
and were due to reasons beyond the control of the applicant. However, the staff submis-
sions stressed the fact that 
[...] McLaughlin placed himself and the Commission in a position where it was not 
feasible for the matter to be dealt with in the normal course prior to March 15. 
[...] Even if the application could have been considered and decided on March 6, if it were 
refused, McLaughlin would have had only nine days to comply with subsection 91(1) by 
making a follow-up offer. This would have been physically impossible, especially since 
compliance with (or exemption from) the additional requirements of O.S.C. Policy 3-37 
would have been necessary. 
See Staff submissions, supra, note 292, pp. 6-7. 
294. Id, pp. 5-6. 
295. Id, p. 6. 
296. Id, p. 7. 
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Despite the fact that such an argument was made in relation to s. 99(a), 
it may possibly be made under s. 99(e) as well. Therefore, an application 
seeking an extension of time or an exemption would have to be presented 
before the expiration of the period allowed to comply with s. 91(1)297. A 
request made subsequently to such an expiration would likely be denied, 
according to the staff counsel's argumentation in McLaughlin. 
101. Such an application brings into play s. 129 of the 1978 Act which 
provides the remaining security holders with a civil right of action where an 
offeror: (1) does not make a follow-up offer; (2) makes one, but with a 
consideration different in value from the greatest one offered in the private 
agreement ; or (3) refuses to take up the securities deposited pursuant to such 
an offer298. The section gives them the right to receive the benefit of the 
greatest financial offer made in the private agreement. Where the conside-
ration is not equal in value, they are entitled to receive the difference between 
the two amounts. In both offers, damages may be assessed if they can be 
established. Section 135 stipulates the time within which the action may be 
brought: not more than 180 days after the plaintiff first acquires knowledge 
of the offeror's breach, or three years after the date of the breach, whichever 
is earlier. Where no offer is made, the right of action is available only where 
the 180 days period has not been respected. 
102. The question to solve starts from the premise that a positive 
ruling has been released. Where an extension of time is sought, a positive 
ruling would prohibit any action based upon s. 129 for the reason that the 
180 days period has not yet expired299. On the other hand, an order based 
either upon s. 99(a) or (e) exempting the purchaser from s. 91(1) once the time 
limit is expired would also prohibit security holders from using s. 129 since an 
exemption from the follow-up offer requirement has been granted. The 
application of s. 129 is conditional upon a finding that s. 91(1) has not been 
respected. 
The same considerations are pertinent where an action under s. 129 is 
started before an appropriate ruling has been issued by the OSC. In this case, 
a positive ruling will obviously have a retroactive effect nullifying the right of 
action under s. 129. The remaining security holders will therefore lose on 
both sides. On the other hand, a negative decision will leave two choices : to 
accept and wait for the follow-up bid or to waive such a right and continue 
the legal action launched under s. 129. These options seem mutually 
exclusive. However, it must be noted that the remaining security holders are 
297. See e.g. Turbo case, [reasons] supra, note 212 and supra, note 288. 
298. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 129; see Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 728. 
299. But not the right to receive the follow-up. See supra, note 288, p. 15B. 
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not disadvantaged by such an interpretation. If they wait for the follow-up 
bid, they will be paid the same amount as they would have received under 
s. 129, with the exception of damages. However, these damages could likely 
be nominal, especially where the length of time between the end of the 180 
days and the OSC ruling is brief. Bearing in mind the time, energy and 
specifically the legal costs which must be incurred in seeking a court ruling 
on the obligation, it would be more appropriate and faster for them to waive 
their rights under s. 129 and to accept the offer made by the purchaser. The 
Commission should be sensitive to these costs involved and not be reluctant 
to issue a negative ruling solely because a legal action has been started by 
some security holders. 
103. Besides s. 129, the OSC may force a purchaser of control to 
comply with s. 91(1) by obtaining an order for compliance under s. 122(1). 
So far, the Commission has used s. 122(1) in McLaughlin 30° and intends to in 
the Turbo caseMi. In a decision released late in December, the Supreme 
Court of Ontario granted the request compelling McLaughlin to proceed 
with the follow-up offer. 
104. The judge made interesting comments during the course of his 
decision. Saying that Mr. McLaughlin had declared in an affidavit his 
incapacity to pay the offer, he added that he was not 
prepared to refuse the order on the hypothetical possibility that he [McLaughlin] 
will not be able to pay for every outstanding place and when it is not known 
how many shareholders will accept the offer and what assets McLaughlin has 
to meet these acceptances.302 
Had McLaughlin been financially unable to pay, it seems that the Court 
would have denied the OSC request. This raises the question as to whether 
s. 91(1) should not be enforced because of its adverse effect upon the 
purchaser. It is submitted again that, in the actual state of the law, the 
impact of a follow-up offer is irrelevant and should not be taken into 
consideration to decide whether the purchaser must proceed with the 
offer. Once the prerequisite conditions of application are fulfilled, 
s. 91(1) is mandatory. Furthermore, if s. 91(1) is not respected, the late 
purchaser may be guilty of an offence under s. 118 303 of the Act. Such 
liability may probably coexist with a civil action pursuant to s. 129 or may be 
started as soon as the follow-up obligation has been infringed upon. The fact 
that the follow-up bid will be made later, to comply with an OSC decision, 
should not be accepted as a defence to an action under s. 118 ; the offence is 
in the breach of s. 91(1) and its timing. 
300. (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. C-l (Jan. 8). 
301. Turbo case, [decision] supra, note 212, 57C, p. 64C (March 12). 
302. Supra, note 300, pp. C-6, C-7. 
303. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 118(c) or (d). 
G. LECLERC The Sale of Control 87 
3.2.2.2. To security holders in Ontario or in a uniform 
act province 
105. The follow-up offer must be made in respect of all the additional 
securities of the same class owned by security holders living either in Ontario 
or in a uniform act province. This latter expression is defined in s. 88(1)(1), 
and is understood as being a province or territory, designated by Regulation, 
where legislation contains provisions "substantially the same" both as the 
Ontario takeover bid section and s. 129. Although it is expected that the four 
western provinces and Québec will fall within the definition304, such a 
regulation determining uniform act province has not yet been issued. 
106. The inclusion of non-Ontario security holders to whom a follow-
up bid is offered has been seen as demonstrating "[...] the difficulties 
inherent in any attempt to develop a national regulatory scheme through 
uniform provincial legislation"305. The authors of the federal Proposals 
noted that such an offer would have been ineffective where made only to 
Ontario security holders. They also stressed that the expression uniform act 
province was an "unsatisfactory halfway measure"306 because minority 
security holders not living in such a province would still be excluded from 
the follow-up bid required. An offer to all security holders resident in 
Canada was therefore suggested as a preferable alternative. Finally, ques-
tions were raised respecting the constitutional aspects of the takeover bid 
section of the 1978 Act. The takeover bid definition, unrestricted to the 
province of Ontario (as well as the follow-up offer deemed a takeover bid), 
was seen as an attempt to regulate interprovincial transactions, being 
thereby beyond the scope of provincial jurisdiction307. The forcefulness of 
such an argument must however be assessed by reference to the actual 
interpretation given to the different securities legislation in Canada, as 
acknowledged by the authors of the ProposalsWi. So far, it does not seem 
that constitutional grounds have been used to oppose the follow-up offer 
obligation. 
3.2.2.3. A consideration at least equal in value to the 
greatest one paid in the agreement 
107. The offer made to the remaining security holders must be equal in 
value to the greatest amount paid at the time the agreement was concluded. 
304. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 727. 
305. P. ANISMAN, P.W. HOGG, supra, note 166, p. 149. 
306. Id., p. 150, note 72. 
307. Id., note 73. 
308. Id., eh. 2, pp. 143-53. 
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The consideration offered to the two categories of security holders need not 
be identical309 : an equality in value is sufficient. This pattern, likely designed 
to give the offeror more flexibility310, has so far proven to be the most 
difficult feature to apply. 
At the time the Act was enacted, s. 99(c) did not raise substantial 
questions. Any interested person was given the opportunity to submit an 
application hereunder ; this application likely had to be made before the 
consideration was tendered3". A valuation of the shares was suggested 
where the offeror was seeking the ruling312. 
108. The takeover fever had however a serious impact upon these 
initial considerations and drastically increased the involvment of the OSC. 
An Addendum to Draft Policy 3-37 was released to deal with the type of 
consideration to be offered in case of concurrent takeover bids and private 
agreements. A takeover bid made concurrently to an agreement will have to 
contain a consideration at least as equal as the one offered in such an 
agreement. In case where an agreement is entered into with the intention to 
make a subsequent takeover bid, and where s. 88(2)(c) does not apply or a 
follow-up bid is not required, the same consideration as that in the agreement 
has to be offered in the takeover bid313. 
309. Torstar, supra, note 8, pp. 64C and 66C. 
310. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 728. 
311. The timing of an application pursuant to s. 99(c) appeared to be an important factor 
before the OSC decision in the Turbo case. The wording of s. 99(c) implies that an 
application by the Offeror must be made before the offer is tendered to the remaining 
security holders. The Commission would likely lose jurisdiction once the offer is made. 
The situation is a little more troublesome where offerees submit the application. Once the 
consideration has been tendered to them, it seems that they will not be able to obtain a 
decision from the Commission because the consideration offered is no longer a proposed 
consideration to be offered. The Offeree would therefore never be given the opportunity to 
make an application under s. 99(c), unless the Commission is willing to accept an 
argument to the effect that the consideration offered remains a "consideration proposed 
to be offered" in respect of each security holder, until accepted. Even though s. 129 is still 
available, the remaining security holders would have to bear all of the drawbacks of a civil 
action. An injunction might however be applied for in an attempt to stop the offer from 
being completed, or an order to the OSC pursuant to s. 123. See generally Alboini, supra, 
note 4, p. 728. In the course of the bid for Canada Permanent, First City undertook to 
apply to the OSC pursuant to s. 99(c) at the time where the precise terms of its offer were 
unknown or undetermined. See (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 85B (Aug. 14). Since the decision in the 
Turbo case, this reasoning seems doubtful. 
312. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 728. 
313. Addendum, supra, note 219, p. 24E ; see supra, #70. The principle found in s. 91(3), that 
every security holder has to be treated equally, underlies these two possibilities. See e.g. 
Torstar, supra, note 8, pp. 64C-65C. 
An equality of treatment among offerees as well as between offerors and offerees, rather 
than identical treatment, is the major concept underlying the Commission's attitude. Such 
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Early in August 1981, the OSC released a notice314 wherein it stated that 
it would take into account variations resulting "from the operation of 
economic factors" between the date of the agreement and the follow-up offer 
in assessing the value of the consideration offered. At the same time, another 
notice was issued in which the OSC took the position that it was quite 
inappropriate 
for any party on behalf of the offeror or in support of the offeror's bid to make 
purchases in the market in guise of market "support", market "maintenance" 
or market "stabilization" which have the effect of keeping those market prices 
at levels higher than would have been the case in absence of such purchases.315 
It also issued orders pursuant to s. 124 because the proposed conside-
ration did not appear to be at least equal in value to the one offered316. The 
peak of this involvment was reached in the Turbo case, the Commission's 
jurisdiction being this time directly but unsuccessfully challenged317. 
109. In this case, the Commission stated that a non-cash consideration 
offered to minority shareholders must be expressed in dollars in order to 
compare its value to the cash consideration paid in the agreement318. Having 
to choose between the net asset value or the market price of the securities 
proposed as the consideration, the OSC selected the latter to determine this 
value319. Because the units were not traded, it was necessary to establish the 
market price thereof. The very technical evidence given by four witnesses 
was based upon a common feature, that the market price, 
an equality, or equivalency, is achieved through different wordings. The same consideration 
must be paid where a takeover bid is launched following a private agreement, or where no 
such agreement is entered into before. The consideration must be at least as great as the 
one offered in an agreement where a takeover bid is related or linked to such an 
agreement. The consideration will be at least equal in value to the greatest one paid in an 
agreement where a follow-up offer is made. It is unlikely that the expression at least as 
great as and at least equal in value to the greatest one will be interpreted differently despite 
the difference in wording. The equality of consideration paid where several agreements are 
concluded is not considered. 
See for the interpretation of the same consideration Torstar, supra, note 8, pp. 64C-65C ; 
John Labatt Ltd and Dominion Dairies Ltd, (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 189B (June 19) [ruling] ( 1981) 
2 O.S.C.B. 1C (July 24) [reasons]. 
314. Re: Take-Over Bids - Value of Consideration in Follow-up Offers, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 23A 
(Aug. 7). 
315. Take-Over Bids: Security Exchange Offers - Market "Support", "Maintenance" or 
"Stabilization", supra, note 251. 
316. In the Matter of the Proposed Amalgamation of Universal Explorations Ltd and the Petrol Oil 
& Gas Company, Limited, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 57D (Nov. 20). 
317. Turbo case, supra, note 212, 55C (March 12), [Turbo Resources Ltd et al. vs The Ontario 
Securities Commission (S.C.D.C.)]. 
318. Turbo case [reasons], supra, note 212, p. 85C. The OSC used the term takeover rather than 
agreement. 
319. Ibid. 
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would be the price paid in a "normal" market, being one in which there is 
neither any undue selling pressure nor undue buying demand distorting the 
"market price".320 
In cases where a market price already exists for the securities to be 
offered, that market price will be determined accordingly. The key question 
will be whether the market price was a normal one, free of any undue selling 
pressure or buying demand resulting in a distortive effect upon the market 
price. 
An attempt to define what a selling pressure may be, or any other 
criteria found in the test laid down, is a hazardous enterprise. These features 
must be evaluated in the light of the specific market situation in each case 
because of their factual character. Their determination belongs solely to 
financial experts from brokerage firms. 
As when s. 99(b) is used, the Commission must rely upon expert 
testimony to decide whether there was a pressure and whether it distorted the 
market price. Until decided, no one can really know whether the market 
price was normal or abnormal, a statement of fact perse frustrating. 
110. The next question the OSC addressed in the Turbo case was 
whether the amount of the consideration was at least equal in value to that 
paid in the takeover bid. Put in a different way, whether $13.13 paid in July 
was still worth $13.13. Indeed, the Commission took the position that the 
operation of high interest rates could modify the amount proposed to be 
offered to minority shareholders 321. Since controlling shareholders are often 
paid cash for their block, they can profit from the reinvestment thereof, an 
advantage denied to other shareholders. 
This matter has been dealt with in McLaughlin322 and in the Turbo case, 
although no decision has been reached. The Commission, in a dicta to its 
Turbo decision, clearly suggested the position it was expecting from 
purchasers of control : 
[i]t is obvious from any reasonable basis of comparison that $13-1/8 paid in 
March 1982 is of less value than $13-1/8 paid in July 1981.323 
111. It results from that position that complying with s. 91(1) will now 
be almost more onerous than with s. 91(3). An equality in the consideration 
was thought to give more flexibility to offerors ; it now provides complete 
equality, but little flexibility. 
320. Id, p. 86C. 
321. See supra, note 314. 
322. McLaughlin, supra, note 3 and 300, pp. C7-C9 [Jan. 8]. 
323. Turbo case, supra, note 121, 86C. 
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112. The Interim Report has put forth new suggestions to respect such 
equality while reducing the purchaser's burden by providing him with an 
alternative manner to complete the follow-up offer. The purchaser could 
either make a general offer at a consideration per security at least equivalent 
in value to the greatest one paid under any of the private agreements, or offer 
to pay a consideration equivalent in value to the highest premium paid by 
the purchaser per security under any of the private agreements324. The 
Report however suggested tax changes before the latter measure be imple-
mented. 
113. The minority shareholders would not suffer any adverse effect; 
they would get the excess premium paid and would keep the opportunity to 
either retain or sell their shares in the market. A reasonable premium would 
be paid to the control block seller. Indeed, that proposition attempts to bring 
the follow-up offer back to a sale of a control block at a premium 
unavailable to the minority. Whether this move is possible, taking into 
account the context in which s. 91(1) has been interpreted as well as the 
behavior of both majority and minority shareholders, is a question to which 
a clear cut answer will unlikely be provided in the near future. Unless the 
concept of equality of treatment is revised, the suggestions of the Interim 
Report might remain suggestions for an undetermined period of time. 
3.2.3. Attempt to avoid the follow-up offer: 
anti-avoidance rules 
114. The follow-up offer requirement may also be triggered by 
transactions other than the private agreement. These transactions, which 
may be termed "indirect deals", have as their objective the avoidance of the 
follow-up offer. Although they may be framed in a perfectly legal manner, 
they obviously go against the spirit of s. 91(1), thereby attracting the 
attention of the Commission. Two schemes may be principally used ; the said 
transaction may take place outside of Ontario, or on the other hand, a legal 
structure or another exemption may be inserted between the effective seller 
and the purchaser of control. 
115. The fact that the agreement pursuant to s. 88(2)(c) is an exempted 
takeover bid is of some assistance when studying the problem of transactions 
taking place outside of Ontario. Technically speaking, the Ontario legislation 
applies as soon as an offer is made to at least one security holder whose 
address in the books of the offeree company is in Ontario, regardless of the 
point of origin of the takeover bid. The fact that an exemption under s. 99(e) 
324. Interim Report, supra, note 16, p. 234A. It must be noted that none of the recommendations 
are based upon that suggestion ; p. 236A. 
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may be sought in order to be exempted from the 1978 Act requirements 
where only a few security holders are in Ontario does not alter the principle. 
Even though "it is questionable whether Ontario could require purchasers in 
other jurisdictions to make offers to Ontario vendors"325, the actual wording 
of s. 88(2)(c) seems to permit such an interpretation. The focus of the 
legislation is not on the place where the transaction happens, but rather on 
whether Ontario security holders are affected. Where there is no takeover 
bid under the 7975 Act, it is obvious that s. 91(1) cannot apply, not because 
the transaction takes place outside of Ontario, but rather for the reason that 
Ontario law does not apply. 
116. Despite this finding, the Commission decided in several cases to 
prevent certain transactions from being completed by using cease trading 
orders or removals of exemptions. A good example available is the Universal 
Explorations126 case, wherein the OSC staff argued that two Alberta 
corporations should respect s. 91(1) when using the Ontario market: no 
decision has yet been released, but Universal was banned from trading in 
Ontario. 
117. This manner of proceeding raised critical comments from secu-
rities practitioners. The Interim Report clearly stated that the OSC was 
loosing credibility by pressuring non-Ontario persons to comply with s. 91(1) 
on a voluntary basis, through the use of cease trading orders, and that it 
could not reasonably impose its view of the public interest to a jurisdiction 
not holding the same opinion327. The Commission justifies the extra-
territorial application of the 1978 Act on the basis that it is required to 
preserve the credibility of the Ontario marketplace328. The extent to which 
that credibility has been affected so far by such types of deals is unknown. 
The fear that residents will deliberately avoid s. 91(1) by incorporating 
outside of Ontario or structuring their deals to avoid the Ontario legislation 
has not been established and appears to be an insufficient argument to 
explain the OSC's position. The converse would also be true, that is 
shareholders electing to obtain an Ontario residence to take advantage of 
s. 91(1). In any event, the fear that Ontario law becomes meaningless for 
anyone but the uninformed does not reflect the real situation. Wealthy 
shareholders, although minority ones, able to afford legal fees, have sought 
orders and rulings with the objective that a follow-up offer be paid. This 
should be looked at by the Commission when assessing the credibility of the 
Ontario marketplace, a concept which may otherwise become meaningless. 
325. See (1978) O.S.C. Weekly Summary, Supp. X, April 7, p. 3. 
326. See supra, note 316; The Globe and Mail, Jan. 16, 1982, B-5. 
327. Interim Report, supra, note 16, pp. 236A-238A. 
328. Chairman's Report, supra, note 7, 83A. 
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118. The use of another legal structure to avoid the follow-up offer is a 
more complicated problem. To deal with this type of transaction, s. 91(2) 
was introduced in the 7975 Act. This section is intended as a solution to 
schemes whereby private companies and the private company exemption are 
used where the private agreement one is unavailable. In a typical transaction 
of this sort, shares from individual sellers are transferred to a private 
company, within or outside of Ontario, and then resold under the private 
company exemption, while the economic benefit of the premium is available 
to the individual seller"9. Previous attempts were made to solve this 
problem, but all were heavily criticized 33°. Section 91(2) was then introduced 
in Bill 7, which is 
[...] designed to impose the same obligation to make a follow-up offer on an 
offeror who, in the circumstances set forth in subsection 91(2), relies on an 
exemption other than the private agreement exemption and pays more than a 
15% premium for the securities acquired."' 
119. The section applies to every form of takeover bid, regardless of 
the fact it is exempted under s. 88(2). Two conditions must be fulfilled before 
the section is applicable. The takeover bid must result in the acquisition by 
the offeror "of the power or authority to control the business or affairs of the 
offeree company" 332. Such an acquisition then has to result in a subsequent 
acquisition of the indirect power or authority to control what the 1978 Act 
calls a "true target company" 333. Although it is unclear what will constitute 
an acquisition of control under the Act, the language used in s. 91(2)(a) is 
similar to that in s. 99(a). The same criteria should apply under both sections 
in determining what "control" is334. The second condition is that such an 
acquisition of control must form, 
[...] to the knowledge of the offeror, part of a series of transactions initiated by 
a present or former holder of securities of the true target company who 
formerly had the power or authority to control the business or affairs of the 
true target company, the principal purpose of which was to permit the indirect 
sale of some or all of his securities of the true target company in a manner that 
would avoid the application of subsection (l)3 3 5 . 
329. See supra, note 325; see also Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-112, 13; 
Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 682-83. 
330. Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 682. 
331. Id., p. 730. He gives an example of such a transaction. It must be noted however that 
s. 91(2) is not restricted to cases where a private company is used. See Control Block 
Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV—113. 
332. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 91(2)(a). 
333. Such a corporation must be a public corporation. 
334. See infra, #157 to 161. 
335. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 91(2)(b). 
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This second condition narrows the application of the entire s. 91(2) by 
relying upon the purchaser's knowledge of the scheme effected by the control 
block seller336. In this connection, a question arises. It has been suggested 
that the purchaser's knowledge involves two steps; (1) awareness that his 
takeover bid forms part of a series of transactions initiated by the present or 
former holder of control of the true target company ; (2) awareness of the 
principal purpose of such series of transactions, i.e. the avoidance of 
s. 91(1)337. Does this mean that s. 91(2) will not apply where the purchaser is 
aware of only one of these items, or does it mean that the knowledge of 
either is sufficient to invoke s. 91(2)? If the former is the case, both criteria 
must be satisfied. Moreover, neither a burden of enquiry nor an "ought to 
know" test are found in s. 91(2)338. When considered in connection with the 
prerequisite condition that the seller must be in possession of control before 
the scheme takes place 339, and the fact that he must be an Ontario resident, 
these omissions could seriously restrict the use of the true target company 
provisions. 
120. Where all the conditions of s. 91(2) have been satisfied, all the 
transactions initiated by the holder of control of the true target company will 
be set aside. The acquisition effected by the offeror is deemed a takeover bid 
in respect of the securities of the true target company made in reliance upon 
the private agreement exemption. The consideration paid for the acquisition 
thereof will be deemed the consideration received by the former holder of 
control who initiated the series of transactions. 
4. The non-application of the follow-up offer: 
the exemptions and their underlying motivations 
4.1. The need for policy requirements 
121. The commission has been given in the 1978 Act wide discretionary 
powers which are set out in s. 99 of the Act240. Section 99(b) as well as s. 99(c) 
have already been dealt with above and will not be raised again 341. Suffice it 
to say these two sections provide the Commission with the authority to solve 
technical difficulties related to a potential application of the follow-up offer. 
On the other hand, sections 99(a) and 99(e) raise substantial questions upon 
336. See Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 730-31. 
337. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV— 113-14. 
338. See Alboini, supra, note 4, pp. 730-31. 
339. Id, p. 731. 
340. These discretionary powers obviously do not preclude the Commission from exercising 
other powers found elsewhere in the Act, such as the cease trading order pursuant s. 123. 
341. Supra, #99 and ff, and «107 and ff. 
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the application of s. 91(1); only these two will be considered here, together 
with the Addendum to Policy 3-37. 
122. To illuminate circumstances under which the OSC would exercise 
its discretion to grant exemptions from s. 91(1), guidelines were released by 
the Commission. Indeed, they were requested by the Minister responsible for 
the Act when he appeared before the Standing Committee of the Adminis-
tration of Justice 342. In his statement, he said he had instructed the OSC to 
prepare guidelines indicating the basis on which the Commission's discretion 
would be exercised. This mandate has been carried out through the release of 
a first request for comments in August 1978 , 4 \ followed by a second one344 
and then a final Ontario Policy numbered 3-41345. 
123. A first reason underlying the need for policy statements lies in the 
fact that an unlimited application of s. 91(1) was seen as undesirable. Both 
the Minister and the OSC, relying on economic considerations, acknow-
ledged that the effect of the follow-up offer could be to prevent some 
desirable transactions346 from being completed. The Commission was 
sensitive to opinions opposing the follow-up offer, at least conceptually. 
Referring to the majority's opinion of the Select Committee as well as to 
some comments from the private sector, the OSC declared that disincentive 
of entrepreneurship and economic onus for the purchaser dictated "a careful 
review of the policy considerations supporting the follow-up offer obli-
gation" 347. Put in a different way, the Commission was attempting to 
narrow the range of cases where the follow-up offer should be applicable. 
Relying upon the broad discretionary power given to it by the Legislature, 
the Commission stated it was directed 
[...] to focus the follow-up offer obligation on those cases in which it is clearly 
appropriate, after allowing for any potential negative impact on such matters 
as entrepreneurship and the incentives to expand small companies through 
public issues.348 
342. Supra, note 5. 
343. Exemptions from the Obligation to Make a Follow-up Offer After a "Control Block 
Premium" Transaction, (1978) OSC Weekly Summary, Supplement X, 11 August 1978 
[hereinafter referred to as August '78 request for comments]. 
344. Request for Comments Application for Exemptions Pursuant to Section 99 From the 
Obligation to Make a Follow-up Offer Pursuant to Section 91(1) After a "Control Block 
Premium" Transaction, OSC, 22 Feb. 1979, but unfortunately unpublished in the Weekly 
Summary [hereinafter referred to as Draft or Draft Policy]. 
345. O.S.C. Policy No. 3-41. Take-Over Bids - Section 99 Applications For Exemptions From the 
Obligation to Make a Follow-up Offer After a "Control Block Premium" Transaction - The 
Securities Act, 1978. (1979) OSC Weekly Summary, Supplement C, 17 August 1979, from 
p. 173 to 182 [hereinafter referred to as Policy or Policy 3-42]. 
346. Minister's statement, supra, note 5. 
347. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 9. 
348. Id, p. 8. 
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This need to restrict the applicability of s. 91(1) was also based upon the 
policy consideration underlying the Act, i.e. the credibility of the market-
place. Moreover, the fact that the City Code principle has not been followed 
in the U.S., although courts had intervened where minority shareholders 
were abused, was another incentive for the OSC to attempt to specify cases 
where an exemption from s. 91(1) would unlikely to be granted. 
124. A second reason is framed upon an obligation owed by the 
Commission to provide the business community with some sureness 349. The 
uncertainty created by the exercise of discretionary powers, as well as the 
need to ensure some form of fairness for both applicants and the Commis-
sion, were arguments relied upon by the OSC as justifying the existence of 
guidelines 35°. These would also serve as an attempt by the Commission to 
facilitate its administration of the Act by reducing the length of hearings, 
although the Policy was not to be understood as meaning that applications 
were no longer required. 
125. As a third reason for the release of policy guidelines, based upon 
both a limited application of s. 91(1) and the need for certainty, the OSC 
stressed its duty to balance the costs against the benefits in each application 
submitted. This argument was first found in the August '78 request for 
comments, which was reissued in February 1979. Examples of cases where 
the requirements of a follow-up offer was outweighed by economic conside-
rations were released by the Commission. Indeed, an exemption would 
receive favourable consideration in such cases even though the result to the 
remaining shareholders was unfair. 
These grounds led the Commission to set up, in the Draft Policy as well 
as in the Policy, two general categories of transactions, one of cases where an 
exemption would unlikely be granted, and the other listing examples where 
an exemption would probably be granted even though such transactions 
might also fall within the first category. 
4.1.1. The first category 
126. In the Draft Policy are listed three major situations "[...] in which 
the application of the new statutory obligation seems appropriate"351 : 
349. Id., p. 12. The Commission added that 
[wjhere legislative or regulatory entry is proposed into a new area of business endeavour, 
the initially adopted requirements should be limited to what is required to meet the clearly 
discerned problem and subsequently expanded if and only to the extent that a need for 
expansion is discatcd by such experience. Emphasis added. Ibid. 
350. Ibid. 
351. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 14. 
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(a) A sale of control where the result is clearly unfair or abusive to the 
remaining shareholders; 
(b) The sale of control follows a public distribution of equity securities of 
the same corporation (whether newly issued or derived from the control 
block) in which it may reasonably be assumed that investors relied on 
continued involvement of the controlling shareholder in the corporation's 
affairs, and the sale of control occurs within a reasonable period — to be 
determined on the particular facts but ordinarily approximating ten years 
— after the public distribution ; 
(c) The offeror proposes obtaining effective control at a premium through 
purchases from fewer than fifteen shareholders, none of whom individually 
has effective control, at a premium unavailable to the remaining share-
holders.352 
The first one was obviously making reference to the American law on the 
sale of assets, while the two others were designed to answer specific 
difficulties encountered in Ontario. Where the transaction underlying an 
application pursuant to s. 99(e) did not fall within any of these three, the 
Commission said it would "[ojrdinarily [...] be prepared to favourably 
consider granting an exemption"353 from s. 91(1). In the interim conclusions 
of the Draft, the OSC went even further: 
In all other circumstances the Commission because of the perceived need to 
encourage entrepreneurship and the benefit to the remaining shareholders of a 
new controller able to more effectively manage or reallocate the assets of the 
corporation, will weigh these factors favourably in its review of the application.354 
127. In Policy 3-41, the Commission became more precise. While 
repeating that it would be "favourably disposed" 355 to relieve an applicant 
from s. 91(1) where the transaction entered into did not fall within any of the 
situations specified, it said that such an exemption from the follow-up bid 
would be granted "[...] unless other circumstances indicate that the exemp-
tion would be contrary to the public interest" 356. It further stated that even 
though the said transaction fell within one of the situations, it might still 
"give favourable consideration"357 to an application for an exemption based 
on one of the guidelines listed in the Policy. 
128. This first category, i.e. cases where a follow-up offer would be 
required, has been underestimated by applicants when submitting requests 
under s. 99(e). It must be noted that the confusion partly results from the 
352. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, pp. 19-20. 
353. Id, p. 15. 
354. Id., p. 20, Emphasis added. 
355. Policy 3-41, supra, note 345, p. 178. 
356. Ibid. 
357. Id, p. 179. 
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language both of the Draft and of the Policy. The latter was indeed 
understood as taking 
[...] the view that an exemption from the obligation should be available in all 
situations except the three kinds of circumstances described therein. [...] [e]ven 
in those situations, there are circumstances in which the OSC would be 
favourably disposed to granting an application for an exempting order.358 
The fine distinction between the Draft and the Policy, i.e. the reliance upon 
the public interest, was not stressed. This reference to the notion of public 
interest slightly altered the procedure to be followed in an application under 
s. 99(e). The examples provided were no longer the only cases where an 
exemption would not be granted. The evidence to be submitted to the 
Commission was no longer solely for the purpose of demonstrating whether 
or not the transaction underlying the request for an exemption would fall 
within the first category. The applicant would rather have to establish that 
the exemption sought would not be prejudicial to the public interest, the 
Commission being allowed, in determing that, to take into account all 
relevant circumstances359. The first category was simply illustrative of 
transactions clearly contrary to the public interest, and where no equality of 
treatment was given to minority shareholders360. To seek an exemption 
based on the argument that the relevant transaction did not fall within any of 
the three examples was therefore an underestimation of the scope of s. 99(e). 
129. The decisions in which the first category was discussed361 illustrate 
however that the Commission is divided upon the manner in which 
exemptions should be granted. In one case, the Commission extensively 
construed the obligation to make a follow-up offer while in another decision, 
it followed more strictly the text of Policy 3-41. 
130. Newsco is the first decision where the OSC gave a broad 
interpretation to the Policy, and as a consequence thereof, to the obligation 
358. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. 1V-99. 
359. This critérium was already present in the August '78 request for comments, supra, note 343, 
p. 1. See infra, note 364 and #179. 
360. The Interim Report said that the theoritical basis of the follow-up offer, i.e. the acquisition 
of control at a premium, was altered by Policy 3-41. See p. 228A. It is submitted that it is 
the application of Policy 3-41 which led to misunderstanding and underevaluation of 
s. 91(1). 
361. Besides Atco and Newsco, two rulings were issued pursuant to s. 99(e) and related to 
s. 88(2)(c), where an exemption from s. 91(1) was granted. Brinco Ltd, (1980) O.S.C. 
Weekly Summary, Nov. 14, 19A; Ziebart Corp., (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 5B (Jan. 9). An order 
under s. 99(c) denied an exemption: In the Matter of Mineral Resources International 
Limited, (1982) 3 O.S.C. B. 114B (Feb. 12). The decision In the Matter of Hudson's Bay Oil 
and Gas Company Ltd, and Dome Energy Limited, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 44C (Sept. 25) was not 
a case falling therein. 
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to make a follow-up offer. The facts of the case read as follows: F.P. 
Publications Ltd, a closely-held corporation, held 51.6% of Ronalds Fede-
rated. Five investors were owning F.P. with almost similar ownership, 
Newsco being one of them with a holding of 22.5% in F.P. Publications. In 
February 1980, Thompson Newspapers Ltd purchased all outstanding 
shares of F.P., but with the exception of the Newsco holding. Later in 
March, discussions were held between Thompson Newspapers Ltd and 
Newsco in respect of the Newsco ownership in F.P. On a suggestion made by 
Thompson Newspapers, Newsco agreed to sell its F.P. holding in exchange 
for the purchase of the Ronalds Federated's block owned by F.P. This 
transaction took place at the end of April 1980, and Newsco acquired the 
51.6% of Ronalds from F.P. Publications at a price of $30, this price being 
above the market price as determined under the Act. Newsco was therefore 
obliged to make a follow-up offer to all remaining shareholders of Ronalds 
Federated. 
The applicant stressed that the deal entered into did not fall within any 
of the situations set up in Policy 3-41362. For the same reason, staff counsel 
argued that Newsco should be exempted363. The Commission answered in 
these terms : 
[t]he Commission may only grant an exemption where it is satisfied that "... it 
would not be prejudicial to the public interest to do so." Thus in deciding 
whether or not an exemption should be granted, all the relevant circumstances 
are open for investigation. This is particularly true if there is any question as to 
whether or not the result of the sale of control is unfair to the remaining share-
holders. We do not intend by these reasons to dilute the importance to an 
applicant of a finding that sale of control falls within none of the three cir-
cumstances in Policy 3-41 noted above, but we do wish to emphasize that the 
Policy clearly states that such a favourable finding may not result in an exemption 
if "... other circumstances indicate that the exemption would be contrary to the 
public interest." This, of course, is a restatement in the Policy of the statutory 
obligation imposed on the Commission under s. 99(e).164 
The transaction was found to be unfair to the remaining shareholders 365 
thereby falling within the first category set out in the Policy. The exemption 
was therefore denied as contrary to the public interest. 
131. The decision in Atco attempted to follow the Policy in a more 
straightforward way. In this instance again, the applicant urged the Commis-
sion to apply and follow Policy 3-41366. The first part of the majority's 
362. Newsco, supra, note 249, pp. 309-10. 
363. See J. WILLOUGHBY, "OSC reserves decision on Webster exemption bid", The Globe and 
Mail, May 22, 1980, B-4. 
364. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 312; Atco, supra, note 158, pp. 419-20. Emphasis added. 
365. See infra, s. 4.3.1.1. 
366. Atco, supra, note 158, p. 419. 
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decision applied the broad interpretation pattern by generally adopting what 
was said in Newsco, and indeed repeated parts of this judgment367. Then, 
relying upon the criteria used in Newsco to determine whether the transaction 
was unfair or abusive, the majority decided that these elements were not 
present in this case : the transaction was not unfair or abusive to the 
remaining shareholders368. Being therefore outside the scope of the first 
category set out in Policy 3-41, the majority granted the exemption369. It did 
not look to other circumstances which would have indicated that the 
exemption was contrary to the public interest. Moreover, it relied upon the 
fact that the case fell within example (a) of the guidelines 37°. 
132. The Vice-Chairman and another commissioner disagreed on the 
issue of s. 99(e) for similar reasons : 
[t]he principles to be applied are reviewed in the majority decision. In the end 
result I was not persuaded that to grant the application would not be 
prejudicial to the public interest. 
It is apparent, as a result of arguments presented in both this and the earlier 
Newsco application referred to in the majority decision, that O.S.C. Policy 
3-41, published prior to the coming into force of the Act in an attempt to give 
some guidance in a very vexing area, has taken on a life of its own in the eyes of 
some readers beyond that which at least some members of the Commission 
anticipated."1 
These reasons are more in accordance with what was decided in Newsco, 
that is whether the transaction is prejudicial to the public interest. Of course, 
if the transaction falls within the first category, the application will very 
likely be denied372; where such is not the case, it must be decided whether 
the public interest is jeopardized as a result of the transaction. And vice-
versa, where the transaction is viewed as prejudicial to the public interest, it 
is useless to argue that it does not fall within the first category of Policy 3-41. 
Indeed, as determined in Newsco, the Policy and s. 99(e) have to be read so as 
to give effect to both of them. 
133. It seems clear that the majority in Atco did not follow such a 
pattern. By relying in a more strict manner upon the Policy, they prevented 
367. However, they said this : "[w]e took the opportunity in the Newsco case to set out our view 
of how the policy statement ought to be interpreted and how it interacts with the terms of 
section 99 of the Act. We do not intend to repeat [...] but we adopt what was said on that 
occasion." Atco, supra, note 158, p. 419. 
368. Id, p. 422. 
369. Id, p. 423. 
370. Ibid, see infra, #188. 
371. Id, p. 424. 
372. See Newsco, supra, note 249; the guidelines may however be relied upon when seeking an 
exemption from s. 91(1). See infra, #135. 
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themselves from looking at other reasons in determining whether the 
transaction was prejudicial to the public interest. It is not submitted that the 
result would have been different if the majority had made this further step. 
Perhaps it would not have found other circumstances leading to the 
conclusion that the deal was prejudicial to the public interest ; on this point 
however, two members disagreed. In Newsco, such an enquiry was unneces-
sary, the transaction falling within example (a) of the first category. What is 
really different from Newsco in the Atco majority reasons, and which is 
viewed as a more restrictive approach, is that the enquiry was not held. Once 
it had decided that the transaction was not unfair, it granted the exemption. 
It is true however that the reliance on example (a) of the guidelines might 
explain the procedure used373; but if such is the case, it is unclear why the 
majority first ruled that the transaction was not unfair, this finding being 
useless if guidelines are used374. 
134. It is therefore unknown how the Commission will proceed on the 
next application solely pursuant to s. 99(e) and the first category. It must 
also be noted that the composition of the tribunal was similar on both 
occasions. Commissioner Thorn dissented two times, the Vice-Chairman 
only in Atco. Finally, both cases were heard as the OSC Chairman was 
leaving, with the result that neither the former nor the present Chairman 
attended the hearings. 
4.1.2. The second category 
135. The second general category was initially outlined in August 
1978. Although the OSC noted it would be impossible "[...] to state with 
certitude that an exemption would be granted in any specific type of 
situation"37S, all surrounding circumstances having to be taken into conside-
ration, the Commission released examples of cases where imposing a follow-
up offer "[...] would be more than outweighed by the economic costs"376. In 
these cases, the OSC would be willing to exempt a purchaser from s. 91(1) 
"[...] unless countervailing circumstances are present"377. 
136. The three examples put forth in the August '78 request for 
comments, as well as others, are found in the Draft Policy. Moreover, the 
Commission declared it would favourably consider granting an exemption 
from s. 91(1) where one of the guidelines is relied upon, even though the 
373. Such is only a dicta however. 
374. See infra, #135 and #183. 
375. August '78 request for comments, supra, note 343, p. 1. 
376. Ibid. 
377. Ibid. 
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transaction falls into the first general category378. The guidelines were based 
upon economic considerations and were illustrative of the OSC's responsi-
bility to balance costs against benefits. The Policy uses the same language as 
that in the Draft, and speaks of guidelines which represent the kind of 
circumstances where, even though the transaction falls within the first 
category, the Commission might relieve an offeror from making a follow-up 
offer379. The same examples are also listed in the Policy. 
137. It might be said that the guidelines illustrate cases where it would 
not be prejudicial to the public interest to grant an exemption380. In this 
case, the logic underlying s. 99(e) is respected. It is also possible to see the 
guidelines as situations under which the principle of equality of treatment 
will be analyzed by the Commission in an attempt to provide both majority 
and minority with a fair result. Such should be a good example of a cost-
benefit analysis, and would as well respect the philosophy of the 1978 Act 
and the Kimber Reportl%x. 
138. However, guidelines could also be viewed as examples of trans-
actions where the notion of public interest is replaced by an economic 
calculation of the costs against the benefits. In this case, the philosophy 
underlying the follow-up offer would seem to be less respected. 
This last hypothesis may easily raise substantial criticisms. It could be 
questionable to use economic considerations as superseding the legal 
principle of equality of treatment. From the conceptual point of view, an 
exemption is usually found either because the situation exempted does not 
need to be regulated, or is beyond the scope of the general rule. Such was 
indeed the spirit of the securities acts where the concept of "public" was 
justifying the availability of exemptions from registration and from filing a 
prospectus382. Particular categories of investors were exempted because they 
were subject to different legislation. On the other hand, those who were not 
members of the "public" were also exempted, the protection provided by the 
securities acts being useless in respect of these investors. By using other 
considerations unrelated to the spirit of s. 91(1), the guidelines released seem 
to go against such a structure. 
139. Even more questionable than the use of these economic reasons 
to set aside the equality of treatment is the granting of an exemption in 
378. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 15; see infra, note 379. 
379. Policy, supra, note 345, pp. 178-79. 
380. This was exactly the case in In the Matter of Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Company Ltd, and 
Done Energy Limited, supra, note 361, p. 45C, and the ruling at p. 149B (Sept. 18). 
381. Ibid. 
382. Such is still the case in jurisdictions other than Ontario, e.g. Québec. 
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reliance on these guidelines even though such would produce an unfair or 
abusive result vis-à-vis the remaining shareholders. The balance of costs 
against benefits should not be a technique used to take advantage of 
minority security holders, especially in a market situation where takeover 
bids are so frequent. The basic philosophy of the takeover legislation in 
Ontario is based upon a double test : the protection of offeree shareholders, 
with the limitation that such protection would not unduly impede potential 
bidders, or put them in commercially disadvantageous positions383. In other 
words, offerors as well as offerees ought to be treated with fairness384. To 
permit the abuse of one side in order to give the other side an advantage is a 
misunderstanding of the basic philosophy of fairness. 
140. It can easily be understood that flexibility is needed in respect of 
the follow-up offer requirement, and that offerors should not be precluded 
from implementing useful transactions. In fact, such reasons may efficiently 
temper the notion of what is prejudicial to the public interest. However, such 
a balance must really work between two opposite interests so as to provide 
them with the same fairness, and not a different connotation of what 
constitutes fairness depending upon the situation. 
4.1.3. The nature of the OSC policies and their legal consequences. 
141. It would not be surprising to say that the manner in which the 
OSC will exercise its discretion is now rather undetermined. To be more 
accurate, the Policy can no longer be relied upon 385 to suggest in which 
circumstances an exemption from s. 91(1) could be granted. It is even 
possible to say that reliance on the Policy might be ill advised since it could 
lead to the refusal of an exemption 386. This tendency has been strongly 
opposed by applicants who have urged the OSC to follow and respect its 
own policy statements. These affirmations led the Vice-Chairman to note 
that the Policy "[...] has taken a life of its own in the eyes of some 
readers"387. Indeed, one might have the impression that the spirit of s. 91(1) 
is no longer to make an equivalent offer to remaining security holders, but 
rather to attempt by every means possible not to make such an offer. That 
383. Kimber Report, supra, note 29, #3.10. 
384. Equal treatment and equal access to the relevant information are designed to achieve such 
a balance. See supra, #12. 
385. J.C. BAILLIE, "Shareholders' Remedies", The Law Society of Upper Canada, The March 
Special Lecture Series, 1981, March 5, 1981 [copy from the author's original], p. 14, see 
supra, # 144. 
386. See McLaughlin, supra, note 3. Indeed, the "proposed interpretation" found in Policy 3-41 
and the OSC interpretation of s. 91(1) oppose one another. 
387. Alco, supra, note 158, p. 424. 
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this is a retrogressive step appears likely388, but would not be unique in the 
history of application of securities laws in North America. Practitioners have 
for a long time attempted to find ways to avoid being subject to the 
legislation389. 
142. The uncertainty surrounding the application of Policy 3-41 raises 
broad questions, some of them related to the duty owed by the Commission 
to respect its own policies as well as to their legal forcefulness. 
143. The OSC power to issue policy statements is undoubted. The 
modern legal literature 39° agrees that the release by an administrative body 
of criteria upon which its discretion will be exercised "[...] enhancefs] the 
effectiveness of the administrative process" 391. The rule-making process has 
388. J.C. BAILL IE , supra, note 385, p. 14. 
389. This concern is not particular to Ontario ; see Commission Recommendation, July 25, 1977, 
concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities, 
supra, note 26, wherein the European Commission refused to set out a list of examples 
where the principle of equality of treatment should be respected where control is sold. It 
said that such a list would create loopholes which would rapidly be used : see p. L212/39. 
In Canada, see the legal battles of the securities commissions in relation to their territorial 
jurisdiction as well as to the definition of security, especially in respect of investments 
contracts. 
390. See e.g. M. FILION, "Le pouvoir discrétionnaire de l 'administration exercé sous forme de 
normes administratives: les directives", (1979) 20 C. de D. 855; W.J. ATKINSON, "La 
discrétion administrative et la mise en oeuvre d'une poli t ique", (1978) 19 C. de D. 187; 
J.M. EVANS, H.N. JANISCH, D.L. MULLAN, R.C.B. RISK, Administrative Law. Cases. Texts, 
and Materials, (1980), especially Chapter 11 ; H.N. JANISCH, "Policy Making in Regula-
tion : Towards a New Definition of the Status of Independent Regulatory Agencies in 
Canada" , (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 46, esp. pp. 90-110; M.Q. CONNELLY, Securities 
Regulation and Freedom of Information. (1979) Commission of Freedom of Information 
and Individual Privacy, Research Publication No. 8. 
391. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Independent Administrative Agencies. Ottawa, 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1980, Working Paper No. 25, p. 117. They explained for 
these reasons 
Increased rule-making would likely enhance the effectiveness of the administrative 
process. First, it is likely to provide for inore efficiency in terms of time and expense. 
Rule-making is an effective way of communicating agency preferences, thereby promoting 
compliance with agency standards. The more issues are reduced to specific rules, the 
fewer will need to be debated in the context of a specific application. This can narrow the 
scope of adjudication. An agency might justify a fairly stringent standing requirement in a 
licence application, for example, excluding representations on issues which have been 
amply considered in prior policy-making proceedings. 
Second, the more policy is reduced to general rules, the more informed an applicant is of 
the considerations which bear upon his application. If he wishes to challenge the policy, 
he is at least aware of what it is beforehand. Along the same lines, the agency has been 
forced to take a position and is not likely to approach an application in a state of 
confusion about the policy governing the case. 
On a broader front, administrative rule-making and public participation therein indicate 
a new direction which the law has taken with the growth of the modern state. 
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been qualified as "[...] one of the greatest inventions of modern govern-
ment" 392. In relation to the OSC, whose major task is the protection of the 
public, the release of policy statements may be indicative of the types of 
behavior which might be considered prejudicial to the public interest. They 
might be extremely important for all participants in the marketplace. 
Policies may be quickly adopted to provide effective answers to new types of 
abuses taking place in the market393. Without broad discretion, the OSC 
would indeed be unable to fulfill its obligations. 
It must however be kept in mind that these policies, or guidelines, are 
without legal effects394 ; they do not carry any compulsory requirements nor 
are they binding upon the authority which issues them395. They are rather 
indicative of the manner in which the discretion conferred will be exercised 
on specific applications396. In any case, they should not be an excuse for the 
agency to refuse to exercise its discretion and to simply rely upon a policy 
statement. Each application must be evaluated in the light of its particular 
facts. A policy cannot be used as a device to set up rigid requirements which 
have to be respected where specific findings are established, nor to prevent 
an application from being granted because the applicant did not follow the 
guidelines397. Along with this, a policy cannot contradict a clear legislative 
text398. 
144. The difficulty with the policies adopted by the OSC is that they 
have often been considered as legal requirements which ought to be 
392. K.C. DAVIS, Discretionary Justice. Bâton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 
65. 
393. A good example is provided by Ontario Policy No. 3-37 and its supplements, which were 
adopted where going private and squeeze-out transactions were used to provide minority 
security holders with supplement of disclosure. 
394. See e.g. Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, pp. 169-71 ; Canadian National Railways Co. v. Bell Telephone Co. of 
Canada, [1939] S.C.R. 308, pp. 318-19; Sirois v. Université du Québec à Montréal, [1974] 
CS. 26; Rossi v. The Queen, [1974] 1 F.C. 531, p, 537; Sarachman v. Commission des 
valeurs mobilières du Québec, [1974] R.L. 462, p. 470; Rehopedale Developments Ltd and 
Town of Oakville, [1965] 1 O.R. 259, pp. 263-65; Re Amstrong and Canadian Nickel Co. 
Ltd, [1970] 1 O.R. 708, pp. 713-14. 
395. See e.g. Junior Mining Exploration and Development Companies, Québec Securities 
Commission, Policy Statement No. 8, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 3, #66-019, 
pp. 11,007-3, OSC Policy No. 3.03, Mining and Oil Companies: Vendor Consideration, 
Retained Interest, Escrow Agreements, Transfers and Releases From Escrow, Amalgamation 
and Escrowed Shares, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54,897, p. 10264. 
396. H.L. MOLOT, "The Self-Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways of Exercising Administra-
tive Discretion", (1972) 18 McGill L.J. 310, pp. 313-16 and 341. 
397. See Re Phillips and Registrar, Mortgage Brokers Act, (1978) 86 D.L.R. (3d) 158 and supra, 
note 390. 
398. Harel v. The Deputy Minister of Revenue of the Province of Quebec, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 851, 
pp. 858-59. 
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respected : not only the text thereof, but the spirit as well3". That the policies 
do not have any legally binding force has never been taken into conside-
ration. The fear of a cease trading order400 or the prospect of being subject to 
OSC proceedings, these constituting the force of the Commission, are 
sufficient incentives for both businessmen and their lawyers to closely follow 
the policies401. To infringe upon one of them is therefore seen as a venture 
into troubled waters. Indeed, a powerful example of the way the Commission 
views its policies is found in the National Sea402 case, in which the Uniform 
Act Policy 2-12403 was simply considered as if it was a legal requirement to 
be respected. Such a result was achieved without any reference whatsoever to 
the legal nature of the Policy404. 
145. The National Policy requirements have been adopted in an 
attempt to provide both the regulators and the investors with a certain level 
of uniformity405. The fact that securities regulation is a field of provincial 
jurisdiction can explain this necessity. Issuers, where filing a prospectus in 
more than one province, were often facing different regulations and different 
technical requirements upon the same kind of information to be disclosed. 
To obtain a sort of uniformity and to prevent federal intervention was 
viewed as necessary. 
399. J.C. BAILLIE, supra, note 385, p. 11 ; M.Q. CONNOLY, supra, note 390, pp. 28-29 ; see also In 
the Matter of Cablecasting Ltd, (1978) O.S.C. Bulletin 37, p. 41 (Feb.). 
400. In the Matter of Cablecasting Ltd, supra, note 399, p. 41 and pp. 43-44. 
401. Ibid. ; J.C. BAILLIE, V.P. ALBOINI, "The National Sea Decision — Exploring the 
Parameters of Administrative Discretion", (1977-78) 2 Can. Bus. L.J. 454, p. 462, 468-69. 
402. In the Matter of Harold P. Connor. C.J. Morrow, W.E. Morrow, J.B. Morrow, CR. 
Macfadden and J.B. Estey, (1976) O.S.C. Bulletin, 149 (June) [hereinafter referred to as 
National Sea Case. 
403. Uniform Act Policy No. 2-12 ; Timely Disclosure ; O.S.C. Policy No. 3-23 ; Administration : 
Timely Disclosure: Uniform Act Policy 2-12. C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-882and 
54-917. 
404. National Sea case, supra, note 402, p. 178 and ff; see also Notice OSC Staff Review of 
Certain Takeover Bid Circulars, (1978) O.S.C. Bulletin 60 (March), where the Commission 
suggested informal discussions in respect of takeover bids by issuers and insiders, and the 
application of Ontario Policy No. 3.37. At p. 61, the OSC noted that "[i]f opportunity for 
staff comment is precluded by failure of the offeror to initiate these discussions at a 
sufficiently early time, the Commission will give serious consideration to an application 
from its staff for a cease trading order under s. 144". See also Notice Re: Commission 
Enquiries — Take-Over Bid Legislation and Policy. Proposed Take-Over Bid for Noranda 
Mines Ltd, supra, note 239: "[w]hile it has [the OSC] no ground to believe that there have 
been violations of either the law or its published policies [...]". 
405. See e.g. National Policy No. 1, Clearance of National Issues, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., 
vol. 2, #54-838; National Policy No. 5, Recognition of Profits in Real Estate Transactions, 
C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-842; National Policy No. 14, Acceptability of Other 
Currencies in Material Filed with Provincial Securities Administrators, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. 
Rep., #54-851; Draft National Policy Statement, Certified Feature Productions and 
Certified Short Productions, (1980) O.S.C. Weekly Summary, Suppl. X-l, July 31. 
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146. Ontario policies are based as well upon a somewhat similar 
objective to provide the business community with more precise indications in 
respect of the application of the Act406. However, some of them are also 
designed to protect investors in certain circumstances. To a certain extent, it 
could be said that these policies are designed to provide protection in 
situations which might be prejudicial to the public interest407. Where a 
particular case does not fall within these situations, an exemption from the 
policy might be available408. The same pattern is also applied under the Act; 
where an exemption from specific requirements is sought, such an exemption 
might be granted as long as it would not be contrary to the public interest to 
do so409. The corollary of such a statement is obvious ; to infringe upon a 
policy without having been exempted could be viewed as a behavior contrary 
to the public interest, so as to entitle the OSC to use the measures discussed 
above. Indeed, there is no choice but to respect very carefully every policy410. 
147. In this context, it is not surprising to realize that counsel for 
applicants have urged the Commission to follow Policy 3-41. The point is 
now that, as noted above, Policy 3-41 is somewhat broad, using the test of 
prejudice to the public interest to determine whether the transaction can be 
exempted. Indeed, it could be said that Policy 3-41 is no longer an attempt to 
provide certainty, inasmuch as the criteria relied upon are per se uncertain 
and vague. It cannot be said that the Commission does not follow its Policy, 
but rather gives to it either a broad or less broad interpretation, contrary to 
expectations. There is absolutely no doubt that the OSC is not legally bound 
by its policies; but a broad interpretation of s. 91(1), despite a policy 
statement emphasizing the need for a restrictive application of the follow-up 
406. See e.g. O.S.C. Policy 3-60. Prospectuses - General Guidelines, (1981) 2 O.S.C.B. 107E 
(Dec. 18). 
407. See e.g. O.S.C. Policy No. 3-25, Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trusts and 
Partnerships, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-919, Introduction: Background of 
Policy 3-25, p. 10286; O.S.C. Policy No. 3-34, Timely Disclosure : Adequacy of Disclosure : 
Cease Trading Order in Other Jurisdictions, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-960; 
OSC Policy No. 3-37, Issuer Bid — An Offer by an Issuer to Purchase, Redeem or Retire its 
own Securities: Timely Disclosure, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-963; Appendix I 
Supplement to O.S.C. Policy 3-37, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., #54-963a; Policy 3-37 
Interpretation —Exemptions, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-963b; see McLaughlin, 
supra, note 3, p. 112C-113C ; Torstar, supra, note 8, p. 67C ; O.S.C. Policy No. 3-41, supra, 
note 345; see new OSC Draft Policy 3-37, supra, note 220. 
408. See e.g. O.S.C. Policy No. 3-37, 3-41 and Draft Policy 3-37. 
409. See e.g. In the Matter of Parts XVII and XX of The Securities Act, 1978 and In the Matter of 
Certain Reporting Issuers, C.C.H. Can. Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-971 [related to O.S.C. 
Policy No. 3-44]. See generally Reporting Issuers Continuous Disclosure and Insider 
Reporting Requirements, (1980) O.S.C. Weekly Summary, Supp. X2, July 31 ; C.C.H. Can. 
Sec. L. Rep., vol. 2, #54-974. 
410. In the Matter of Cablecasting Ltd, supra, note 399, p. 43. 
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offer, might result in a lack of confidence by the business community in the 
Commission. 
148. To a certain extent, the Commission has been caught by the 
situation it itself created in interpreting policy requirements as if they were 
legal ones. The conflicts between Policy 3-41 and the OSC interpretation of 
this Policy, as well as its broad application of s. 91(1), are also illustrative of 
the results produced by an increasing use of policies, compliance being based 
upon a cease trading order4". However, it is also indicative of the distortive 
effect created by the actual number of takeover bids taking place throughout 
North America. Private agreements are not only used to provide selected 
shareholders with financial advantages, but also as tactical manceuvers to 
achieve control in a takeover fight. What is often sought in these situations 
are technical applications of the legislation. Imperative guidelines, which 
have to be applied, would, to a certain extent, be used to circumvent the 
spirit of securities legislation, a result the Commission would unlikely find 
acceptable. As it said, 
[...] the Commission wishes forceably to draw to the attention of the public 
that, although technical interpretation is necessary, it is the expectation of the 
Commission that the participants in the capital markets of this province will be 
guided by the basic philosophy and rationale from which the securities laws of 
this province were developed. The sophisticated gloss of technicality must not 
be used to obscure the true intent and import of the basic philosophies that 
underlie the securities laws of the province. Technical interpretations that run 
contrary to these basic philosophies and principles will not be acceptable to the 
Commission.'412 
This latter reason is probably the most evident one at the present time. 
It has been noted that the OSC's decisions should be analyzed "[...] on a 
cost-benefit basis in light of medium and long term consequences as well as 
short term consequences"413. The application of s. 91(1) in fact has short 
term positive advantages for remaining shareholders, even though it seems 
questionable whether it is beneficial for minority shareholders in general4U. 
In normal market situations, where takeover bids are a less frequently used 
measure, this statement is more than accurate. It is however unclear the 
411. See the concern stressed by the former O.S.C. Chairman J.C. BAILUE, supra, note 385, 
p. 12. See Turbo case, supra, note 212, pp. 82C-83C for an example of the underlying 
philosophy of the OSC while using cease trading orders and removal of exemptions in 
takeover bid contexts. 
412. In the Mailer of the lake-over bid by Federal Commerce & Navigation Ltd and In the Matter 
of the take-over bid by Olympia & York Investments Lid, supra, note 33, pp. 25C-26C. 
413. J.C. BAILLIE, supra, note 385, p. 15. 
414. Id., p. 16. He gives an example where a decision to go public might be postponed, if not 
deleted ; the range of new equity investments would therefore be less than it could have 
been. 
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extent to which the long term economic benefit may conflict with the 
Commission's duty to maintain the credibility of the marketplace. The 
actual situation raises serious concern among the general public about the 
fairness of such a marketplace415. To assure the public that the marketplace 
is fair to every investor is by itself a long term objective416. Equal access to 
information has been one method to achieve this objective. Equal treatment 
should simply be another way to reach the same one417. 
4.2. The exercise of discretion under s. 99(a) 
149. The Commission possesses the discretionary power418 to exempt 
a purchaser from making a follow-up offer where there is evidence that "the 
offeror will not or did not acquire through the offer the power or authority 
to control the business or affairs of the offeree company"419. S. 91(1) having 
been introduced partly as a response to abuses in sales of control420, it seems 
logical that such a requirement may be waived where the control is not 
effectively acquired by the purchaser. 
150. S. 99(a) focuses on the acquisition of control by the offeror rather 
than on the sale thereof by the seller421. For instance, a holding which per se 
does not involve effective control may be sold and provide the purchaser 
with such control where he already owns securities of the offeree company. 
From this purchase, the offeror will have acquired effective control. 
It also seems that although any interested person might submit an 
application pursuant to s. 99(a), security holders who were not tendered a 
415. See "Exposed Shareholders", The Globe and Mail, edit, note, June 15, 1981 [following the 
O.S.C. decision in BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2) case]. 
416. See e.g. T.S.E. Notice to Members No. 3038, May 22, 1980. 
417. See e.g. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 114C; pp. 61-62. As noted above, the OSC 
involvement raises the question as to whether the equality of treatment is still desirable in 
Ontario. If the answer is yes, is the discretion conferred to the Commission the most 
suitable manner to achieve this equality?, or would it be more advisible that a single, 
absolute rule be adopted? The discretionary power given to the OSC is probably the most 
flexible one to face new market situations, but is also the most interventionism one. Every 
participant in the market place will have to bear and accept the drawbacks arising from 
the choice of policy made. 
418. S. 99(a) gives to the OSC a discretionary power; the finding that control was either 
acquired or not does not automatically compel the Commission to issue and order pursuant 
to s. 99(a) exempting the offeror from s. 91(1). See McLaughlin, supra, note 3, 385C, 
p. 388C [Divisional Court] and the dissenting opinion in Dataline, supra, note 433. 
419. 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 99(a). 
420. See supra, # 2-7. 
421. See 1978 Act, supra, note 1, s. 99(a); Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 724. The Interim Report 
stressed that such a pattern was accurate taken into account the characteristics of the 
Canadian economy. See p. 229A. 
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follow-up offer will not be allowed to seek such an offer through a request 
under s. 99(a). This section is designed to exempt a purchaser from making a 
follow-up bid, not to require him to make one422. Indeed, the wording of 
s. 99(a) suggests that only the purchaser can find any advantage in applying 
for a ruling under s. 99(a). 
151. Before being subject to s. 91(1) and to seek to be exempted from 
it, the definition of takeover bid must first be satisfied423; otherwise, the 
transaction is not subject to s. 91(1). Where the purchaser owns more than 
20% of the offeree's voting securities, he is deemed to have acquired effective 
control424. His application under s. 99(a) will therefore attempt to reverse 
this presumption425. 
152. Where an application under s. 99(a) will be made426, the applicant 
must give notice of his intention to do so to minority shareholders427. The 
manner in which notice will be given has to be set out in the application. 
Where the applicant wishes not to give such notice, he must submit valid 
reasons428. Different methods to make the minority shareholders aware of a 
request to be exempted from the follow-up offer include direct mailing429, 
newspaper advertisement 43°, releases to the financial press and wire service 
as well as a notice in the OSC Bulletin431. It must also be noted that the 
applicant may seek the advice of the Commission to determine which 
method should be used in respect of his request432. 
422. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 725. 
423. See supra, #46-48. 
424. See Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 723. 
425. Stated in a more restricted manner, s. 99(a) may be relied upon by an offeror where he 
considers that "there is a real question as to such power or authority" was acquired as a 
result of an agreement. See Policy 3-41, supra, note 345, p. 177. The section is unavailable 
where control is already in possession of the offeror. See McLaughlin, supra, note 3, 
p. 104C, pp. 52-53, and infra, #157 and ff. 
426. This applies for s. 99(e) as well. 
427. See Policy 3-41, supra, note 345, p. 182. 
428. See e.g. the application for exemption filed by McLaughlin, 5 March 1981, O.S.C. file 
No. 08381, p. 7. The applicant justified it on the ground that no change of control took 
place, but agreed to give notice to minority shareholders if a hearing was requested by the 
O.S.C. Such a notice would be given in the manner required by the Commission. 
429. See e.g. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 308. The Commission noted that 
[...] notice by mail to individual shareholders will not be required in all cases but that the 
matter is very much a question of the size of the company, the publicity attendant upon 
the particular transaction, the number of shareholders and their geographical location. 
430. See e.g. Alco, supra, note 158, p. 414. 
431. See for the McLaughlin case, (1981) I O.S.C.B. 26A, 27A (March 27). 
432. In Newsco, Alco and McLaughlin, the O.S.C. requested the applicant to give notice to 
minority shareholders in the manner it indicated. 
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153. S. 99(a) contains unclear expressions. None of the words "power 
or authority", "control", "business and affairs" are defined. Moreover, the 
use of the expression "will not or did not acquire" adds to the uncertainty of 
s. 99(a). 
154. The expression "power or authority" refers to effective or de 
facto control rather than the concept of legal control. In Policy 3-41 as well 
as in the Draft, the Commission emphasized that the acquisition of the 
practical authority to nominate a majority of directors would be an element 
heavily relied upon in determining whether effective control has been 
acquired433. Indirect, limited or negative control would not constitute 
situations where the purchaser would be able to elect a majority of 
directors434. The Draft was even more precise, saying that the acquisition of 
effective control should be made without a proxy battle435. Moreover, the 
Draft adequately pointed out that such authority would be acquired where 
the agreement says that actual directors would resign to be replaced by the 
purchaser's nominees upon the closing of the transaction. This authority 
would also be obtained where directors "[...] feel a moral obligation to resign 
if requested to do so"436. Indeed, the "practical authority to nominate a 
majority of directors" is not an expression whose connotation is restricted to 
direct nominations or elections. Control may be achieved by a combination 
of resignations, an increase or decrease in the number of directors on the 
board, nominations and elections437, where each mechanism is insufficient in 
itself to provide the offeror with effective control. The "practical authority" 
might therefore be understood as including every scheme whereby the 
purchaser places his nominees on the board as a result of the agreement, 
rather than focusing merely on the technique used to obtain the control 
position. It must be clear however that the new controller must obtain a 
majority on the board, and not simply several seats which would be 
insufficient to give him effective control438. 
433. See Policy 3-41, supra, note 345, p. 177; Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 7. However, all 
relevant facts must be taken into account. In the Matter of Dataline Inc., (1982) 3 O.S.C.B. 
48C, p. 50C (Feb. 19), the majority of the Commission found that the offerors did not 
acquire that authority following a private purchase of shares representing 34% of the 
outstanding shares, another shareholder owning a 50.3% holding. 
434. However, they might be viewed as materially affecting the control. See infra, U 158 and ff. 
The majority of the Commission implicitly confirmed that interpretation In the Matter of 
Dataline Inc.. supra, note 433, 50C. 
435. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 7. 
436. Ibid. 
437. In such a case, the offeror is not given enough seats on the board ; but timely resignations 
and an increase or decrease in the number of directors could give the offeror effective 
control, especially if he is entitled to decide who will replace the leaving directors. 
438. In the Matter of Dataline Inc., supra, note 433, the offerors did not obtain any seat on the 
board with a purchase of 34% of shares. 
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155. The use in the Policy of the words "as a consequence of the 
private agreement" as opposed to "through the offer" as used in the Act, 
may raise a problem where resignations provide the purchaser with effective 
control. Where the resignations take place on the conclusion of the 
agreement, there is no difficulty ; but where they occur several weeks or even 
several months later, the issue is whether they can still be viewed as being a 
consequence of the private agreement or, phrased differently, whether the 
purchaser acquired control through the agreement. 
The resignations should be a direct consequence of the agreement, even 
though they occur several months later439. Where other steps are taken 
before the directors resign, the link between the agreement and such 
resignations may become indirect. It must be borne in mind that the OSC 
will take into consideration all relevant facts in reaching a conclusion on an 
application pursuant to s. 99(a). The personal willingness of one or some 
directors to quit should not be viewed as a direct consequence of the 
agreement where unrelated to the conclusion of the agreement. In fact, 
control should be a consequence of positive acts performed by the pur-
chaser440. Only resignations solely motivated by the agreement should be 
taken into account. Otherwise, a personal reason would become the direct 
and the agreement the indirect cause. In any event, the resignation is the first 
step ; if the purchaser does not have any control over the election or the 
nomination of the new director, he cannot be said to be placing his nominee 
on the board. In such a case, the resignation would not provide the offeror 
with effective control. 
156. The meaning to be given to the expression "will not or did not 
acquire" may be explained in different ways. One consists in the fact that the 
offeror has acquired an important holding in the offeree company, although 
insufficient to give him effective control, and has contractually agreed not to 
increase such ownership441. The offeror would therefore be precluded from 
seeking the control of the offeree company in the future. Another one is 
related to the practical authority to nominate a majority of directors and the 
timing of an application pursuant to s. 99(a). Such an application by the 
purchaser may be submitted before the private agreement takes place. It 
might be difficult to know whether the applicant will acquire such an 
439. Such a statement has however to be analyzed in light of the evidence submitted. 
440. Indeed, the Draft Policy stressed that evidence from directors might be requested to 
determine whether they were asked to resign. But see infra, #158 and 159. 
441. In the Mailer of British Columbia Forests Products Ltd. Alberta Energy Company Ltd. 
Noranda Mines Ltd (Part II), (1981) 1 O.S.C.B. 177B (June 12) [ruling] and (1981) 2 
O.S.C.B. 6C (July 24) [reasons] [hereinafter referred to as BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2)\ See 
pp. 12C-15C. 
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authority upon the implementation of the agreement, especially where a 
combination of resignations and nominations of directors will give the 
offeror effective control442. In such a case, the weight given to the practical 
authority to nominate a majority of directors might be lessened in favor of 
other findings. However, where an application is submitted after the 
agreement has been reached, there is no doubt as to the reliance by the 
Commission upon such a practical authority in determining whether control 
was acquired443. 
157. By relying upon the notion of effective control444, the OSC has 
clearly set aside that corporate control could only be achieved through de 
jure control. It is interesting to note that this concept was still in use by 
Canadian courts as recently as 1965445. Since the work published in 1932 by 
Berle and Means446, it is acknowledged that an ownership of more than 50% 
is no longer required to run a company. Working or management control447 
is often sufficient to permit a small group of individuals with little ownership 
to direct the corporation448. Together with the fact that a corporation acts 
442. See supra, note 416. 
443. See e.g. In the Mailer of Dataline Inc.. supra, note 433. 
444. In the McLaughlin case as well as in BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), submissions were made in 
order to discover whether the control should be determined on a fully diluted basis 
[McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 105C ; p. 54] or meaning legal, effective or absolute control. 
In McLaughlin, they were considered irrelevant, given the circumstances of the case. In 
BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), nothing was said in the decision; but see infra, #158. If the 
authority to nominate a majority of directors is still the main item on which the O.S.C. will 
rely in applications pursuant to s. 99(a), which was doubtful in the reasons released in 
BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), but became clear from the majority reasons in Dataline, these 
arguments could be viewed as useless because the manner control is obtained is more or 
less irrelevant. What is important is to be able to nominate the majority of directors. 
445. See e.g. Minister of National Revenue v. Dworkin Furs (Pembroke) Ltd, [1967] S.C.R. 
223; Purdom v. Doherty, (1929), 3 D.L.R. 719, p. 7 2 1 ; see also 1978 Act, supra, note 1, 
s. 1(2), (3). 
446. Supra, note 136. 
447. Id., p . 70 and following: 
Five major types can be distinguished, though no sharp dividing line separates types from 
type. These include (1) control through almost complete ownership, (2) majority control, 
(3) control through a legal device without majority ownership, (4) minority control, and 
(5) management control. Of these, the first three are forms of control resting on a legal 
base and revolve about the right to vote a majority of the voting stock. The last two, 
minority and management control are extra legal, resting on a factual rather than a legal 
base. 
448. Id., p. 69 where the authors stress that 
[ujnder the corporate system, control over industrial wealth can be and is being exercised 
with a minimum of ownership interest. Conceivably it can be exercised without any such 
interest. Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without 
appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development. 
This separation of function forces us to recognize "control" as something apart from 
ownership on the one hand and from management on the other. 
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through its board of directors, these facts have led authors to propose new 
definitions which stress that control is the capacity to choose directors : 
[s]ince direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the 
board of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies in the 
hands of the individual or group who have the actual power to select the board 
of directors, (or its majority), either by mobilizing the legal right to choose 
them — "controlling" a majority of the votes directly or through some legal 
device — or by exerting pressure which influences their choice. Occasionally a 
measure of control is exercised not through the selection of directors, but 
through dictation to the management, as where a bank determines the policy of 
a corporation seriously indebted to it. In most cases, however, if one can 
determine who does actually have the power to select the directors, one has 
located the group of individuals who for practical purposes may be regarded as 
"the control."-"" 
158. Before the decision in BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), the reference in 
the Act to the power to control "the business and affairs"450 of the offeree 
corporation, as well as the forbiddance set out in the Draft from using 
proxies to nominate directors, indicated that control could have been viewed 
as being positive acts made pursuant to a sufficient ownership. In fact, negative 
control, i.e. the power to block transactions with a small holding, was not 
considered either by the Act or the Policy. Uncertainty has however been 
introduced in respect of this argument following the OSC's decision in 
BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2)451. In this one, the Commission, after it had referred 
to Policy 3-41, stated an opponent's argument in which it was argued that 
AEC and the two other major shareholders were forming a control group. 
Then, the OSC referred to s. l(l)(ll)(iii) and said that the tests to be applied 
in determining whether the sale of a control block was materially affecting 
the issuer's control were not dissimilar to those to be applied in respect of 
AEC's application 452. However, the Commission did not make any specific 
reference to such tests and decided that AEC did not or would not acquire 
control of BCFP453. 
159. Such a finding might result in unknown consequences. It could 
signify that the criteria used in order to determine what materially affects the 
449. Id.. pp. 69-70. See also A.A. BERLI;, supra, note 134, [58 Colum. L. Rev.]; B.GIBSON, 
"The Sale of Control in Canadian Company Law", (1975-76) 10 U.B.C.L.R. 1. 
450. 1978 Act. supra, note 1, s. 99(a). 
451. Such an argument is also found in the dissenting reasons of the OSC Chairman in 
Dalaline, supra, note 433, 53C, where he said that a 34'G holding was carrying with it an 
element of "power or authority to control". It seems therefore, despite the clear reasons 
given by the majority, that the uncertainty created by the BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2) reasons 
subsist among commissioners. 
452. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), supra, note 441, p. 13C. 
453. Id, p. 14C. 
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control of an issuer will apply to s. 99(a) as well. In this case, an ownership 
insufficient to run the corporation on a daily basis, but giving to its holder 
the power to block significant corporate transactions454, would constitute 
control under s. 99(a), especially if no other shareholder, alone or acting in 
concert, is able to elect a majority of directors. If this reasoning is correct, 
the decision in AEC could be explained on the grounds that the 28% block 
obtained by AEC from Noranda was insufficient to impede the completion 
of significant corporate transactions. 
On the other hand, the OSC might have used s. l(l)(Il)(iii) in an attempt 
to discover whether the Noranda departure and replacement by a new 
shareholder was materially affecting the control group made up of Noranda 
and the two other major shareholders, one of them directing 26.052% and 
the other one 14.978% of BCFP's shares455. The fact that Noranda was 
leaving would have affected the control group, providing that they were 
acting in concert ; but the evidence submitted was to the contrary. 
160. Two facts must be noted in respect of both interpretations. In the 
first case, both would reduce the importance to be given to the finding that 
the purchaser might or might not be able to elect a majority of directors. As 
a result, Policy 3-41 would be weaker and less useful than it is presently. 
Indeed, it would now be completely useless. 
As noted above, the majority of the Commission in Dataline relied 
solely upon Policy 3-41 and the test found therein. Although a dissenting 
opinion was expressed, it may be said that the uncertainty created by BCFP-
Noranda-AEC(2) was temporary. In the second case, the difference of 
language between s. l(l)(ll)(iii) and s. 99(a) must be stressed. The former 
speaks of control being materially affected while the latter uses the expression 
"power or authority to control the business or affairs". Both wordings seem 
.to refer to different things. To materially affect the control could imply that 
its actual status or exercise may be altered by specific events. On the other 
hand, to control the business or affairs lies more in positive acts made 
pursuant to a sufficient ownership; in other words, whether the purchaser 
has acquired the power to run the business on a daily basis. If the OSC 
decides to apply s. l(l)(ll)(iii) to requests made in reliance upon s. 99(a), the 
range of application of this section will be seriously restricted. 
454. Alboini, supra, note 4, p. 507; as said above, the majority of the OSC implicitly dismissed 
that possibility, while the minority relied upon in Dataline, supra, note 433. 
455. BCFP had three major shareholders ; Noranda with 28%, Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co. 
with 26.052%, which was in turn equally controlled by Mead Corp. and Scott Paper Co. In 
addition, Mead owns directly 14.9787c of BCFP. See BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2), supra, 
note 441, p. 8C. 
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161. The power to control the business and affairs of the offeree 
corporation would not be acquired if the purchaser was in an indirect 
control position before the private agreement took place. However, this 
indirect control, which is the control of a third company which in turn 
controls a subject company, must really be in the hands of the purchaser 
before the transaction is completed. In Newsco, the applicant owned about 
23% of F.P. Publications, which in turn controlled Ronalds Federated 
through an ownership of 51.6%. The indirect control of Ronalds by Newsco 
was therefore around 11.6%. The applicant submitted that it had not 
acquired control of Ronalds through its agreement with F.P., an agreement 
whereby Newsco obtained the 51.6% holding of Ronalds. In such a case, it 
was evident to the Commission that Newsco was unable to control Ronalds 
prior to the agreement, but was able to do so afterwards456. 
A limited control would similarly be insufficient to deem the offeror as 
having acquired effective control of the offeree. Such might occur where 
several major shareholders each hold a significant ownership, none alone 
being sufficient to permit them to obtain a majority of directors. They are 
therefore unable to control the business of the offeree company. Where none 
of these major shareholders is acting in concert with another, and where 
none of them is allowed to increase its ownership as a condition of the 
agreement entered into, such limited control would not give the offeror 
effective control457. 
162. The Draft Policy provides an example in which an application 
pursuant to s. 99(a) could be granted. It is based upon the idea that the 
purchaser is seeking only a consolidation of its control block, being already 
456. "There is a world of difference in terms of 'the power or authority to control the business 
or affairs of the offeree company' in directly owning 51.6% of the common shares ofthat 
company, and between owning 22'/;% of a company that owns 51.6% of the company said 
to be controlled. That indirect control works out to 11.6%. While it is true that Newsco 
was one of a small group of shareholders that controlled F.P. and that F.P. controlled 
Ronalds, we do not think that put Newsco in a position such that it could be said that it 
had 'the power or authority to control the business or affairs of the offeree company' as 
that concept is stated in s. 99(a). It should be noted with respect to the question of control, 
that Policy Statement 3-41 indicates that 'substantial weight will be given as to whether 
the offeror will, as a consequence of the private agreement transactions, acquire the 
practical authority to nominate a majority of the Directors.'" 
Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 309; Turbo case, supra, note 212, for another example of 
acquisition of indirect control. The difference is that Turbo was not a shareholder of either 
company before it purchased the control block. Compare to McLaughlin, supra, note 3, for 
direct control by insiders. 
457. BCFP-Noranda-AEC(2). supra, note 441, pp. 12C to 14C ; but see the dissenting opinion in 
Dataline, supra, note 433, even though the offerors had no director on the board. 
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in a control position. The purchase effected is therefore a mere acquisition of 
shares rather than an attempt to obtain control458. 
This illustration is curiously structured ; it would allow a purchaser, 
who had obtained control without paying any premium459, to consolidate 
his position by entering into agreements, to pay an excess premium and then 
to be granted an exemption under s. 99(a) for the reason that control was not 
acquired as a result of these latter agreements460. 
163. This example, although not reproduced in the Policy, was likely 
relied upon by McLaughlin when he applied for an exemption pursuant to 
s. 99(a). Through an agreement the applicant increased his holding from 
52.895% to 57.92%461. As noted by the Commission, the result was to 
remove any possibility that McLaughlin might lose control to someone 
else462, especially where the ownership was calculated on a fully diluted 
basis. While seeking an exemption from s. 91(1), the applicant stressed there 
was no sale of control, in as much as he already held such control463. 
This argument proved not to be persuasive, and the application was 
denied. The OSC was very clear ; where an offeror already has control, an 
application to be relieved from the follow-up offer could only be based upon 
s. 99(e)464. The Commission underlined that nothing in the 1978 Act said 
that s. 91(1) should not apply where an offeror had control465, and added 
that 
[...] it would be absurd, or at least distorted interpretation of the language of 
clause (a) of section 99 to restrict its application only to bids by non-controlling 
offerors. Section 99 is, however, supplemental to section 91 and must be read in 
a manner which will give effect to the purpose and intent of section 91.466 
164. The resulting effect of the decision in McLaughlin appears 
difficult to justify, especially in light of the Dataline case. In both instances, 
control was acquired and a premium paid to the controlling shareholders, 
the difference being that the equality of treatment was used only in 
McLaughlin. This may be explained by the fact that transactions carried out 
by both a controlling and insider shareholder, which may potentially affect 
458. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 7. 
459. The Draft Policy stressed that such should be the case where control was acquired through 
the stock exchange 5% rule, or by way of private agreement. 
460. S. 99(a) of the 1978 Act was understood as such ; see Control Block Transactions, supra, 
note 90, p. IV-106. 
461. Or, on a fully diluted basis, from 49.6% to 54.3%. 
462. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 99C; pp. 48-49. 
463. Id., pp. 103C-105C; pp. 52-54. 
464. Id, p. 105C; p. 54. 
465. Id., p. 106C; pp. 54-55. 
466. Ibid., p. 54. 
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the credibility of the marketplace or be abusive to other shareholders, should 
not be permitted, whether or not they are prohibited by the 1978 Act. The 
Interim Report adequately questioned the inherent abuse of minority share-
holders by an insider buying shares at a premium where control is not 
acquired467. It may be suggested that the abuse arose from the fact that 
through the purchase of shares, McLaughlin was securing absolute control 
over his company, thereby preventing other shareholders from selling their 
shares to a potential bidder. Put in a different way, had the takeover fever 
been nonexistant, the decision might have been different. 
165. The OSC attempted to interpret s. 91(1) solely in light of equality 
of treatment, and did not look at the other main branch of the streams 
sustaining the follow-up offer468, i.e. the acquisition of control. A private 
agreement under s. 88(2)(c) is a takeover bid of a special kind in the sense 
that a private acquisition of shares resulting in a holding of more than 20% 
for the purchaser does not automatically trigger the application of Part XIX 
of the 1978 Act, as well as the equality of treatment found therein469. Such 
will be the case, through s. 91(1), if a 15% premium above the market price is 
paid. For non exempted takeover bids, Part XIX and the equality of 
treatment therein, such as s. 89(3) and s. 91(3), apply, but not s. 91(1). As 
noted above, s. 91(1) applies only to takeover bids exempted by s. 88(2)(c) ; a 
certain form of equality of treatment is therefore provided in either case. The 
major difference is that through s. 99(a), the non acquisition of control may 
relieve an offeror from making the follow-up offer. To pretend that a follow-
up offer must be made in every instance where a 15% premium is paid, 
regardless of the control feature, implies that one of the branches referred to 
in the decision is set aside to the profit of the other one470. 
166. Strong criticisms of the McLaughlin decision are also found in the 
Interim Report, wherein it was reemphasized that s. 91(1) should only be 
triggered by an effective acquisition of control whether by one or successive 
transactions, control being understood as the ability to "exercise a con-
trolling influence over the business and affairs of the offeree company"471. 
The Interim Report also clearly stated that s. 91(1) was not designed for the 
protection of minority shareholders from so-called abusive transactions by 
insiders. 
467. Interim Report, supra, note 16, p. 226A. 
468. McLaughlin, supra, note 3, p. 104C; p. 53. 
469. See supra, #70. 
470. The argument by which the minority shareholders have to be given some protection where 
an insider makes a takeover bid does not sustain the position taken by the Commission. 
Although this seems an obvious statement, s. 91(1) was not the proper manner to provide 
them with the protection needed. 
471. Interim Report, supra, note 16, p. 226A. 
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167. In any event, it may be said that McLaughlin was the victim of his 
reliance upon both the Policy and the Draft. The recent decision in Dataline 
gives one to understand that the same uncertainty surrounding the inter-
pretation of the first category found in Policy 3-41 has now reached s. 99(a). 
McLaughlin resulted in the application of s. 91(1) to insiders already in 
control contrary to any expectation. In Dataline, the majority, after having 
decided that control had not been acquired, granted the exemption while a 
dissenting opinion relied upon the notion of public interest to refuse it either 
under s. 99(a) or s. 99(e). Dataline appears to have been decided more in 
conformity with the twofold spirit of s. 91(1) than McLaughlin was. In the 
event that the minority opinion of Dataline is adopted in a succeeding case, 
the interpretation of both s. 91(1) and s. 99(a) would become much more 
restricted and, to a certain extent, meaningless, since the equality of 
treatment would become the sole critérium leading to a compulsory offer to 
remaining shareholders. 
4.3. The exercise of discretion under s. 99(e) 
168. Section 99(e) contains the most important discretionary power 
given to the OSC under Part XIX of the 1978 Act. It allows the Commission, 
upon an application by an interested party, to relieve any person or company 
from the requirements of Part XIX where such "would not be prejudicial to 
the public interest"472. 
169. As said above, Policy 3-41 was released to specify the criteria on 
which the OSC would rely in exercising its discretion. However, both the 
language and the interpretation of the Policy have resulted in a confusing 
situation. In short, the fact that the transaction does not fall within the first 
category is insufficient to justify an exemption. It must also be established 
that the deal is not prejudicial to the public interest. It was also noted that 
reliance upon the Policy could result in unexpected outcomes. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether the public interest concept may be countervailed by the 
application of the Policy. Indeed, Policy 3-41 must be looked at very 
carefully before relying upon it when seeking an exemption from the follow-
up offer. 
4.3.1. Cases where an exemption is unlikely to be 
granted: the first general category 
170. In the Draft as well as in the Policy, the OSC has focused on three 
situations as militating against the granting of an exemption : 
472. 1978 Act. supra, note I, s. 99(e). 
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(a) A sale of control where the result is clearly unfair or abusive to the 
remaining shareholders; 
(b) The sale of control follows a public distribution of equity securities of the 
same corporation (whether newly issued or derived from the control block) 
in which it may reasonably be assumed that investors relied on continued 
involvement of the controlling shareholder in the corporation's affairs, 
and the sale of control occurs within, say, ten years after the public 
distribution ; or 
(c) The offeror proposes obtaining effective control at a premium through 
purchases from fewer than fifteen shareholders, none of whom individually 
has effective control, at a premium unavailable to the remaining share-
holders.4" 
Indeed, the latter two are truly examples of situations in which an exemption 
would not be granted, while the first one stands as a general statement which 
stresses the result of any sale of control. It might be said that examples (b) 
and (c) are types of transactions whose result will be unfair or abusive to the 
remaining security holders. Although they emphasize specific circumstances, 
they are not, at least conceptually, different from example (a) because they 
also produce an unfair result in respect of remaining shareholders474. It can 
therefore be said that one general category of cases in which an exemption is 
unlikely to be granted is that involving transactions whose results are clearly 
unfair or abusive. Despite this finding, exemples (c) and (b) will still be 
looked at before example (a) is analyzed. 
171. Example (c) has been named the institutional purchase trans-
action475, and involves a deal whereby the offeror acquires the complete 
holding of several large holders, often institutions, none of whom have 
effective control. This purchase is made at a premium generally unavailable 
to the small remaining security holders476. This pattern of transaction has 
been viewed as detracting from the credibility of the marketplace, especially 
from the point of view of the small remaining shareholders, because they are 
473. Policy 3-41, supra, note 345, p. 178. See the comments found in the Interim Report 
pertaining to Policy 3-41, pp. 229A-230A. There is obviously a difference between 
example (c), speaking of the acquisition of control, and examples (a) and (b) which use the 
sale of control. The fact that s. 91( 1) imposes a follow-up offer to the purchaser, rather than 
to the seller, was discussed above as well as in the Interim Report. To the explanations 
found therein, the concept of equality of treatment in takeover bid situations must be 
added, bearing in mind that most of the requirements of Part XIX of the 1978 Act apply to 
the offeror. 
474. The difference would be that the unfair or abusive result does not have to be established in 
cases (b) and (c). Only the conditions of application of both examples would be sufficient 
evidence that such deals are unfair or abusive. 
475. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-102; see also supra, note 473. 
476. Ibid. 
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not offered the same opportunity to sell their shares477. It has been suggested 
that an underlying reason for not granting an exemption in this case is that 
the private agreement entered into really constitutes a selective takeover bid 
tendered only to a specific group of shareholders, so that control may be 
obtained478. The result is obviously unfair and abusive to those remaining 
security holders, specifically under the actual market situation479. 
172. Example (b), as the Commission itself acknowledged, flows from 
the Minister's statement to the Standing Committee480. It attempts to 
provide a solution to problems raised by a specific type of transaction which 
commonly took place in the early seventies481. The transactions referred to 
in example (b) are based upon the theory 
[...] that the presence of the controlling partner has caused the public 
shareholders to invest, and that there is some special attribute which the 
"senior partner" has, which gives the company its attractive qualities. The 
provision is intended to reduce the situations where the controlling shareholder 
brings in the public, takes advantage of the benefits which the expanded share 
capital base provides, and then sells his control position at a premium while 
leaving behind his public "partners".482 
The Commission's concern lies in the fact that the investors' investment 
expectations, often based upon the presence of a particular majority 
shareholder for a reasonable period of time, are disappointed. Combined 
with the sale of the control block at a premium unavailable to the public, it is 
not surprising that these transactions raised concerns in the Ontario 
marketplace483. 
The OSC has suggested that ten years be viewed as a reasonable period 
of time before which the controlling shareholder might sell his block without 
bringing the follow-up offer into play, but has emphasized that circumstances 
of particular cases would be taken into consideration as well484. It has also 
stressed that where the majority shareholder has acquired control of a public 
company through market purchases or a partial takeover485, the time limit 
477. See Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 14. 
478. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-102; Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 14. 
479. Supra, s. 3.3.3. 
480. Supra, note 5. 
481. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-101. 
482. Id, pp. IV-101, 02. 
483. See Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 13. 
484. Id., pp. 13-14. The latter statement was found in the final text of example (b) as set out in 
the Draft, but was omitted in the Policy. This, however, does not set aside a finding by the 
O.S.C. of particular facts tempering the ten year period. 
485. This critérium will be used where the corporation is already public. The manner in which 
control is acquired before the company goes public is not considered. 
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alone would not be the only element relied upon in determining whether a 
transaction falls within example (b). Further analysis would be required in 
such a situation. The OSC stated that a public distribution of equity 
securities, following the acquisition but prior to the sale of control, in which 
it is reasonable to assume that investors had relied upon the continued 
presence of the same controller, would fall within example (b). Evidence to 
the effect that the majority shareholder had "significantly changed the 
objectives and the nature of the corporation would tend to support such 
reliance"486 by investors487. 
173. The public distribution of equity securities is obviously the 
element which triggers the application of example (b). However, the most 
difficult finding to establish before example (b) is applicable is whether the 
presence of the majority shareholder was a major investment factor for 
public investors. It is indeed likely that the reliance upon this presence might 
not be of equal importance for each investor. It is unclear whether the sole 
reliance on the presence of the controller would be sufficient, whatever the 
weight of such reliance. The presence as well as the work performed by the 
majority shareholder488 give the impression that the weight of the reliance is 
irrelevant; in fact, example (b) focuses on the controller and assumes that 
shareholders have invested because of him. On the other hand, the language 
used in the Draft may lead one to think that the ten year period and the 
reliance by investors are two different criteria, the second applying speci-
fically where the corporation is already a public one. In the text of example 
(b) however, both criteria are linked by the preposition "and", which implies 
that both need to be established before the transaction would fall within 
example (b). It may be accurate to say that the Draft Policy intended to 
discuss the reasonable period first, and then the reliance where the public 
issue takes place, both criteria having to be found present in any transaction 
before falling within example (b). 
4.3.1.1. A sale of control unfair or abusive to the 
remaining shareholders 
174. The most important type of transaction in which an exemption 
from the follow-up offer will be unlikely includes any transaction where the 
486. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 14. 
487. In the final text of example (b), the distinction between the acquisition of a public 
company and a private one is not made, which may lead one to think that this critérium 
will apply to both and not only in those cases where public corporations acquired were 
already public. 
488. The final text both in the Draft and in the Policy uses the expression "continued 
involvement of the controlling shareholder". There is however no change in the spirit of 
example (b). 
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result of the sale of control is clearly unfair or abusive to the remaining 
security holders. What constitutes a result which is clearly unfair or abusive 
is however far from determined. 
175. Policy 3-41 does not provide any definition or guidance in respect 
of what might be viewed as unfair or abusive. It could be said that any form of 
private agreement is inherently unfair to non-controlling shareholder489. 
However, the introduction of s. 91 ( 1 ), the allowable premium and the Policy as 
a whole tend to demonstrate a contrary view. It was suggested that an 
outrageously490 large premium, and situations where no real market exists in 
which public shareholders may sell their shares, while the majority share-
holders can sell their complete holding, could be examples of abusive 
results491. 
176. The Draft Policy gives two specific examples which clearly 
originate from American case law on the sale of control. The Draft first 
stresses that the appropriation by the new controllers of corporate assets for 
their own benefit, instead of for shareholders generally, would fall within 
example (a). This statement is backed up by the fact that in the U.S., 
controlling shareholders and directors are subject to fiduciary duties when 
managing the affairs of their corporation. Where they take advantage of 
their position, or use others' property for their own benefit, they breach 
these fiduciary duties and are accountable to the corporation for the money 
received. What distinguishes the U.S. from the traditional common law as 
found in Canada and in the U.K. is that not only directors, but majority 
shareholders owe fiduciary duties. The Commission therefore clearly sug-
gested that such a situation should apply in Canada as well. The Ontario 
remedy to the breach would however be different ; instead of compelling 
majority shareholders to return the profit received, an equivalent offer 
should be made to remaining security holders 492 by the offeror. 
177. The second example set out in the Draft is more specifically based 
on the U.S. case law. In decisions called looting cases, American courts have 
held controlling shareholders liable where it has been found that they had 
acquired corporations with the objective of looting them493. The OSC drew 
references to such situations by using the expression "[...] follow other 
policies to the same end which would reduce the profitability of the 
corporation"494. 
489. Since the decision in McLaughlin and the dissenting opinion in Dataline, this seems to be 
the opinion of at least some of the commissioners of the Commission. 
490. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-101. 
491. Ibid. 
492. See e.g. N. LEECH, supra, note 119, p. 838; R.W. JENNINGS, supra, note 120, p. 29; 
A. HILL, supra, note 122, p. 1023; and see supra, #44. 
493. Supra, #33. 
494. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 13. 
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What is surprising is not the reliance upon American law. It has been 
acknowledged that principles underlying legislation both in the U.S. as well 
as in Canada are similar and indeed, were drafted almost similarly495 ; it is 
rather the explanation put forward by the Commission in attempting to 
define more precisely which types of transactions would be unfair or abusive. 
The OSC said that 
[...] [w]hile corporate law provides remedies for such situations in practice they 
are expensive and difficult for a minority shareholder to pursue. The requi-
rement for a follow-up offer should act as an additional control mechanism.'"6 
The Commission recognized that the line drawn between corporate and 
securities law was no longer adequate. Corporate and common law were not 
the only ways to provide protection to minority shareholders : in fact, they 
were insufficient to adequately protect them in takeover situations. The OSC 
therefore expressed its disagreement with both the Merger Study and the 
Kimber Report ^  where it was said that securities regulation was not 
designed for such objectives, and that the evolution of the common law 
would be sufficient to provide minority shareholders with sufficient pro-
tection. 
178. These two examples set out in the Draft were not referred to by 
the Commission in its decisions pursuant to s. 99(e). The OSC preferred, 
through its own case law, to set up elements to be used when determining 
what constitutes498 an unfair or abusive result. However, the basic position 
put forth by the OSC has still been followed ; since corporate and common 
law were insufficient to protect minority shareholders, the Commission 
therefore used its discretion to provide them with more efficient protection. 
179. It must be borne in mind that once an exemption under s. 99(e) is 
sought, the Commission can take into account the entire background of the 
transaction499 as well as the special facts 50° of each application in determining 
whether the exemption is to be granted. For instance, recent corporate 
history, transactions in the offeree's company securities and market liquidity 
may be criteria relied upon by the Commission in deciding whether the 
transaction is unfair or abusive501. 
495. See supra, note 159. 
496. Draft Policy, supra, note 344, p. 13. 
497. See supra, #15 and #19. 
498. See Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 310. 
499. Id, p. 311; Atco, supra, note 158, pp. 419-20. See supra, #138. 
500. See e.g. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 314. 
501. Id, pp. 311, 313; Atco, supra, note 158, p. 419. 
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180. The OSC has taken steps to stipulate more precisely the opera-
tional meaning of "unfair"502 result in relation to the remaining security 
holders. It is incorrect, when determining what constitutes an unfair result, 
to concentrate on the size of the excess premium as being the most relevant 
factor503. However, where a takeover bid, made at a consideration substan-
tially lower than the one in the agreement504, has recently taken place, the 
Commission may conclude that a very small excess premium, when put in a 
real market context, is in fact a substantial one505. A small float of the 
offeree's shares and the resulting thinness of trading may lead the Commis-
sion to the same conclusion 506. Indeed, the OSC has evaluated the importance 
of the premium not only with respect to the market price, but also in relation 
to the reality of the trading507 of the offeree company's stock to determine 
whether the result is unfair to the remaining shareholders508. 
181. The two examples set out in the Draft Policy and discussed above 
were clearly left aside. Although these may indicate what is meant by an 
abusive transaction, it also seems clear that the OSC is not bound by the 
draft of one of its policies. However, the fact that the Commission used 
different factors in determining which transactions were unfair rather than 
applying those listed in the Draft Policy might have been indicative that the 
Commission had not yet reached a compromise on its reliance upon 
common law concepts in the application of Ontario securities law. In Atco, 
while reviewing the criteria used in Newsco to determine whether the 
transaction was unfair, the majority of the Commission noted that IU had 
acted upon what "[...] was best for it as the majority shareholder of CU and 
not on the basis of what was best for all of the CU shareholders including the 
minority" 509. The majority of the Commission then added that the broad 
question concerning the type of duty owed by the majority towards the 
minority, as raised by the IU behavior was, in most instances, "[...] best left 
502. In Newsco, the O.S.C. stressed that the transaction was unfair and it used criteria to 
determine so. In Atco, some of the same criteria were used, but this time, the O.S.C. 
decided that the transaction was neither unfair nor abusive. It is unclear whether both 
expressions carry different meanings and are designed to deal with different situations, or 
whether the O.S.C. sees no real difference between both wordings. 
503. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 311 ; Atco, supra, note 158, pp. 419-20. However, it may be one 
critérium relied upon. See Atco, supra, note 158, p. 422. 
504. Id., p. 312; id, p. 421. 
505. Newsco, supra, note 249, pp. 312-13. However, the fact that the offeree company's stock is 
heavily traded and widely held could countervail this fact. See Atco, supra, note 158, 
pp. 420-21. 
506. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 313. 
507. Ibid. 
508. Ibid. The exemption was denied as prejudicial to the public interest. 
509. Atco, supra, note 158, p. 422. 
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to company law and to minority shareholders who may pursue their 
remedies in other forums"510. It seemed clear that the Commission was not 
the proper place to raise such an issue. Moreover, the majority indirectly said 
it would be willing to accept differences of treatment between both groups so 
long as they were not unfair or abusive to the remaining shareholders5". 
182. It is interesting that a different attitude was adopted in Newsco, 
especially where the OSC discussed the effects of the prior acquisition of 
Ronalds' shares by F.P. Publications. Even though a difference of 50% 
between the acquisition and resale prices could not be per se unfair to the 
remaining shareholders, the Commission noted however that it was 
[...] an important factor as to how the shareholders of Ronalds have been 
treated and it does reflect on the equitable treatment of shareholders in the 
capital market generally — a factor of which this Commirsion must take 
special cognizance.512 
It is even more interesting to note that since then, the Commission has 
clearly emphasized the need for equality of treatment between majority and 
minority, most particularly in takeover situations. While stressing in several 
cases513 that the Canadian common law had proven to be ineffective in 
protecting the minority, the OSC indicated that through its policies, 
declaration of principles and through specific sections of the 1978 Act, it had 
resumed the task of so protecting them 5'4. In this sense, it might be said that 
the spirit of the examples set out in the Draft was respected and brought back 
into operation by the Commission. 
4.3.2. Exemptions of the second general category : 
the guidelines 
183. As said above, guidelines have been suggested by which a 
purchaser would be entitled to seek an exemption pursuant to s. 99(e) even 
though the transaction fell within the first category. In these cases, the 
balance between the economic costs and the benefits of the follow-up offer is 
considered a more important factor than the equality of treatment515. 
184. All examples set out as guidelines are illustrative of techniques 
which will permit the purchaser of control to seek an exemption pursuant to 
510. Ibid. 
511. Ibid., lasl paragraph. 
512. Newsco, supra, note 249, p. 312. 
513. See McLaughlin, supra, note 3, BCFP-Noranda-AEC( 1), supra, note 15; BCFP-Noranda-
AEC(2), supra, note 441 ; Torstar, supra, note 8. 
514. See e.g., supra, #67. 
515. See, for a list of them, Policy 3-41, supra, note 345. 
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s. 99(e) even though the result may be unfair or abusive to the minority. In 
each of these cases516, the majority may be allowed a premium where the 
minority will be deprived of the opportunity to share in such a premium. 
185. More highly questionable than the view that these situations 
supersede the notion of public interest, is the fact that they override the first 
category of cases where an exemption will be denied because the result is 
unfair or abusive. It is difficult to see why the basic principle of equality of 
treatment should be set aside where specific corporate techniques are used by 
the majority shareholders to alter or modify the corporate life. It must be 
borne in mind that the aim of securities regulation is the protection of every 
investor participating in the marketplace. Such protection may be specially 
required to assure every participant that the credibility of the marketplace is 
not in jeopardy where these specific transactions are completed. This 
objective can hardly be said to be achieved where one realizes that the basic 
principles found in the legislation are simply set aside by the release of some 
guidelines under which the Act will apply. 
186. It is even more difficult to see a thread among the guidelines. In 
example (a), (b) and (d), no form of equality of treatment is available to 
remaining security holders. However, examples (c) and particularly (e) are 
illustrative of some form of such an equality. In example (e) for instance517, 
remaining shareholders are offered the opportunity to share in the premium 
where corporate techniques such as amalgamation, winding-up or arran-
gements are used. Moreover, where a squeeze-out results from an amalga-
mation, the Commission has stressed that other common law and OSC 
requirements will have to be observed. In such a context, it is interesting to 
note that the policies released by the Commission, which have to be followed 
in such cases, are designed to ensure fairness as well as equality of treatment 
between majority and minority shareholders. In example (e), flexibility is 
allowed in the manner in which the follow-up offer is made, but the offer 
must still be equivalent in value to the one paid under the agreement. 
The reason for these differences is unknown ; the whole situation seems 
even more questionable where one looks at example (d) and realizes that it is 
designed for reorganizations. Why a form of equality of treatment is possible 
for certain corporate transactions but not for some others is also unknown. 
187. It is interesting to note that some American courts ruled that 
controlling shareholders infringed upon their fiduciary duties in situations 
516. See infra, #188 and ff. 
517. See In the Matter of Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Company Ltd, and Done Energy Limited, 
supra, note 361. 
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similar to those found in example (e). Through corporate reorganizations518, 
mergers5'9 and other sophisticated techniques520, control has often been 
acquired or secured by controlling shareholders at a premium unavailable to 
those remaining. This premium has usually been obtained through exchang-
ing shares at a more favourable ratio for shares owned by controllers. 
Generally relying upon the breach of fiduciary duty by the majority, several 
transactions of this sort have been successfully challenged by shareholders 
who were not offered the same premium. 
188. Example (a) is directed at the repatriation within Canada of a 
foreign owned corporation, and is the one most open to criticism. It is 
difficult to understand why shareholders from Ontario as well as those in a 
uniform act province would have to pay the costs of such a repatriation, 
while the foreign owner would be able to have all the economic advantages 
of the sale of control52'. It is also very hard to understand on what principle 
the OSC relies to claim the power to determine a national economic policy. 
It is even harder to believe that the Commission is an appropriate forum for 
such a determination 522. It must be kept in mind that provincial powers 
related to securities legislation are basically designed for the protection of 
investors within the limits of the province523. Even though these laws have 
been broadly interpreted, it is more than doubtful that investor protection 
might lead a provincial commission to set up and enforce what it considers 
to be of national economic interest. Such a duty lies more in a political 
process and is, in any event, outside the scope of a provincial authority. 
Example (a) of the guidelines was relied upon by the majority in the 
Atco case as a supplementary argument justifying the granting of an 
exemption 524. It did not however explain or identify in which circumstances 
example (a) could be used ; it simply used it. 
189. Example (b) of the guidelines may be used where control is 
transferred to employees or family members of the majority shareholders. 
The example starts from the premise that these potential purchasers may be 
518. See e.g. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogen, supra, note 113; Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 63 S. Ct. 454 (1943); 318 U.S. 80. 
519. See e.g. Manacher v. Reynolds, 165A 2d 741 (C. Ch. Del., 1960) ; Levy v. American Beverage 
Corp., supra, note 108. 
520. Merger and going private : Berkowitz v. Power/Male Corp., 342A 2d 566 (S.C.N.J., 1975) ; 
redemption and liquidation: Zahn v. Transamericana Co., 162 F.2d 36. 
(10th Cite, 1947); recapitalization : Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F. 2d 667 (8ih Circ., 
1962); cer. den. 372 U.S. 941 (1963). 
521. See Atco, supra, note 158, p. 421. 
522. Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90. 
523. See e.g. Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] A.C. 318 (P.C.). 
524. Atco, supra, note 158, p. 423. 
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unable to finance a follow-up offer, and thus, if one was required, it might 
either discourage the controller from leaving or might force him to sell his 
block to an unwelcome party. Both results are viewed by the Commission as 
undesirable. The availability of an exemption in such circumstances might 
however be narrowed where it is established that the actual majority 
shareholder has used his position to induce a purchase of his control block 
and to keep the premium for himself: in other words, using example (b) to 
contravene the spirit of s. 91(1). 
As noted525, it is doubtful whether Ontario shareholders should bear 
the costs of an unfair or abusive transaction in order to provide the controller 
with a premium unavailable to others. In the actual market context, this 
example might also be used to secure absolute control within the family as a 
defensive measure against a potential takeover bid at the expense of the 
minority. Even though an underlying argument to example (b) is that a sale 
of control to employees or family members is a good thing526, it seems 
unclear whether the resulting effect might be as good for both the company 
and other shareholders. 
190. Example (d) deals with corporate reorganizations in which the 
control block is not sold, but rather is displaced from the original parent to 
one of the affiliate corporations once the reorganization is completed. This 
change in the holder of control is allowed where a bona fide corporate 
reorganization occurs. 
The example arises from the premise that effective control has not been 
disposed of at the expense of minority shareholders, and that control is still 
held within the corporate group, even though a premium has been paid. 
Example (d) is also subject to criticism, especially if it is compared to 
example (e). It is unclear why remaining shareholders should not be allowed 
to share the premium following a transfer of control, even though such 
control is still within the group. Although the reasons for the reorganization 
are based upon valid business purposes, there is no convincing explanation 
as to why the premium should not be shared, especially if the transfer results 
in an increase of the affiliate's holding in the parent company. 
191. Examples (c) and (e) are cases where the remaining shareholders 
are not really abused, or where they knowingly waive their right to an equal 
opportunity. Example (c) may be relied upon where minority shareholders 
525. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-103; it must however be noted that 
the original entrepreneur should be allowed to get a premium on the sale of his control 
block, bearing in mind that in these cases there is often no distinction between the life's 
enterprise and the company whose control block is owned by the entrepreneur. This would 
be an exemption to the equality of share principle. 
526. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-103. 
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agree, after full disclosure and a two thirds vote, to forego their right under 
s. 91(1). It seems obvious that the Commission cannot compel security 
holders to receive something which they do not want, even though it 
considers the transaction unfair or abusive to them. The OSC's duty in such 
a case is to make sure that no one will receive other advantages when voting 
in favour of waiving the follow-up offer. The exclusion of such votes could 
permit the Commission to fulfill such a duty. 
192. Example (e)527 is designed to provide the offeror with relief from 
s. 91(1) where minority shareholders are offered a share in the premium 
through specific corporate transactions. Although the premium paid is 
different in mode, an equivalent offer has been made to remaining share-
holders, which respects the principle underlying s. 91(1). The example is 
framed on the payment of a consideration at least equal to the greatest one 
paid in the agreement. Indeed, the offeror would have to establish that 
remaining shareholders would not be in a worse position than if they had 
been tendered a takeover bid528 and that the consideration offered is 
equivalent. 
Example (e) is designed to cover cases where the proposed transaction 
following the agreement would not technically qualify as an offer, but where 
equality of treatment is respected. As said above, there are some similarities 
between American cases and example (e). The only major difference is that 
example (e) will apply where a private agreement has been entered into prior 
to an amalgamation or liquidation, whereas in the U.S., the premium was 
paid through the amalgamation, merger or liquidation. 
193. Both examples (c) and (e) follow a different logic from that 
underlying examples (a), (b) and (d), in the sense that they are truly cases 
where it is not prejudicial to the public interest to grant an exemption from 
s. 91(1). In both cases, remaining shareholders are offered an equal opportu-
nity which they can either refuse or accept. Moreover, both examples would 
hardly fall within the first category of Policy 3-41. Indeed they follow the 
legislative objective which attempts to balance costs against benefits, but 
which also attempts to respect the equality of treatment among all share-
holders. 
194. The last example set forth in the guidelines is a case where the 
Commission feels that the offeror does not have to be put in a disadvan-
tageous position. In example (f), the purchaser is forced to acquire the 
control block at a price determined by neither party to the agreement, the 
price of which may be higher than the market price calculated under the Act. 
527. See supra, note 517. 
528. See Control Block Transactions, supra, note 90, p. IV-104. 
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The Commission appears to think that under such circumstances, even 
though the result might be viewed as unfair to the remaining shareholders, it 
might be inappropriate to compel the purchaser to make a follow-up offer. 
5. Conclusion 
195. One of the first conclusions concerns the OSC's involvement in 
so-called corporate matters. It is obvious that there is no real distinction in 
Canada between securities and corporate law. Such a separation is found in 
the U.S. and is explained by constitutional reasons. For a long time, it has 
been observed that state corporate law was inadequately protecting share-
holders. On the other hand, federal securities regulation has provided 
minority shareholders with new legal means, unavailable under state law. 
U.S. courts ruled that these means could not be used to challenge infringe-
ments upon common law, but were rather designed to enforce the federal 
legislation, which had superseded the old common law in many instances. 
These considerations do not exist in Canada. The OSC, through its 
decisions in respect of takeover bids and follow-up offers, as well as through 
some of its policy statements, has clearly showed that it had intended to 
compensate for the inadequacies of the common law vis-à-vis minority 
shareholders. 
196. This involvement follows the logic underlying securities legislation, 
which is primarily designed towards investor protection. Protection should 
be understood as maintaining a certain form of equality between majority 
and minority shareholders and should not be regarded as an objective 
beyond the scope of the duties assigned to the Commission. The protection 
of minority shareholders in the takeover bid context, or more precisely the 
equality of treatment among all shareholders in such situations, is simply 
one specific aspect of a more general task which the OSC has to perform. It 
is furthermore interesting to note that commentators, in articles dealing with 
shareholders' remedies in corporate law, have discussed the duty performed 
by the Commission and have concurred with its involvement in matters of 
minority protection. 
197. The involvement of the OSC in corporate matters should however 
be looked at from two different viewpoints. The first is a limiting one ; it 
should not be taken for granted that an increase in the Commission duties is 
the only manner to assure the credibility and the fairness of the Ontario 
marketplace. This means that the OSC does not have to intervene directly in 
every transaction whereby control is transferred. 
The second viewpoint is an extending one ; because it is doubtful 
whether controlling shareholders can self-regulate their behavior, the OSC is 
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often viewed by investors and by the public as the only organism which can 
effectively protect their interests. The forcefulness with which applicants 
sought exemptions from the follow-up offer might confirm this view. 
Moreover, recent takeover fights in Ontario have clearly demonstrated that 
wealthy participants in the marketplace have attempted by every means 
possible not to respect the spirit of the securities act, but rather to achieve 
their objectives whatever the costs. Moral requirements, even though 
successfully applied in England, will be inadequate in North America. 
198. The second conclusion deals more specifically with the existence 
of the follow-up offer. As was noted in the second chapter, to compel an 
offeror to make an equivalent offer to remaining shareholders where control 
is acquired from less than fifteen security holders is more a choice of policy 
and of philosophy of regulation than anything else. The objective of s. 91(1) 
is to prevent the sale of control at a premium where remaining shareholders 
are not offered the same opportunity. The underlying consideration of the 
takeover bid Part of the 1978 Act is the equality of treatment for all holders 
of the same class of securities. 
This legislative philosophy is not the only one possible; indeed, a 
different one was proposed by the majority of the Select Committee in 1973. 
The follow-up offer philosophy is neither right nor wrong; rather, it could be 
seen as suitable or less suitable. S. 91(1) should not be dropped because its 
application has proven to be difficult, or because Ontario is the only 
province where a follow-up is required; s. 91(1) should be deleted only if the 
philosophy of equality of treatment and fairness, which underlies Part XIX, 
is replaced by another one. 
199. It is submitted that the key problem is less the existence of the 
follow-up offer per se than the manner it has been applied and interpreted 
since the enactment of the 1978 Act. Actually, the OSC directly intervenes in 
the process of s. 91(1) : it may decide whether the consideration is sufficient, 
whether the market price was accurate, to prohibit the use of certain 
exemptions, etc. These discretionary powers, thought to provide the Com-
mission with the necessary flexibility, have transformed the principle of 
equality of treatment where control is sold into a highly judicial issue whose 
result is sometime unexpected. For instance, the release of policy guidelines 
which have narrowed the scope of application of the follow-up offer, and 
then the broad interpretation given to them by the OSC in its decisions have 
raised broad criticisms from participants in the marketplace. Put in a 
different way, is the principle underlying s. 91(1) applicable without such a 
strong involvement? 
200. This is the key problem. If s. 88(2)(c) is deleted, then, the rule is 
the same for everyone, there is no need for discretion, but there is no 
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flexibility at all. On the other hand, if the 1978 Act stays as it is now, there is 
flexibility, but also a strong judicial process to deal with. Even though the 
answer is again more a choice of policy than the solution of a strict legal 
question, a more discrete involvement from the Commission would be 
viewed as desirable. The credibility of the marketplace together with the 
protection of investors can be properly achieved without a continuous and 
direct intervention of the regulators. 
201. A last conclusion deals more specifically with the use of policies 
by the Commission. Policy 3-41 and its subsequent application showed that 
the Commission has gone too far, and that it has been caught for having 
considered policies as legal, binding requirements. It is not submitted that 
the OSC should not be given large discretionary powers ; but that the policy 
statements should no longer be viewed as carrying the same binding force as 
regulations or statutes. The non-compliance with policies ought not to be 
viewed as an "automatic" violation of the spirit of the Act, or as a behavior 
prejudicial to the public interest. If this is the Commission's intention, it 
should be given powers to make regulations and to enforce them. On the 
other hand, the release of policy guidelines ought not to be considered by 
practitioners as being more than indications of the manner in which the OSC 
is willing to exercise its discretion. 
